WORLD COMMUNITY INTERESTED IN SOONEST SETTLEMENT OF KARABAKH CONFLICT
news.az
Dec 29 2009
Azerbaijan
Sir Andrew Wood News.Az interviews Sir Andrew Wood, British political
scientist, former British Ambassador to Russia (1995 – 2000).
How would you comment on the shutdown of British Council’s office
throughout Russia? Do you view it as a continuation of recent cooling
in British-Russian relations?
You were right to say that at government to government level it has
been decidedly cool, including because of the murder in London of
a former Russian citizen, it appears by another Russian citizen who
has since become a Duma Deputy. The British Courts have also proved
unwilling to implement Russian requests for the extradition of other
persons, including a leading Chechen dissident, on the grounds, among
others, that they do not believe that the accused would receive a
fair trial in Moscow. These issues were not resolved to Moscow’s
satisfaction during Foreign Secretary Miliband’s visit to Moscow
earlier in 2009.
The back history of cool relations between the British and Russian
governments is quite a long one. Russian actions against the British
Council are part of that back history. The British Council, which is
whatever some Russians choose to suspect, a completely non governmental
organisation, built up its presence very considerably during the 1990s
and worked effectively with a wide range of Russian organisations,
both official and non-governmental, well into the first years of
President Putin’s time in the Kremlin. I am quite sure that there
are large numbers of Russian citizens who would welcome the return
of the British Council to its work, and the acceptance on the part of
the Russian authorities of what it can contribute to the intellectual
enrichment of both countries as legitimate and valuable.
The wider point here of course is that the relationship between the UK
and Russia goes beyond the relationship between governments – none of
which, after all, last for ever. Many thousands of Russian citizens
have chosen to live in the UK, to educate their children there,
and to trust British authorities to deal fairly with their financial
interests. British business, for its part, is heavily involved with
the Russia market. Whatever our political differences, in short,
the Russian and British peoples generally get on well together.
There are numerous factors that deteriorate Russia’s relations with
the West. Do you consider the soonest "reloading" of ties possible
and what do the sides need to do to improve these relations?
You asked about wider Russian relations with the West. It would take
a long time to analyse these in detail. One of the factors underlying
what you rightly describe as their worsening has been the development
within Russia of a Great Power mentality, and Moscow’s claim to a
special role within the former Soviet space. Moscow points to NATO
enlargement as a major issue. One can see why this is sensitive for
Russia from an emotional point of view. But NATO is not configured
for military action in the way it was as late as the eighties,
and cannot rationally be seen as a military threat to Russia. One
is left with the impression that it is the wish of formerly Soviet
countries like Ukraine or Georgia to get closer to and eventually to
join the Alliance that Moscow finds objectionable,or even impossible to
understand. Moscow declares that it accepts that such sovereign states
have the right to join whatever alliance they may wish, but Russia
is nonetheless angry when they try. Russian pressure on such states
of course encourages them to look elsewhere for a counter balance.
This account is inevitably a simplification. There is existing
potential for benign evolution in the relationships between Russia
and its fellow former Soviet states, Russian military reform will if
implemented have its effect, and above all, the fact of interdependence
between Russia and the West, as well as the interdependence of all the
countries of the trans Atlantic area, will continue if we are wise
to argue the point that we are better off together than apart. The
‘reset’ button pressed by the United States, and offered by the new
NATO Secretary-General, cannot resolve all the issues that trouble
Russia’s relations with the West, but they have had an effect on
the atmosphere. There has been interest in the West in seeing if
anything concrete can be made of the proposals for a new security
architecture put forward by President Medvedev. The countries of
the West have consistently supported Russian entry into the WTO,
on the understanding that Russia would implement its provisions once
in the organization. Russian and EU markets are tied together. The
interlocking web of our interests and obligations, in brief, ties
us together – and means too that this web cannot be sustained just
by Russia and Western groupings like the EU of NATO, for it also
includes other independent and often ex-Soviet actors as well.
The former USSR countries are linked with common economic and
democratic problems associated with the burden of the transitive
period. How much time will be spent for Azerbaijan to be able to
become a full member of the European family?
All I can do is to suggest some elements for an answer. The countries
of the former Soviet space differ from each other, and so do the
countries of the rest of the European family. All of them are in some
sort of process of evolution.
No country is perfect in its commitment to fully fledged democracy.
Sir Andrew WoodBut as there are constituent elements of the EU and
NATO groupings perhaps we can take these as some sort of yardstick
for what we might mean by the European family. Such elements would
be the separation of powers, all subject to the judgment of an
independent judiciary; equality of all, including the most powerful,
citizens before the law; freedom of the press and freedom of speech;
freedom of assembly; independently adjudicated property relations;
and freedom of religion. This complex system has to be protected by
freely and transparently elected governments ready to pass on to
their successors the responsibility for government, secure in the
knowledge that those successors will act properly to those whom they
have replaced. And none of this can work without the consent and
understanding support of the body of citizens as a whole.
The trouble with all these elements is that they can be replaced by
dangerous imitations. Elections can be managed. The rule of law can be
maintained in appearance while violated in practice. Freedoms can be
abused. The best safeguards against these cancers are the commitment
of the citizenry and the independence of the three main branches of
government: the executive; the legislature; and the judiciary.
No country is perfect in its commitment to fully fledged democracy.
The more dependent the country is on the authority of a particular
personality, the less well prepared it will be for the future – and
one does not have to be far sighted to note that many countries in
the ex-Soviet space have in built succession problems. The conduct and
outcome of the elections in Ukraine will show how ready that country
will be to continue down the path of long term institution building.
It is at present, or so it seems to me, encouragingly well set on
constructing an effective democratic future. If that continues, it
will be important to the rest of the countries of the former Soviet
Union. But in the end it will be the internal dynamics of the ex-Soviet
countries which will determine events, and only a fool would be ready
to set a timetable for their success in approaching a general European
norm. Azerbaijan has a lot going for itself in principle, and the hopes
of most of its OSCE partners, for it to use in its further development.
Due to the relative passiveness of the West, Russia is almost the only
influential mediator in the Karabakh settlement. Do you think it may
settle this conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia alone or there is
a need for Europe’s and US participation in the peacekeeping process?
Of course the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is a major obstacle. You asked if
Russia could act with effect as the sole effective intermediary in the
face of what you saw as the relative passivity of the West, or whether
the latter should make more effort. I would not claim to be an expert
in this area, though I have visited the graves of the dead in Baku, and
learned enough of what passed to have a feel for the pain in Azerbaijan
behind this question. My understanding of the pain in Armenia is less
direct, but it is there nonetheless. So I hope that you will forgive
me if I say that it is up to the two governments principally involved
to look for a settlement, and to take responsibility for it, and that
if Baku and Erevan cannot do this, then there will be no settlement
until they do. Intermediaries can help once that condition is there –
but until it is, their presence and efforts all too often give cover
for the parties in dispute to take maximalist positions which may play
well at home but prolong the underlying conflict. There are plenty of
examples of conflicts lasting for decades despite the earnest efforts
of well meaning outsiders to resolve them.
What do you think are the prospects of the soonest resolution of the
Karabakh conflict? Do you share the view that it can be attained
quicker than the resolution of other conflicts in the post-Soviet
area including in Georgia and Moldova?
I am not close enough to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to begin to guess
whether it may be resolved before the questions of restoring the
territorial integrity of Moldova or Georgia. But there have been some
changes in the context, not all of them welcome to Baku – or Erevan
for that matter – which could at least affect the outcome. If Moscow
can encourage that process, that would surely be welcome. I do not
think it aims to do that alone, and the wider context includes others
too. An equitable and lasting settlement would be in the interests
of the international community as a whole. And the sooner the better,
including for both Baku and Erevan.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
