IRAN’S EXPANSION IN SOUTH CAUCASUS. IN THE FORM OF ABKHAZIA, ANKARA AND TEHRAN ACQUIRE LEVER FOR MANIPULATIONS
By Yuri Simonyan
Nezavisimaya Gazeta website
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Dec 24 2009
Russia
The Abkhazian coastline awaits investors. Photo by Grigoriy Tambulov
(NG-Photo)
Next year might become the year of the political and economic expansion
of Iran in the South Caucasus. Abkhazian President Sergey Bagapsh
said Wednesday [ 23 December] that Tehran was ready to take part in
the economic processes in the republic. Armenia too confirmed a few
days ago that it would implement the large-scale bilateral energy
and transport projects worth the total of $3 billion. And Azerbaijan
invited Iran to mediate in the Karabakh problem regulation.
Discussing the global political situation with respect to recognition
of his republic’s recognition, Abkhazian President Sergey Bagapsh
told journalists that Sukhumi works closely on this matter with the
Near Eastern and Caribbean countries. "WE have close contacts with
representatives of Iran who visited Abkhazia. There were also meetings
with Moscow. Iran is ready to take part in the economic processes
in Abkhazia," the Abkhazian leader said, although he stressed that
"talking about the possibility of recognition of Abkhazia by Iran is
premature yet."
At this stage, Sokhumi finds this situation quite suitable. In
effect, Tehran uses the formula for Turkish-Abkhazian cooperation:
The economy without recognition. For Abkhazia, destitute after many
years of blockade, the importance of the economic ties with major
regional players like Turkey and Iran is colossal. Besides the need
for simple trade, Abkhazia now has hopes for major investment. And
in all sectors at that. The political component of the new situation,
which Sokhumi is trying not to ‘reminisce’ aloud for obvious reasons,
is also important. If Ankara and Tehran really go for major investment
projects, there will be fewer worries locally that the tiny republic in
the Black Sea region will be "assimilated" by its powerful main patron.
For their part, both Turkey and Iran have acquired a lever for
political manipulations in the form of Abkhazia. Both in the region
and in the international arena at large – in particular in developing
or adjusting relations with Russia, which sponsors Abkhazia, and with
the United States, which sponsors Georgia. It can also be used in
relations with Georgia itself, which still occupies the key position in
the South Caucasus, and with Azerbaijan, which experiences territorial
problems of the same type as Georgia has. And with Armenia too, which,
let us put it this way, maintains Azerbaijani problems.
As was noted, Iran’s possible interests in Abkhazia remain unknown.
They can be very wide, considering Tehran’s ambitions of regional
leadership. Iran backed its desire to play in the South Caucasus
the role of the first fiddle with the publication of its investment
plans for Armenia and Georgia one and a half years ago. In total, they
were worth $4 billion. But if Yerevan received concrete proposals to
build the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline and power relay lines for electric
energy export, to build an oil pipeline and a refinery, and to connect
the railroad networks, Tbilisi, in view of its special partnership
relations with the United States, received via the Georgian ambassador
in Iran a message: We will give you $1 billion, figure out what do
you want to spend it on.
Georgia did not have to think long and hard: Even when Georgia
remained without natural gas because of the latest breakdown on the gas
pipeline, and Iran was ready to set up temporary supply via the gas
pipeline which was built in the Soviet era, the Georgian leadership
encountered categorical "disapproval" of its sponsor from across the
ocean, which urged Georgia to never get oblivious of its partnership
commitments, which in case of Iran was to be manifested in boycotting
of the Tehran regime.
Washington’s attitude is negative towards the cooperation between
Armenia and Iran too, but there is greater understanding in that case:
Armenia is almost under blockade, and it has no choice. Joint plans
of Tehran and Yerevan were impressive. However, for now they have not
gone beyond the gas pipeline and the power relay line. And the process
of normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations, which recently
broke the deadlock and which, among other things, envisages opening of
the borders and restoration of the railroad service, has brought into
question the plans of construction of the expensive Armenian-Iranian
railroad, which is doubly problematic during the global crisis. And
when it seemed that it made sense to forget about that project for a
while, Armenian Transport and Communications Minister Gurgen Sarkisyan
said at a news conference in Yerevan last Tuesday [ 22 December] that
the Asian Development Bank provided $1 million for the feasibility
study for the project of construction of the Iran-Armenia railroad.
Tender will be announced next year to choose the consulting company,
and the results will be known in April "In 2010, we will approach the
phase of actual construction of the railroad. There is agreement with
Tehran on financial assistance, and negotiations are under way with
the Asian Bank on borrowing money for implementation," the minister
said. The cost of the project is $1.5 billion.
On the same day, Armenian Energy and Natural Resources Minister Armen
Movsesyan confirmed at his press conference Yerevan’s and Tehran’s
plans to complete the energy sector projects whose implementation was
slowed down, among other things, "by the domestic political situation
in Iran." He stressed that an oil refinery is to be built and an oil
pipeline for the refinery from the Iranian city of Tabriz to the
Armenian town of Yeraskh, where the refinery is to work. The work
will start next year, Movsesyan is certain.
Introducing the economic vector in the South Caucasus and, as a
consequence, acquiring a political lever, Tehran received a direct
invitation to take part in political processes too by the end of the
year. Unwilling to remain sidelined in the process of the "Iranian
expansion," Baku voiced its desire to see Iran as a mediator in the
Karabakh resolution process. On Monday [ 21 December], after his
meeting with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, Iranian
Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki said that he was ready to assume
the mission.
It is possible that, by extending that invitation, Baku bluffed for
Ankara: Azerbaijan deems treason the signing by Turkey of protocols
on normalization of relations with Armenia before the Karabakh
problem is resolved, and it seems that Azerbaijan does not quite
trust Ankara’s reassurances of brotherly attitudes any more. It is
impossible to get involved in the complex process of regulation of
the Karabakh problem in such a simple manner. At least the parties
to the conflict, and probably, other mediators, including the United
States which is unlikely to deal with Iran, must agree. But who said
that a parallel process cannot be conducted? With Armenia’s approval
of Tehran’s mediation, which, incidentally, is not manifested in any
manner, Iran’s dreams about regional leadership will come as close
to coming true as never before.