news.az, Azerbaijan
Jan 7 2010

Turkey to try persuade Moscow to exert pressure on Armenia in Karabakh issue
Thu 07 January 2010 | 12:13 GMT Text size:

Tabib Huseynov News.Az interviews Tabib Huseynov, analyst of the
International Crisis Group.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to visit
Russia during which the Karabakh conflict is said to be one of the
central issues. What should we expect from this visit?

We should view this visit as a link in the overall chain of the
settlement process. Certainly, this single visit will not change
anything, but if we view it in the context of the whole process, this
visit is very important as Turkey will try to persuade Russia to
influence Armenia. If Armenia agrees to a compromise in the Karabakh
settlement, which would result in a framework agreement on basic
principles of the settlement, the ratification of the Turkish-Armenian
protocols will be possible. Turkey understands that without a progress
in Karabakh it won’t be able to open borders with Armenia as
Azerbaijan is against it. Therefore, Ankara wants Russia to influence
Armenia. In this sense, certainly, Erdogan’s visit is important for
Turkey.

How do you assess Erdogan’s chances to persuade Russia to put pressure
on Armenia?

In fact, the chances are not bad. If we view the dynamics of
development of relations between Turkey and Russia, it is very
positive. Turkey and Russia today are very big trade partners, they
have strategic partnership in a wide specter of issues, for example,
on preservation of the status quo in the Black Sea basin, which means
that these countries are for their own hegemony in the region. This
issue is of great importance for Russia and Turkey. Moreover, Turkey
has recently agreed for Russia’s use of the Turkish coast to lay the
South Stream gas pipeline which is also important for the relations
between these two countries. It should be noted that Russia is
interested in the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border also because
it will cut Armenia’s dependence on the Georgian transit and, thus,
the role of Georgia as a transit country in the region and for Armenia
will be reduced. Therefore, considering Moscow’s interest in the
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, it can be suggested that it will try
to attain any progress in the Karabakh issue. We have seen that
throughout 2009 Russia has been the most active mediator in the
Karabakh conflict settlement. It is possible to agree on a framework
agreement on the basic principles if the dynamism of the last year’s
Armenia-Azerbaijan talks as well as the international interest to the
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement remain.

As Armenia is the closest ally of Russia in this region and
considering this it is clear that Moscow will not change its position
in the Karabakh settlement, does Turkey have something to offer to
Russia in exchange for its benevolence in the Karabakh conflict
settlement?

Well, then it would be more reasonable to ask what Azerbaijan can
offer to Russia¦ I think, certainly, Armenia will remain the closest
ally of Russia in the Caucasus. Even if Azerbaijan tries, it will not
be able to take Armenia’s place for Russia. But the situation around
the Karabakh conflict today is somewhat unique because all external
powers, including Russia, are interested in changing the status quo in
the region not radically but gradually and in a predictable and
controllable manner. There is a certain consensus among the OSCE Minsk
Group co-chair countries that the status quo of the Karabakh process
is not sustainable. After the Russian-Georgian war Russia is also
interested in changing the status quo in the region, as it understands
that the remaining problems may detonate and lead to undesirable
implications for itself as well as for Europe and the US. They came to
an opinion that the status quo should be changed gradually and in a
predictable manner so that this change does not destabilize the
situation and preserves all stakeholders’ interests. The framework
agreement on the basic principles that is now being discussed by the
presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in fact does not contradict to
the basic interests of Russia as the Russian influence in the region
will not decline in case the conflict settlement fixed in these basic
principles is initiated. This means that Russia will preserve its
levers of influence both on Armenia and on Azerbaijan as the
determination of Karabakh’s status will be left to an indefinite
future term.

By the way, despite your opinion that Russia is interested in
normalization of these relations, there is another opinion that the
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will further extrude Russia from the
South Caucasus. What can you say about this opinion?

I think it is possible but in a remote perspective. This will not be
the case in the short- to middle-term perspective. Even if the border
between Turkey and Armenia opens, it will not mean that all the
problems between the two countries will be settled at once. There will
be a long process of reconciliation. The historical commission will
consider topics that are painful both for Turks and Armenians. The
Armenian insecurities about Turks will not pass quickly among
Armenians. Besides, one should recall that the Russian troops are
still present in Armenia and for the foreseeable future they will be
remain to protect Armenia’s borders. Moreover, Russia will retain the
economic leverages on Armenia. Thus, the Turkish-Armenian border poses
no clear threat to Russia. On the contrary, it will provide wider
opportunities to Russia for raising its political presence in the
region, reducing Armenia’s dependence on the Georgian transit and
getting more opportunities to put pressure on Georgia, including,
perhaps, in the Javakheti issue. For example, today Moscow and Yerevan
are not interested in stirring up trouble in Georgia’s Javakheti
region as Armenia depends strongly on the Georgian transit. But if
Armenia has an alternative access to the world, Moscow and Yerevan may
feel more convenient raising up the issue of Javakheti. Overall, we
should take into account that Russia’s policy in the region is
many-sided, and Turkey’s growing role in the region does not
necessarily lead to reducing the Russian role.

Leyla Tagiyeva
News.Az