WHY EASTERN EUROPE’S FUTURE WAS NOT ORANGE
By Steven Eke
BBC NEWS
urope/8452559.stm
2010/01/11 16:59:43 GMT
The colour orange was the most memorable symbol of the Orange
Revolution, the chain of events that led to regime change in Ukraine
at the end of 2004. That colour put Ukraine on the map for millions
of people across the world.
In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, there were many in the
West and the countries of the former Soviet Union who predicted
a domino-type wave of revolutions, that would bring democracy and
liberalisation and reverse the authoritarianism that was widespread
and consolidated in the region.
Amusing lists began to appear on the internet: Russia would have a
"vodka revolution"; Belarus, a "potato revolution"; Kazakhstan, an
"oil revolution", etc.
National stereotypes aside, many suggested that Alexander Lukashenko,
the strongman leader of Belarus (who has now been in power for 16
years) could not hold out much longer.
Others thought that Armenia and Azerbaijan would follow the pattern
set by Georgia’s Rose Revolution, and throw off rulers whose political
legitimacy had hardly been established by free and fair elections.
Predictions that the particularly repressive regime in Uzbekistan
would end abounded.
These predictions were wrong.
They were based on the idea that democratisation was an inevitability;
they took little account of the fragility of the newest democracies.
More seriously, they ignored Russia’s determination to restore
its influence in the "near abroad" using, among other factors,
a pre-emptive approach to stop pro-Western leaders taking power.
Little regime change
In retrospect, in much of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution actually helped strengthen already entrenched authoritarian
regimes.
It was also reflected in what human rights groups say were
crackdowns on media freedom, and particularly unofficial youth and
non-governmental groups.
" In Belarus, nearly four years later, the opposition is fractured;
the president’s popularity, if polls are to be trusted, remains high.
There was no regime change, let alone revolution "
Even in Georgia, whose Rose Revolution started the upheavals,
incumbent governments have moved hard to silence critical voices in
the electronic media.
The Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan was the first domino to fall
after Ukraine.
Three factors sparked off what became known as the "Tulip Revolution":
allegedly fraudulent elections; resentment at a president (and
ruling family) widely considered corrupt; and grinding poverty and
unemployment among the young.
Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, there was no organised opposition movement,
no figurehead, and the unrest quickly became chaotic and at times,
very violent.
President Askar Akayev fled the country, and regime change took place.
But these events are now most often seen as violent demonstrations
against poverty. The country remains prone to serious political
instability.
Belarus also witnessed post-Orange Revolution attempts to appropriate
colours as political symbols.
In September 2005, during an unauthorised demonstration by opposition
and unofficial youth groups (marking the disappearance of a popular
opposition leader back in 1999), militia snatched white-red-white
national flags from participants as their display was illegal.
One of the demonstrators ripped off his blue denim shirt and, holding
it aloft, proclaimed that was to be the symbol of protest.
The demonstrations that followed the March 2006 presidential election
in Belarus were quickly branded "the jeans revolution" by foreign
media.
While initially large, they, like blue jeans, faded and were quickly
cleared by the authorities.
Nearly four years later, the opposition in that particular country
is fractured; the president’s popularity, if polls are to be trusted,
remains high. There was no regime change, let alone revolution.
Failed opportunities?
But what about Russia?
One Ukrainian commentator memorably referred to the Orange Revolution
as "Moscow’s 9/11".
Yet the same people who were involved with Russia’s policy in Ukraine
at that time – in particular Gleb Pavlovskiy, the spin doctor once
banned from Ukraine on national security grounds – are now still
close to the government, even key shapers of the media scene.
Their approach differs now, though.
There will be no repetition of Russia’s visible, partisan involvement
in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.
Indeed, Mr Pavlovskiy has since concluded that Russia must pursue its
aims through the media, institutions, social networks and societies –
not by siding blatantly with its favoured candidates in other states’
elections.
And how does the West look in all this? Is there actually a failure
by the West, first and foremost the EU, to seize the opportunities
presented by the Orange Revolution? After all, Poland pushed hard for
the EU to provide Ukraine with some sort of viable roadmap towards
membership.
Yet the EU now appears to have finally discounted whatever membership
aspirations Ukrainians (and, for that matter, Georgians or Moldovans)
felt at the end of 2004.
Plans to sign a new Association Agreement have been repeatedly delayed,
and Ukraine is now grouped together with countries like Belarus and
Armenia, as part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, whose goals are,
in the main, modest.
Nonetheless, the EU highlights co-operation in business and trade,
which have grown remarkably. The EU is Ukraine’s largest trading
partner, and is by far the largest investor in Ukraine.
And, for many people in the West, Ukraine is a much closer, and
more accessible country, owing to factors like visa-free travel,
Eurovision and, of course in the future, Euro 2012.