TURKEY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SURVEY

Lragir.am

12/01/10

Ahead of the UN Human Rights Council May 2010 Universal Periodic
Review of Turkey, Forum 18 News Service has found that the country
continues to see serious violations of international human rights
standards on freedom of religion or belief. A long-standing crucially
important issue, with many implications, is that Turkey has not legally
recognised religious communities in their own right as independent
communities with full legal status – such as the right to own places of
worship and the legal protection religious communities normally have in
states under the rule of law. Additionally, the most dangerous threat
to individuals exercising freedom of religion or belief has been a
series of violent attacks and murders on those perceived as threats;
in recent years the victims have been Christians. Turkish citizens
have argued to Forum 18 that the protection of the right of all to
freedom of religion or belief, as laid down in the international human
rights standards which Turkey is party to, should be the standard
used by the authorities in all affected fields. They also argue that
the authorities act against the intolerance fuelling violent attacks
and murders.

Ahead of the UN Human Rights Council May 2010 Universal Periodic Review
of Turkey, Forum 18 News Service has found that the country continues
to see serious violations of international human rights standards on
freedom of religion or belief. The single most important and the most
long-standing issue is the fact that – despite undertaking to do so in
the 1923 Lausanne Treaty – Turkey has not legally recognised non-Muslim
religious communities in their own right as independent communities
with full legal status – such as the right to own places of worship
and the legal protection religious communities normally have in states
under the rule of law. This problem faces all religious communities
in Turkey, including those which were not present in 1923. Even the
majority Sunni Islamic community is not recognised in this way, instead
being under the control of the Diyanet, or Presidency of Religious
Affairs, which reports directly to the Prime Minister. Additionally,
the most dangerous threat to individuals exercising freedom of religion
or belief has been a series of violent attacks and murders on those
perceived as threats. In recent years the victims have been Christians.

Turkey straddles Europe and Asia and has a population of over 72
million, about three-quarters of them ethnic Turks. The next largest
ethnic group are the Kurds, with smaller numbers of ethnic Arabs,
Circassians, Armenians, Laz, Georgians, Greeks, Jews and others. An
estimated 99 per cent of the population are of a Muslim background,
mainly Sunnis, with 20 to 30 per cent of the population being Alevis,
and very small numbers of Shias. The largest non-Muslim religious
community are Christians, with the Armenian Apostolic being the
largest church followed by Syrian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Catholics
of various rites and Protestants. Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses
are present in smaller numbers – in the case of Baha’is around 10,000.

Political background The ‘deep state’ – military, security, bureaucracy
and elite representatives – have been unhappy with the rise of the
ruling AKP party. The deep state remains wedded to Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk’s ‘secularism’ as they understand it. This entails overt
state control of Islam through the Diyanet, which reports directly
to the Prime Minister, and enshrines serious restrictions on the
ability of non-Muslims and Muslims outside state control to exercise
freedom of religion or belief. It is difficult to reconcile with the
Constitution’s statement that the Republic is a secular state, as this
‘secularism’ gives state-run Sunni Islam rights which no other group
enjoys. It also imposes controls on state-run Sunni Islam imposed on no
other group, such as on the content of sermons. The Diyanet is funded
with tax collected from all citizens, regardless of their religion or
belief, and supports tax exemptions for the only mosques permitted
(those controlled by the Diyanet) and employs and pays the salaries
of their imams. No other faith, or indeed non-state-controlled Muslim
group, is permitted to train its clergy in Turkey.

Among the other problems flowing from the state definition of
‘secularism’ are continuing and long-standing problems caused by the
ban on religious communities’ themselves owning property. Communities
as diverse as Alevi Muslims, Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Protestants,
and the Syrian Orthodox Church have seen no significant progress
in resolving property problems. Examples include no progress
on recognising Alevi Muslim cem houses as places of worship and
continuing vexatious legal cases aimed at depriving the Mor Gabriel
Syrian Orthodox Monastery in south-eastern Turkey of its land.

As non-Muslim communities are under threat of violent attacks, the
Interior Ministry issued a circular in June 2007 asking law enforcement
forces to protect non-Muslim places of worship, and be watchful
for plans to attack them. A number of plans to mount attacks were
subsequently uncovered and prevented, for instance a plot to kill the
pastor of a church in Antalya. However, this step, although welcome,
addresses only the symptoms of intolerance, not the root causes.

Official protection for religious leaders, such as the Ecumenical
Patriarch, is widely seen by these communities as being designed as
much to control as to protect them. Suspicion of the authorities’
intentions remains. Alevi Muslims broke off formal talks with the
government over denial of their rights, expressing frustration at the
lack of concrete progress in enabling them to exercise their religious
freedom. Informal workshops involving representatives of the Alevis,
the Diyanet and others continue. An August 2009 lunch meeting between
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and religious leaders, including
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, was followed by a visit to two
Greek Orthodox sites. But no concrete improvements ensued in their
ability to exercise freedom of religion or belief.

The rule of law The Mor Gabriel cases – which started after
state officials unilaterally redrew land boundaries – highlight
problems around the rule of law and how society does or does not
understand this, which has a serious impact on freedom of religion
or belief. Another trial drifting on with no sign of a verdict is of
two Turkish Protestants, Hakan Tastan and Turan Topal. They are on
trial for ‘insulting Turkishness’ and defamation of Islam, following
their involvement in a Bible correspondence course in October 2006. The
trial in Malatya of the five men accused of murdering three Protestant
Christians in 2007 has drifted on since its start in November 2007. In
2009 police have avoided bringing witnesses to court on various
occasions, and no verdict appears imminent. Hopes that impunity for
those who attack Christians would be over remain disappointed.

Two recent victories in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – by
the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2008 and a Greek Orthodox Foundation in
2009 – have still not led to the recovery of confiscated property. The
ECHR appears to be the only realistic hope of implementing in law some
very important aspects of the right to exercise freedom of religion
or belief – provided its judgments are implemented.

Violent attacks and murders The Armenian, Greek and Alevi communities
have in the past been subject to mass pogroms and violent attacks that
have resulted in migration of these communities inside and outside of
Turkey. There have also been in the past murders of individuals for
their beliefs, such as of the atheist and former imam Turan Dursan in
1990. However, a recent series of murders has drawn attention to the
continuing need to address the problem of the murderous intolerance of
sections of Turkish society. These murders were of: Fr Andrea Santoro,
a Catholic priest in 2006; the Armenian Turkish journalist Hrant
Dink in 2007; and of two ethnic Turkish Protestants, Necati Aydin
and Ugur Yuksel, and a German, Tilmann Geske in Malatya in 2007. In
July 2009 a Catholic German businessman engaged to an ethnic Turk,
Gregor Kerkeling, was murdered by a mentally disturbed young man for
being a Christian.

In August 2009 Turkish Protestant Ismail Aydin, who works for an
association spreading knowledge about Christianity, was taken hostage
at knifepoint. The young man responsible claimed that ‘this missionary
dog is trying to divide the country’ and wrapped a Turkish flag around
Aydin’s head. He was seen on TV reports telling his captor that ‘this
flag is mine as well! I’m a Turk too, but I’m a Christian.’ His captor
responded that ‘you have betrayed the Turkish flag and country’. The
police rescued Aydin and the attacker is being prosecuted. But the
incident highlighted again the dangerous unwillingness of many within
Turkey to accept that there are many ways to be a Turk.

What fuels violent attacks and murders?

Factors which encourage violence include; disinformation by public
figures and the mass media; the rise of Turkish nationalism; and the
marginalisation of smaller groups within society. All three trends
feed off each other, and all of Turkey’s smaller religious or belief
communities – those within Islam and Christianity, as well as Baha’is,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, atheists and agnostics – are affected by them.

There has been disinformation and defamation against Christians, in
particular against Protestants who share their beliefs with others
in public discourse as well as in the media.

A day after the Malatya murders, Niyazi Guney, a senior Justice
Ministry official, told Turkish parliamentarians that ‘missionary
work is even more dangerous than terrorism and unfortunately is not
considered a crime in Turkey’. He repeated this in Milliyet newspaper.

Terrorism and missionary activity are thus presented as connected.

Almost any manifestation of Christian belief – including meetings
in churches – is seen by those who hold these views as ‘missionary
activity’.

Missionary activity has been on the agenda of the National Security
Council (MGK), which is chaired ex officio by the President and also
comprises the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of all the
branches of the Turkish Armed Forces and several government ministers.

In a February 2005 evaluation of current and future challenges to
Turkish security, the MGK drew attention to ‘a need for social
activities that will prevent the spreading of organisations and
ideologies that will have an impact on Turkey’s unity’. It suggested
that ‘abusive missionary activities should not be permitted’. What
exactly was meant by ‘abusive missionary activity’ was not defined.

The Turkish phrase used for missionary activity in official discussions
and formal papers, as well as by the xenophobic and nationalist parts
of society, has extremely negative connotations.

‘Misyonerlik faaliyetleri’ can be translated into English as missionary
activities, which does not convey either a positive or a negative
evaluation of the activities. But ‘misyonerlik faaliyetleri’ has
in Turkish the connotations of missionary scheming, plotting and
intrigues. Both words have negative connotations in Turkish, and used
together as one phrase convey a double negative connotation.

‘Missionary’ conferences propagating such views continue to be held by
the Diyanet in provinces and townships using state facilities. Similar
activities are also conducted by the military and the Gendarmerie
(Jandarma) to ‘enlighten’ their personnel – including conscripts –
about what they see as ‘missionary activities’.

Associated with this is intolerance promoted within the school
curriculum (see below).

The intolerance in society towards non-Muslims also extends to
atheists, who cannot openly identify or organise themselves in Turkey.

Ergenekon and the ‘deep state’ The trial which began in 2007
of influential people – from the police, army, bureaucracy,
business, politics and the mass media – alleged to be part of an
ultra-nationalist group, Ergenekon, has revealed strong and widespread
opposition among them to freedom of religion or belief.

Ergenekon members are alleged to have maintained deathlists of people,
including Christians with a missionary background. The Malatya murder
trial is revealing plausible links between the ‘deep state’ and the
murders, Turkish media noting that a link between the murders and
the Gendarmerie seems obvious. The Gendarmerie, it seems, knew in
advance of the murders and did not take steps to prevent them. Also
according to the media, Fr Andrea Santoro and his church were under
surveillance by the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) secret
police on the very day of his murder.

The media has featured documents discovered in the Ergenekon
investigation proving that the Gendarmerie actively monitored
missionary activities in the Malatya region through informers, before
and after the Malatya murders. It should be noted that the activities
being monitored were lawful acts of teaching and promoting one’s
beliefs. Unlawful disinformation or defamatory practices limiting
lawful enjoyment of human rights do not appear to have been monitored
or acted against.

Media intolerance Protestant Turks have noted a significant decline in
numbers of violent attacks directed at their churches and religious
leaders in 2009. This is possibly due to a decline since 2007 in
defamatory mainstream media coverage of them. For example, a widely
viewed national TV channel, ATV, has stopped broadcasting reports of
‘illegal’ churches, or Turks converting to Christianity.

However, intolerant reporting and commentary continues in local and
ultra-nationalist newspapers, as well as on websites and blogs. One
local news website, Ilgazetesi, featured an article on 17 June 2009,
entitled ‘Local Missionaries’, stating that ‘The primary goal of
missionary activity is to break the resistance of the people to
imperialism and abuse! Making them Jewish or Christian is the second
goal.’ The continuing intolerant mind-set of many is fuelled by such
irresponsible media reports, and makes members of vulnerable groups
fear that violence against them could escalate again.

No legal status as religious communities Full legal recognition of all
religious communities would be a major step forward in both achieving
freedom of religion or belief as understood in the human rights
standards Turkey has ratified, as well as addressing the prejudice
that non-Muslim religious communities are ‘foreign’ and not genuinely
Turkish. At present, religious communities which existed in the Ottoman
Empire operate legally under an archaic system of imperial decrees and
regulations that deny them full legal status as religious communities
and restrict their freedom to function. Communities which did not
have a recognised existence before the Turkish Republic was founded
in 1923 have little hope of gaining any kind of recognised status
in law. Articles 37-45 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, on ‘Protection
of Minorities’, should have led to the recognition of then-existing
non-Muslim religious communities in their own right, as independent
communities with full legal status – such as the right to own places
of worship. But this has not happened, not least as the Treaty left
it unclear what such recognition might mean.

Bizarrely, the government ministry which handles relations with many
of Turkey’s indigenous non-Muslim religious communities which existed
before the Lausanne Treaty is the Foreign Ministry.

The situation of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey is extremely complex
under the present legal framework. The official view of the state is
that different regulations apply to the various non-Muslim religious
communities. Firstly in the state’s view, there are the groups that
count as non-Muslim minorities within the meaning of the Lausanne
Treaty. In the view of the state, these are exclusively the Armenians,
Bulgarians, Greeks and Jews. A second group are the non-Muslim
minorities who were present in Turkey in 1923 at the time of the
Lausanne Treaty but were not recognised by the state as minorities
within the meaning of the Treaty. These are, for example, the Syrian
Orthodox Church, churches such as the Chaldean Church and the Syrian
Catholic Church, and the Roman Catholic Church.

However, it is very important to note that the communities in both
these groups actually exist today and have been recognised by the
state as existing – but they have not been legally recognized and
have no legal personality (Tuzelkisilik).

Besides the non-Muslim minorities are a number of so-called community
foundations that are attributed by the state to, but not necessarily
controlled by, certain non-Muslim minorities (such as Armenians,
Greeks, Syriac Orthodox, Jews and others) which have gained legal
personality (Tuzelkisilik). It is also important to note that, legally,
there is no link at all between these community foundations and the
non-Muslim minorities the state attributes them to.

Neither the Roman Catholic Church nor those Protestant churches that
existed in Turkey before 1923 have any community foundations that
could be attributed to them.

None of these non-Muslim minorities – whichever category the state
sees them as belonging to – have as religious communities the kind of
rights to religious freedom that Article 9 of the European Convention
on Human Rights envisages. In practice, all these communities are on
a very similar legal footing to newer communities such as Baha’is
and Jehovah’s Witnesses, which did not exist in Turkey in 1923,
and which today have no legal status as communities.

The 2004 Associations Law was welcomed by some newer communities,
such as Protestant and Jehovah’s Witnesses, as it allowed people
within these communities – but not the communities themselves – to
form a legal entity that would allow them to engage in some activities
legally. However, the ‘Association formula’ is still rather new and
some communities are reluctant to use it. A major reason is that,
being small communities, they cannot fulfil the necessary requirements
to establish an association. State officials seem to pay more attention
than is usual to associations established in connection with religious
communities.

There are also serious questions of possible inadequacies in the
‘Association formula’. One problem is that if those who run the
foundation and those who lead the community are not the same people,
there is a possibility that they may disagree with each other – which
may leave the community again without the possibility of legally
carrying out activities. The ‘Association formula’ proposed by the
government to ‘solve’ the legal personality problem does not provide a
satisfactory solution. Whether it will work effectively as a ‘limited’
solution remains to be seen. This will depend on both whether the
formula is in practice found to be simple and flexible enough for
the needs of small communities, and whether audits and decisions by
state officials take account of this. These developments will need
to be closely monitored.

Even for long-established communities with the limited recognition
which has been conferred – without rights to for example own places
of worship – the attitudes of the Turkish state can be hostile and
even threatening. This has been seen in the case of the Armenian
Apostolic Patriarch Mesrop Mutafyan, who leads Turkey’s biggest
Christian church, who was elected Patriarch in 1998 against the
express wishes of the Turkish authorities. He has been forced to
retreat into health-related seclusion, brought on by years of pressure
from the media, the public and from the Armenian diaspora, some of
which has dubbed him a traitor. Should Patriarch Mesrop not recover,
the Turkish authorities are likely to insist – as they have done up
to now – that his successor as head of the Armenian (as well as the
Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate must be a Turkish citizen resident in
Turkey. The Armenian Church may struggle to find a candidate with
the diplomatic and linguistic skills and the international experience
for such a crucial role in such a delicate and exposed position. This
problem is of importance not just for the Church but for the Armenian
community as a whole.

Denial of recognition also leaves the adherents of many faiths
vulnerable to discrimination, as citizens have their religious
affiliation recorded in official records. In this way the state
indicates which religions are ‘legitimate’ and which are not. The
Baha’i community has about 10,000 members, but is not recognised as
a religion. As the Baha’i faith therefore cannot be chosen in the
public registry, Baha’is are forced to choose either Islam or leave
the religion part of their Identity Card empty.

Who can own places of worship?

An aspect of this non-recognition is that even recognised religious
communities cannot themselves own properties such as places of
worship. Bizarrely, these must be owned by separate foundations not
under the direct control of the communities. This has drawn much
attention, focused on the passage of a series of Foundation laws –
none of which have solved the basic problem.

The most recent amendments to the Foundations Law have at least led
to a number of improvements to the functioning of these community
foundations. Yet even so the communities to which the community
foundations are attributed still complain about a number of severe
problems relating to their community foundations that have not
been resolved. Expectations outside Turkey that the amendments to
the Foundations Law would also lead to a complete solution for all
the unresolved questions regarding legal recognition of non-Muslim
minorities have not been fulfilled. As Dilek Kurban of the respected
TESEV Foundation noted, the Foundations Law is ‘incompatible with
the principle of freedom of association, which is guaranteed by the
European Convention on Human Rights, the Constitution and the [1923]
Treaty of Lausanne’.

It should be made clear that the Foundations Law can only be the
right place to resolve problems regarding the community foundations
and is not the right place to resolve the basic problems of non-Muslim
minorities in Turkey. That may only be expected from a new Constitution
based on the European Convention on Human Rights and implementation
in law of religious freedom.

Stalemate for Alevi Muslims Alevi Muslims form between 20 and
30 per cent of the population, but the overwhelming majority of
their places of worship – cemevi or cem houses – are not recognised
by the state. The Alevi community organised a mass demonstration,
attended by tens of thousands of Alevis on 8 November 2009 expressing
their frustration that they are still not treated as citizens with
equal rights, and calling for the abolition of both the Diyanet and
compulsory religious education lessons in public schools.

Another cause of frustration for Alevis is that their leaders – called
‘Dede’ or elders – are not entitled to legally hold that title. This
dates back to 1925, when Act No. 677 of 30 November 1341 (1925)
‘On the Closure of Dervish Monasteries and Tombs, the Abolition of
the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition
of Certain Titles’ was brought in. This abolished the title, and
Article 174 (Preservation of Reform Laws) of the Constitution makes
it impossible to change this Law. This Article states: ‘No provision
of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering
unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to raise
Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to
safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in
force on the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution
of Turkey.’ Among the laws listed is Act 677.

Education about religion or belief In contrast to the children adhering
to the two non-Muslim religious communities acknowledged in the
education system – Christians and Jews – Alevis, Baha’is, children
of other faiths and atheists are forced to attend de facto Sunni
religious education classes in public and private schools. Diyanet
officials have occasionally indicated that they regard Alevism as a
part of Sunni Islam and do not respect their different interpretation
of Islam. This means that Turkey has not seen any need to alter the
religious education curriculum. In a court ruling (Hasan and Eylem
Zengin v. Turkey, Application no. 1448/04) the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) stated that this is unacceptable.

Turkey is obliged by this judgment to take action to ensure that
the same problem does not reoccur for anyone. However, as Turkish
news agencies reported on 25 August 2008, then Minister of Education
Huseyin Celik claimed the decision was about the old curriculum. As
Alevi beliefs are included in the new curriculum, the Minister claimed
the ECHR judgment was inapplicable. Implementation of the judgment
is still pending before the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers.

Teaching of other subjects includes disinformation about or defamation
of faiths. Missionary activity is listed as one of the national
threats in compulsory public school books that are taught in Grade
8 classes on the History of Turkish Republican Reforms and Ataturkism.

The textbook states that missionaries ‘try to fulfil their goals
through the significant financial support of foreign powers, some
non-governmental organisations and from their own supporters.

Missionaries exploit the financial hardships of people. They
translate texts related to their own beliefs into different languages
and distribute them free of charge and accordingly use written and
visual media for their propaganda purposes. They are a threat to the
national unity and integrity of our state and nation.’ Those at risk
from violent attack think such sentiments – propagated through the
school system and mass media – are major factors in violent attacks
and murders motivated by intolerance.

As a participating State of the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Turkey has agreed to implement measures
‘to counter prejudices and misrepresentation, particularly in the
field of education’. Initiatives to assist this include the Toledo
Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public
Schools. However the authorities have shown no visible interest in
providing fair education on religions and beliefs in schools.

Discrimination within the public service It is virtually impossible
to find people from non-Muslim backgrounds in high level civil servant
positions and impossible in senior ranks in the military. While there
are non-Muslims employed at lower levels there are frequent allegations
that they experience discrimination and are never allowed to take a
high ranking position. Syriac Orthodox Christians, for example, have
complained to Forum 18 that their young people are never allowed the
possibility of careers leading to senior positions in the military
or the civil service – even when they are fully qualified for such
careers. Many are deeply disappointed, Forum 18 has been told, when
they realise that they are not seen as ‘genuine’ Turks, and so will
never be allowed the chances to serve their country which those seen as
‘genuine’ Turks have.

Religious clothing A 1934 Law which according to Article 174 of the
Constitution may not be altered or abolished bans wearing religious
garments on the streets, with Muslims being the initial targets. With
the exception of the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarch
and the Chief Rabbi, no religious minority leaders until the 1980s
acted against this ban.

Enforcement has been more sporadic recently, but many religious leaders
choose not to wear religious clothes outside their place of worship,
partly because of this Law and partly – in the case of members of
religious minorities – for fear of provoking attacks.

Foreign Greek, Russian and Georgian Orthodox priests have complained
in recent years that they have been forced to remove their cassocks
and crosses before being allowed to enter the country.

The wearing of headscarves by Muslim women has long been a
controversial issue. The AKP party’s move to allow female university
students to wear headscarves was prevented by the Constitutional
Court, and caused much debate and hostility in the secular sectors
of the population. Although it is prohibited to attend university
wearing headscarves, or any religious symbol, this prohibition is
not consistently implemented. It has become a symbolic issue that
seems to embody the questions of whether Turkey will continue to be a
‘secular’ country – as the state defines this – or not.

Conscientious objection to military service denied
Conscientious objection to compulsory military service is not
permitted. Conscientious objectors of military age (including among
the roughly 3,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses) face an unending cycle of
prosecutions and imprisonments. In the ECHR case of Ulke v. Turkey
(Application no. 39437/98), the Court found that such punishment was
a violation of the prohibition in the European Convention of Human
Rights of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. Turkey continues to
disregard the 17 October 2007 call of the Council of Europe Committee
of Ministers for it ‘to adopt rapidly the legislative reform necessary
to prevent similar violations.’ Internet censorship Access to the
website of well-known atheist Richard Dawkins is prevented in Turkey
through a court decision. His books, as also those of other atheists,
are however permitted, despite legal attempts to ban them. Similarly,
access to a website dedicated to Turan Dursun, a well-known Turkish
atheist murdered for his beliefs in 1990, is barred.

Conclusion Many people and communities have for a long time faced
obstacles in carrying out peaceful religious activity – activity
that is protected in the international freedom of religion or belief
agreements that Turkey has committed itself to. The long-standing lack
of willingness to legally recognise religious communities in their own
right, the disinformation by public officials and the public education
system, ultra-nationalism and mass media intolerance behind violent
attacks and murders, and the Turkish definition of ‘secularism’ are
the clearest examples of this. They cause serious doubt about whether
the country is really committed to universal human rights for all.

Other obstacles include: problems around the rule of law;
discrimination against Alevi Muslims; discrimination within the
public service; lack of freedom to wear religious clothing in public
institutions; denial of conscientious objection to military service;
and limited internet censorship.

Turkish citizens committed to human rights for all have argued to Forum
18 that the protection of the right of all to freedom of religion or
belief, as laid down in the international human rights standards which
Turkey is party to, should be the standard used by the authorities
in all affected fields. They also argue strongly that positive steps
should also be taken by the authorities to eliminate social hatred
against all groups that are the targets of intolerant attitudes.

By Otmar Oehring, Head of the Human Rights Office of Missio
<;, and Guzide Ceyhan, This article was published
by F18News on: 27 November 2009