HOW GORBACHEV CONTRIBUTED TO THE ‘KARABAKHIZATION’ OF AZERBAIJANI POLITICS
Paul Goble

Georgian Daily
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Jan 19 2010
Georgia

Twenty years ago this week, Mikhail Gorbachev sent troops into
Azerbaijan to crush the popular front there, but what the Soviet
president achieved by his actions was the further radicalization
of Azerbaijan and the "Karabakhization" of Azerbaijani politics, a
situation that continues to this day, according to a leading Moscow
commentator.

In an article posted on the "Novaya politika" site yesterday,
Sergey Markedonov says that the unwillingness of the Soviet
government to force Armenia to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan and
its dispatch of Soviet forces to Baku "became a transforming moment
in the process of the national self-determination of Azerbaijan"
(novopol.ru/text80474.html).

Bot h Moscow’s failure to defend the territorial integrity of the
Azerbaijan SSR and the brutality of its forces in the Azerbaijani
capital changed everything, Markedonov continues. Until then,
Azerbaijan "had lacked a powerful dissident movement," unlike Georgia
or the Baltic states.

However, "the striving of the Kremlin to refrain from the adoption
of a one-sided resolution of the ‘Karabakh question’ and the refusal
of Moscow to fulfill its political contract to guarantee Azerbaijani
territorial integrity pushed Baku onto the path of the search for
national independence and sovereignty."

And that drive, one based on a near universal popular consensus that
Karabakh must be reintegrated into Azerbaijan, meant that nationalism
rather than communism became the republic’s dominant ideology. Indeed,
Markedonov says, it is possible to speak of "Karabakhization" as
"the foundation" for Azerbaijan’s statehood.

In response to the Soviet invasion, 45,000 Azerbaijanis quit the ranks
of the CPSU, and Heidar Aliyev, who had been forced from the Politburo,
reemerged as a national leader by speaking to a meeting of Azerbaijanis
and others at the permanent representation of his republic in Moscow,

For him and for all Azerbaijanis, Markedonov continues, "problem number
one for independent Azerbaijan" was the question of the restoration
of the territorial integrity of the country, because its military
defeat by the Armenians had had such "a serious influence on the
self-identification of Azerbaijanis."

In the judgment of the Moscow analyst, "Heidar Aliyev’s return
to Azerbaijani politics" allowed the country to overcome ethnic
separatism at home from the Talysh, Lezgins, and Avars) and "also
to minimize the threat [to predominantly Shiite Azerbaijan] from the
side of radical Islam."

After 1993, Markedonov says, "Baku easily dealt with both military
risings and ‘rose revolutions,’ but "the main thing that Aliyev was
able to achieve is an adequate assessment of the military and foreign
policy resources of an independent Azerbaijan and on the basis of
this assessment to form a sensible strategy."

Aliyev recognized that using military force to resolve the problem
was not a promising strategy and thus was willing to reach a ceasefire
accord with Armenia, and he also understood, Markedonov says, that Baku
needed to "overcome the unique diplomatic vacuum around the republic"
by reaching out to all major powers and portraying Azerbaijan as
"a civilized state."

In recent years, many people have asked how long this "breathing
space" and "concentration" can continue, Markedonov notes, but he
argues that however emotionally powerful appeals to recover Karabakh
may be, Azerbaijan would not profit from any use of military power
anytime soon.

First of all, the Moscow specialist on the Caucasus says, "both Armenia
and unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh are serious competitors," something
that dashes any hopes for "a blitzkrieg." Second, the unsuccessful
use of force could threaten the stability of political arrangements
in Azerbaijan, as the case of Elchibey in the early 1990s shows.

And third, any military campaign "would create problems not only of a
military but also of an informational-political character." Overnight,
such actions would "destroy the image of Azerbaijan, which has
been carefully cultivated over the years, as a victim of ‘Armenian
aggression.’"

Even if Baku were successful, it would not be forgiven, Markedonov
argues, saying that Azerbaijanis should not see the Russian moves
in Chechnya as a precedent. That is because, he continues, "what the
world forgave Moscow for is something it would not forgive Baku."

Consequently, Azerbaijan’s only option, he concludes is to "wait and
‘concentrate.’"

But the passions ignited by the events of Black January and the
centrality of the fate of Karabakh and the other occupied territories
remain so great that it is perhaps no surprise that on this "round"
anniversary, many Azerbaijanis are hoping against hope that the
negotiations will lead to the recovery of their lands or seeking
alternatives.

And one of the most interesting – and, following Markedonov’s argument,
instructive — is the call by the Sheikh ul-Islam Pasha-Zade, the head
of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Azerbaijan, for Gorbachev to be
brought to trial in the Hague for his crimes against the Azerbaijani
nation (;div= 33786).

That won’t happen, of course, but it is a reminder of the continuing
sensitivity of the events of a generation ago in the Caucasus now,
an impact that any who are seeking to address the problems there must
not only acknowledge but face up to, all the more now because these
feelings have been allowed to fester so long.