ARMENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULING SETBACK FOR US DIPLOMACY
news.az
Jan 20 2010
Azerbaijan
Ilgar Mammadov US strategy in the South Caucasus needs to be changed,
Baku-based politician Ilgar Mammadov writes in an article for News.Az.
The newly emerged details of the Armenian Constitutional Court ruling
on the Turkish-Armenian protocols mark a major setback for American
diplomacy in the South Caucasus.
The ruling "contains preconditions and restrictive provisions which
impair the letter and spirit of the Protocols", reads a statement
by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The statement says that the ruling
undermines the very reason for negotiating the Protocols as well as
their fundamental objective.
Unlike comments by various Turkish officials about the link between
resolution of the Karabakh conflict and ratification of the protocols,
the ruling of the Armenian Constitutional Court is a formally binding
text, and not a personal or party political opinion. It must be
changed if Turkish-Armenian dialogue is to move forward.
US diplomacy made significant efforts in recent years to outplay Russia
in the South Caucasus by normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations. In
implementing that now failed strategy, US diplomacy made resolution
of the Karabakh conflict secondary to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.
This was in vain, as the new Armenian move has shown. From now on,
even if the Armenian parliament ratifies the protocols, this will be
a mere propaganda move as Turkey engaged in the talks and signed the
protocols with the understanding that Yerevan will firmly recognise
the Turkish-Armenian border and drop allegations of genocide against
Turkey.
The American approach would be very credible and intelligent, were
it not for a fundamental omission: Armenia is governed from Moscow,
it is not an independent state.
Correcting the error does not mean doing the opposite, i.e. giving
priority to resolution of the Karabakh conflict and postponing
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. The US should approach the region from
another angle – that of rewarding countries for practical cooperation
with America.
For almost two decades Azerbaijan has been a more committed partner
and ally of the United States than Armenia in the South Caucasus and
more important in practical terms. Azerbaijan sees no rewards for that
choice as far as resolution of the Karabakh conflict is concerned. As
a result, the country is drifting back to closer ties with Moscow,
not necessarily in the expectation that the Kremlin will play into the
hands of Baku this time, but because of the greater sense of security
the Russians can provide, especially in the post-August 2008 realities
of the South Caucasus.
US reluctance to put pressure on Armenia over the Karabakh issue is
a total mystery, given America’s well-known practicality. A possible
explanation is that the loyalty of American citizens of Armenian
descent is dearer to policymakers in Washington than Azerbaijan’s
lasting loyalty. However, I can hardly imagine success of a foreign
policy influenced by the quasi-religious prejudices of a group of
citizens about "small, Christian Armenia surrounded by the wild,
Muslim Turks of Azerbaijan and Turkey."
If we all claim to be defending goodies against baddies, then the
120,000 Armenians who lived in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomy
of Azerbaijan are no better than the 300,000 Azeris expelled from
Zangezur, which was not an autonomy in Armenia, as part of the
on-going Karabakh conflict. If they are entitled to more respect
than the Azerbaijanis of Zangezur, that can only be recognition of
military action as a legitimate and effective tool in the conflict.
US assistance in restoring and expanding the authority of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomy within Azerbaijan is the solution that
will lead to sustained peace and growing US influence in the South
Caucasus. It will protect US diplomacy from new setbacks like the
one created by the Armenian Constitutional Court a few days ago.