ARMENIAN EXPERT: TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY TRIES TO DRAG OUT RATIFICATION OF TURKEY-ARMENIA PROTOCOLS
Today
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Jan 21 2010
Azerbaijan
Day.Az interview with Armenian political expert, Deputy Director of
the Caucasus Institute Sergey Minasyan.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry has issued a statement criticizing the
Armenia Constitutional Court decision declaring Turkish-Armenian
protocols consistent with the Armenian Constitution. In your opinion,
will the parliaments of both countries ratify the protocols?
The Armenian Constitutional Court decision is a prerequisite to submit
them to the parliament for ratification. However, in political terms,
statement of the Armenian Constitutional Court was accepted by Turks
as an example of counter-pressure on Turkey.
In the meantime, by its statement the Turkish Foreign Ministry tries
to drag out process of the protocols’s ratification in the country’s
parliament owing to serious internal problems the Turkish government
is facing.
Currently, however, the ratification of the Protocols depends not so
much on domestic political development within Turkey or in Armenia,
but on the outcome of multi-level negotiations between the world’s
leading players, match or mismatch of their positions, mutual influence
and pressure on regional policy.
In other words, possible recognition of so-called "Armenian resolution"
by the U.S. Congress on the eve of April 24 or Turkey’s EU admission
influence the ratification more than failure of the "Kurdish
initiative" by "Erdogan or backlash of the Turkish of opposition. So,
probability of Turkish Parliament’s ratifying the protocols still
remains while it is not serious problem for Armenia to ratify them
following approval by the Constitutional Court.
Russian FM Sergey Lavrov visited Armenia a couple days ago. What
does this visit mean given that it happened almost simultaneously
with Turkish prime minister’s visit to Russia?
This visit scheduled back in December last year intended to discuss
prospects of bilateral cooperation in all fields including humanitarian
and military-political ones. Another thing is that Lavrov’s visit
also coincided with a very interesting and important stage in regional
politics, especially intensification of the Armenian-Turkish process
and expected ratification of the protocols in the parliaments.
Russia is actively promoting the Armenian-Turkish process, which is
almost the only example of convergence of foreign policy interests
of Moscow, Washington and Brussels in the post-Soviet area. So,
consultations between the foreign ministers of both countries on a
range of critical issues of regional policy were natural.
Turkish President Abdullah Gul has stated that Russia and Turkey
are holding quiet, but very intensive diplomatic consultations with
special emphasis on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. How do you comment
on this statement?
Ankara and Moscow are constantly holding diplomatic consultations which
is quite natural and understandable, because they are the two major
regional powers. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is unlikely
to be the main subject of consultation, not only in the context of
Russia-Turkish bilateral relations, but also even during exchange
of views between Russian and Turkish leaders on the Armenian-Turkish
process as testified by outcomes of Erdogan’s Moscow visit and latest
public statements by Russian PM Putin and FM Lavrov.
What is Turkey’s role in solving regional issues, in particular,
the Karabakh conflict?
It depends on whether Turkey is ready to fully normalize relations with
Armenia and reopen the borders without any preconditions in accordance
with the provisions of the protocols. If Turkey’s parliament ratifies
the protocol within a reasonable time, Ankara will be able to play a
more active role in the region promoting peaceful settlement of the
Karabakh conflict.
If not, then Turkey will again remain outside our region, and
its policy initiatives in the South Caucasus will not realized,
as we have partly seen in connection with decline in importance of
"Caucasus Platform" Ankara launched back in 2008.
How do you assess outcomes of the past year in terms of the settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? Can we hope for a breakthrough on
this issue in 2010 given the intensified high-level meetings?
The negotiation process will see some kind of dynamics, comparable
to the dynamics of the past year. Possibly, certain documents and
declarations with the participation of the conflicting sides will be
adopted, but no comprehensive agreement on a final settlement will
be reached.