Eurasia Daily Monitor
Friday, January 22, 2010 — Volume 7, Issue 15
YANUKOVYCH CONSISTENTLY RUSSIA-LEANING IN UKRAINE’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
by Vladimir Socor
Russia’s authorities have adopted a position of studied equidistance
between the two main candidates during Ukraine’s presidential election
campaign. Moscow has interfered only to the extent of ostracizing
President Viktor Yushchenko, whose re-election chances it knew to be
nil. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Party of Regions leader
(formerly two-time prime minister) Viktor Yanukovych will face each
other in the February 7 run-off. Moscow as well as Western governments
have insisted throughout the campaign that they would work with either
winner after the election, only stipulating that the process be free
and fair.
Formal equidistance seems to be the only possible option at this
stage, in view of the volatile race with an unpredictable outcome. But
this option also reflects the lessons of the 2004 presidential
election in Ukraine, when the Kremlin’s Yanukovych project failed
outright, and the opposite Yushchenko project unraveled soon
afterward. His presidency already sinking in 2006, Yushchenko tried to
keep afloat by bringing RosUkrEnergo into Ukraine (as Yanukovych had
first decided to do in 2004 as prime minister) and bringing Yanukovych
back as prime minister (2006-2007) on a fast track toward the
presidential candidacy again.
Yanukovych’s programmatic statements during this campaign differ
starkly from Tymoshenko’s positions regarding Ukraine-Russia relations
and Ukraine’s place in Europe. Theirs are, in major respects, two
different foreign policies. Yanukovych’s stated positions are aligned
with Russian policy objectives on some issues of central significance
to Ukraine, his prescriptions opposite to those of Tymoshenko.
On gas supplies and transit, Tymoshenko has signed agreements in 2009
with Russia on supplies and with the European Union on modernizing the
transit system. The agreements envisage European-level prices for
Russian gas supplies to Ukraine and E.U.-led technical and financial
assistance to the transit system’s modernization, keeping Ukrainian
ownership intact.
Yanukovych, however, calls for sharing control of the Ukrainian system
with Gazprom, in return for discounted prices on Russian gas
supplies. Yanukovych has brought back the old idea of creating a
Gazprom-led international consortium to implement that
bargain. Apparently reflecting the Donetsk steel and chemical
industries’ need for low-priced gas supplies, Yanukovych is turning
this issue into a campaign promise of cheap gas for the people, vowing
to renegotiate the agreements with Russia (Inter TV, Interfax-Ukraine,
January 15, 19, 21).
Regarding the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, Yanukovych
considers the possibilities of Ukraine participating in it
selectively, for certain categories of goods and commodities (steel,
chemicals, and agricultural products presumably topping the list of
sheltered interests). Yanukovych and Moscow are willing to negotiate
the terms of such Ukrainian participation. This would, however,
complicate and slow down the negotiations launched by the Tymoshenko
government toward a free trade agreement with the E.U. and an
association agreement with it. Yanukovych claims that Ukraine could
have it both ways, in an overarching framework of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, however, are not
WTO members; and their chances have become more remote since Russia
insists on their admission as a group, which is unacceptable to WTO
countries, including those of the E.U. (Interfax, January 16, 20).
Yanukovych supports a prolongation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s
stationing on Ukraine’s territory. In return for higher rent payments
(currently a derisory $ 95 million per year), Yanukovych says that he
would favor extending the Russian fleet’s presence beyond the 2017
deadline, and delaying official debate until the deadline draws closer
(thus pre-determining the deadline’s breach). According to him, the
Russian fleet enhances Ukraine’s and Russia’s common security; and
extending the fleet’s presence would fit within Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev’s concept of a new European security
architecture. Tymoshenko, however, insists that no foreign forces may
be stationed in Ukraine after 2017, pointedly citing the
constitutional prohibition in this regard (Inter TV, January 15).
Following Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, Yanukovych came out in
favor of `recognition’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Elements in his
Party of Regions submitted resolutions to that effect in the Verkhovna
Rada and the Crimean regional legislature in 2009. Yanukovych did not
seem to actively support that effort but he did not distance himself
from it either. He seems ignorant of such resolutions’ potential
boomerang effect on Ukraine in the Crimea.
In line with Russia’s policy, Yanukovych supports awarding official
status to the Russian language in Ukraine’s regions (not necessarily
confined to the east and south). This would be impossible to legislate
at the national level because it would necessitate a two-thirds
majority in the Verkhovna Rada to amend the constitution. Yanukovych
(as well as Moscow) calls for using the European charter of minority
and regional languages in Ukraine as a means to confer official
status–in practice, a privileged status–for Russian at the level of
Ukraine’s regions.
The Party of Regions has entered into a cooperation agreement with
Russia’s party of power, United Russia. According to the Duma’s
international affairs committee chairman, Konstantin Kosachev, the two
parties’ relations have a `systemic character’ (Interfax, January 17).
Tymoshenko’s presidential candidacy, however, has been endorsed in
emphatic terms by the European People’s Party, the umbrella
organization of Europe’s Christian-Democrat parties.
— Vladimir Socor
Thursday, January 21, 2010 — Volume 7, Issue 14
RUSSIAN-BROKERED DIARCHY WOULD BEST SUIT MOSCOW IN UKRAINE
by Vladimir Socor
Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and opposition Party of
Regions leader (formerly twice prime minister) Viktor Yanukovych will
face each other in the presidential election run-off on February
8. Russia has made clear that it is willing to work with Tymoshenko,
Yanukovych, or both leaders at present and in the post-election
period.
By all indications, Moscow does not have a preferred Ukrainian
candidate. However, Moscow must contemplate a preferred outcome, which
could well be a diarchy in Ukraine. A Russian-brokered governing
diarchy would enable Moscow to play both sides in Ukraine and emerge
as a political arbiter or balance holder between them.
Moscow has previously supported diarchy-type arrangements in two
post-Soviet republics: in Armenia in 1998-2000 and in Moldova in
2001. Both experiments ended with the imposition of de facto
presidential rule by Moscow-friendly presidents, despite the mixed
presidential-parliamentary systems formally existing in both
countries.
Ukraine’s existing constitutional arrangements are a prescription for
stalemate, pitting the presidency against the government and
parliamentary majority, and turning rivalries between parties into
conflicts between institutions. The 2004 constitutional compromise
aggravated this situation, with often paralyzing effects. The Orange
Revolution’s unintended result turned out to be disorganization of the
state and generalized dysfunctionality of its institutions.
As President Viktor Yushchenko-who bears a major share of
responsibility for that situation-departs the scene, Ukraine’s
three-cornered power contest is turning into a bipolar one involving
the Party of Regions and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYUT). A fragile
and unstable equilibrium between these rival forces after the
presidential election would open possibilities for Russia to advance
its objectives in Ukraine (see article below). From Moscow’s
standpoint, the optimal solution in Ukraine would be a tense diarchy.
An unstable Ukraine or a deeply dysfunctional Ukrainian state,
however, is not in Russia’s interest. Ukrainian political leaders
would simply be unable to deliver on agreements reached in such
circumstances. Ukraine’s Western partners as well as Russia have
learned this repeatedly from 2005 onward — with the partial exception
of the BYUT-led government in 2009. Moscow needs a Ukrainian president
and government sufficiently effective to deliver on agreements, but
still unconsolidated and insecure in power, and leaving scope for
Moscow to deal alternately with Ukraine’s rival political forces.
Whether Tymoshenko or Yanukovych win the presidency, Moscow may well
encourage diarchy-type arrangements to take shape for the
post-election period. That would involve a Russian-brokered
cohabitation between the Ukrainian president and government, as well
as between the parliamentary majority and an almost evenly matched
opposition. A delimitation of spheres of authority at the level of
institutions could then, with Russia’s encouragement, take shape also
between Kyiv and Donetsk, formally or informally.
Russia can therefore be expected to try a soft version of the general
post-Soviet paradigm of controlled instability. In Ukraine’s case it
can exploit the stalemate between institutions and branches of power
and their respective political exponents. The Kremlin had earlier
invoked more severe forms of controlled instability by playing on
Ukraine’s regional differences, e.g., to influence the presidential
election in 2004 and derail the Ukraine-NATO membership action plan in
2008. At the present stage, however, Moscow has no cause to encourage
centrifugal forces and no interest in doing so.
On January 19, two days after the first round of Ukraine’s
presidential election, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev instructed
Ambassador Mikhail Zurabov in front of TV cameras to take up his post
in Ukraine immediately. Zurabov had been appointed in August to fill
that vacant post, but was never actually sent to Kyiv, as the Kremlin
refused to deal with Yushchenko. Once Yushchenko lost the election’s
first round on January 17, Medvedev instructed Zurabov in this
set-piece meeting to work with the first-round winners in
Ukraine. Without naming names and without awaiting the run-off,
Medvedev expressed confident hope that `capable, effective authorities
would emerge in Ukraine [from this election], willing to develop
constructive, friendly, multi-dimensional relations with Russia.’ The
message to Tymoshenko and Yanukovych is that Moscow is ready to work
with either of them or both. Medvedev elevated Zurabov’s status by
appointing him special presidential envoy for economic relations with
Ukraine (i.e., reporting directly to the Russian president),
concurrently with the ambassadorial assignment (Interfax, Russian
Television, January 19).
If Tymoshenko wins the presidency, Ukraine could overcome the
political stalemate without a Russian-brokered diarchy
solution. According to many observers, a Tymoshenko success would
induce defections from the Party of Regions and residual
pro-Yushchenko sub-factions, reinforcing the BYUT-led parliamentary
majority and government. Should Yanukovych win the presidency,
however, he is widely expected to trigger pre-term parliamentary
elections for a new majority and government under his Party of Regions
(UCIPR [Kyiv], `The Obvious and the Hidden,’ Research Update, January
14).
Yet another electoral campaign, if Yanukovych does trigger it, would
cripple Ukraine’s and international lenders’ efforts to deal with the
economic crisis in the country. It would also prolong Ukraine’s
permanent election campaign syndrome (almost continuous since 2004)
even further. And it would increase Moscow’s opportunities to play
arbiter and stabilizer between Ukrainian political forces, for greater
Russian political influence in the country.
— Vladimir Socor
Thursday, January 21, 2010 — Volume 7, Issue 14
RUSSIAN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN UKRAINE’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
by Vladimir Socor
FroM its preliminary stages down to the January 17 first round,
Ukraine’s presidential election has occasioned a full and continuous
display of Russia’s strategic policy objectives toward the country.
Irrespective of the presidential run-off’s outcome on February 8,
Moscow has already achieved-largely by default-three basic objectives
regarding Ukraine.
First, the Kremlin no longer has reasons to fear the Orange freedoms’
contaminating effect upon Russia. Given Ukraine’s political and
economic predicaments, it has lost the attractiveness of a democratic
example to Russia’s populace or elite circles. If anything, Russian
business interests associated with the state authorities seem poised
for predatory takeovers of crisis-hit Ukrainian assets.
Second, Russia has managed to remove discussion of Ukraine’s
hypothetical NATO membership from the political agenda. All serious
parties and candidates now avoid this subject as a political liability
in Ukraine and as an irritant to Russia.
And thirdly, Moscow has been content to watch the defeated President
Viktor Yushchenko instrumentalize Ukrainian national identity issues
as his last resort and `anti-Russian’ card. Yushchenko’s tactics
seemingly vindicated Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s August 11
open-letter warnings to him and Ukraine. The outgoing president’s
campaign has split the Ukrainian electorate in the west and center,
complicating the country’s post-election politics even further.
The next tier of Russian objectives emerged both before and during the
Ukrainian presidential election campaign. They can also be deduced in
part from presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych’s campaign
statements. The operational order of Russia’s priorities should become
somewhat clearer after the run-off’s outcome. Moscow’s post-election
goals are mostly familiar ones, albeit in a changing Ukrainian and
international context. They include:
— Introducing some form of shared control over Ukraine’s gas transit
system (several forms are theoretically available), notwithstanding
Ukrainian legislation explicitly banning all forms of alienating that
transit system.
— Acquiring ownership in Ukrainian industries through Russian state
banks and Kremlin-connected oligarchs.
— Expanding the use of the Russian language in Ukraine’s public
sphere; and claiming an inherent Russian vetting right on Ukraine’s
educational policies and interpretations of the national history.
— Using Ukrainian interest groups to link Ukraine with the planned
Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, which would delay Ukraine’s
free trade agreement with the European Union and its association
agreement with the E.U.
— Stonewalling any preparations for withdrawal of Russia’s Black Sea
Fleet from the Crimea, so as to render the 2017 withdrawal deadline
inoperative long before its technical lapse, and necessitate its
extension by Ukraine.
— Committing Ukraine officially (and notwithstanding the Russian
Fleet’s presence) to neutrality or permanent nonalignment, which would
foreclose the country’s option to join NATO in the future.
— Encouraging a double-vector discourse on Ukraine’s external
orientation, which would confuse Western partners and Ukrainians
themselves about the country’s intentions and prospects.
Russian business interests generally seem to await the final outcome
of Ukraine’s presidential election, before bidding for Ukrainian
industrial property. In one major case, however, they have
jump-started the acquisition process before Ukraine can recover from
crisis. In the second week of January, a consortium of Russia’s
state-owned Vneshekonombank (chairman of the board: Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin) and the Metalloinvest steel holding of
Kremlin-friendly Alisher Usmanov announced a preliminary $ 2 billion
deal to acquire some 50 percent ownership in the Industrial Union of
Donbass, a major Ukrainian steel producer, with plants also in Hungary
and Poland (Interfax-Ukraine, January 6, 8, 15).
Presidential candidate and Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych
seems not only unduly alarmed, but also utterly confused about Russia
bypassing Ukraine’s gas transit system through the Nord Stream and
South Stream projects. In two campaign appearances, Yanukovych has
called for Ukraine to invest in Nord Stream and South Stream, but at
the same time bring Gazprom into Ukraine’s transit system in the hopes
of ensuring larger gas transit volumes through Ukraine
(Interfax-Ukraine, Inter TV, January 15, 19).
Some Russian representatives are testing Ukrainian reactions to more
ambitious goals than those officially announced. Thus the CSTO’s
Secretary-General, Nikolai Bordyuzha, has declared that Ukraine would
be welcome to join the CSTO or participate in at least some of the
organization’s activities (Interfax-Ukraine, January 18).
Ultimately, Moscow would hope to reach a point at which it could,
together with Ukraine, define what Ukrainian interests are in the
Russia-Ukraine relationship. According to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergei Lavrov when dispatching Ambassador Mikhail Zurabov to Kyiv (see
article above), Russian policy must ensure that Ukraine’s new
president `understands not to make our relationship hostage to
somebody’s ambitions=80¦that have nothing in common with the Ukrainian
people’s interests, or those of the Russian people’ (Interfax, January
19).
Russia is still very far from achieving that kind of influence over
Ukraine’s political system and decisions. However, Moscow’s
intermediate objectives as displayed during Ukraine’s presidential
election campaign could, if attained, increase Russian political
influence gradually to a significant level in Ukraine.
— Vladimir Socor