THE SOCHI MEETING REVISED EXISTING STATUS QUO IN THE REGION
Karine Ter-Sahakyan

/PanARMENIAN.Net/
26.01.2010 GMT+04:00

At the current stage of negotiations the most essential thing for
Baku is that Karabakh not be a legally recognized state, as it would
deprive Baku of the opportunity to launch military action.

The meeting of Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian Presidents in
Sochi at first glance clarified the situation in Karabakh conflict
regulation, especially in the part referred to by Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov. The case in point is some preamble that is agreed
upon and concerns the direct participation of Nagorno-Karabakh in
negotiation processes. However, on the whole, the Sochi meeting only
adjusted the existing status quo in the region, once again confirming
that in the foreseeable future Russia is determined to keep her role
of a leader in the Caucasus.

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Settlement of the Karabakh conflict is almost at a
standstill, and attempts of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries
to somehow set the process going result in declarations at the best.

Well, no other variant could be expected as the two sides are
diametrically opposed and in the near future, as we have been
repeatedly saying, progress is definitely not foreseen. It’s hard to
judge whether this is good or bad, but if the improbable happens and
NKR sits round the table of negotiations as a full participant, then
indeed we can speak of a breakthrough. Another advantage was that the
presidents refrained from signing a "Meindorf-2", for it is clear that
no declaration can force to sign a framework agreement on Karabakh.

Nor is realistic the timing of an agreement defined by OSCE Minsk
Group Co-Chair of Russia Yuri Merzlyakov. According to him, the parties
have been given 2 weeks to agree on the basic principles of conflict
regulation, which is simply impossible by definition. In short, as
far as the Karabakh conflict settlement is concerned, the year of
2010 will be like that of 2009.

In this regard it should be noted that last week according to Dmitry
Medvedev’s presidential decree there was set up the North Caucasus
Federal District, designed to naturally strengthen Moscow’s position
in the highly volatile region. On the whole, the positions of the
two sides can be described as follows: Russia, as an OSCE Minsk
Group co-chair country, is interested in temporary holdup of war over
Karabakh because she needs to further strengthen her position. The USA
and EU in the person of France will not hinder Moscow, as they need
her as a transit route to Afghanistan. As far as Turkey and Iran are
concerned, their positions are already defined: they cannot influence
the adoption of any solution to the Karabakh problem, neither will
they be allowed to hinder. And again we come to the conclusion that
it is especially Moscow that will not allow it, reasoning from mutual
benefit: both Turkey and Iran are now in need of Russia’s support.

Strained Turkish-Israeli relations ban be settled with the help
of Moscow, not to mention Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, the
increasing activity of Turkey in regional affairs may, oddly enough,
harm Azerbaijan, because in this case, the countries concerned will
adhere to a uniform policy, and Ankara, with his open support for Baku
and obvious aversion to Armenia, can be driven into a corner. Iran’s
policy in this issue is much balanced: Tehran just wants to "help to
regulate the conflict as a disinterested party". And, most likely,
if the time comes, Tehran will be given preference (as compared
to Ankara).

And it turns out that only very serious events taking place far from
the Caucasus can shake or knock Russia out of the region. Where and
what it might be is not yet clear; it may depend on the outcome of
elections in the Ukraine, on Belarus, on anything. Thus far everything
is quiet. But this quietness may explode if Baku suddenly decides to
launch a war. However, at the current stage of negotiations the most
essential thing for Baku is that Karabakh not be a legally recognized
state, as it would deprive Baku of the chance to launch military
action, even if a window of opportunity turns up.