CROSSING THE LINE
by Wendy Kristianasen
Le Monde Diplomatique
feb 9 2010
France
"A taboo has been broken," said Markar Eseyan, a columnist for the
independent Istanbul daily Taraf and the Armenian weekly Agos. "Now
we can at last acknowledge the past. The issue of genocide is a red
line, along with the Kurdish and Cyprus issues. The AKP has had the
courage to confront and even cross these red lines. It saw that in
one stroke it could both transform the way Turkey sees itself and
open it up to the world."
Eseyan is from Istanbul, one of 50,000 Armenians left in Turkey. How
does he view the protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia, on 10October
2009, which agreed to establish diplomatic ties between the countries
and called for the opening of their common border? "Many in the
diaspora do not believe that the opening is a real coming to terms.
But they have not lived here. I am hopeful that it is a beginning,
not an end."
At issue is Nagorno Karabakh (1): Turkey wants Armenia to agree to
withdraw from Karabakh, after other Azerbaijani-occupied territories,
before it will open the common border. From 2007 Armenian and Turkish
diplomats met secretly in Switzerland. Then came football diplomacy:
Armenia’s president invited his Turkish counterpart to a World Cup
match between the two national teams in Yerevan in September 2008. The
opening has been backed by Washington (and US Armenians pressured to
support it). And despite Armenian reservations and Turkey’s reluctance
to use the word genocide for the 1915 killings of the Armenians,
the countries finally signed an accord. This has yet to be ratified
by their parliaments.
This external dynamic has gone hand in hand with developments within
Turkey. The killing of the Armenian editor Hrant Dink on 19 January
2007, after he had been taken to court (like the writer Orhan Pamuk)
for insulting Turkishness under article 301 of the Penal Code, provoked
a heated debate within Turkey. A hundred thousand people protested at
Dink’s murder, demanding the annulment of article 301; it was amended
on 30 April 2008. "The taboo has gone," said Eseyan. "Not to the extent
of talking of genocide or saying that 1.5 million people were killed,
but freedom is growing and we feel better."
On Cyprus there is a sense that Turkey has done what it can and the
issue has passed out of its control. After years of gridlock, the AKP
government backed the UN peace plan under Kofi Annan. Turkish Cypriots
voted yes (by 64.9%) to the 24 April 2004 referendum under which the
constituent states would have federated and entered the European Union
as the United Cyprus Republic. The Greek Cypriots voted no (by 75.83%)
— and a week later joined the EU (whose acquis communautaire exclude
the Turkish north of the island).
This has now become a matter of credibility for the Turks, whose own EU
accession has been indefinitely postponed with the coming to power of
France’s President Sarkozy and Germany’s Angela Merkel. Even so, some
Turks see a new, if slender, hope for a solution in the election of
Greek prime minister, George Papandreou, leader of the socialist PASOK
(Panhellenic Socialist Movement), who, like his Turkish counterpart,
is pragmatic and solution-oriented. What solution might emerge is
unclear; but talks continued in January.
The opening to Iraq has brought social and economic dividends, but
also security to the autonomous Kurdistan region of northern Iraq
which borders Turkey, until recently a training ground and base for
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) resistance. This has opened the way to an
important Kurdish initiative (now called a "democratic opening") at
home. The government has understood that it needs to defuse tensions
to end the violence in southeast Turkey and the leadership role of
the military there. The reforms have focussed on cultural and social
issues: some villages have been allowed to rename themselves, more
rights have been given to local mayors and there is greater scope
for teaching in Kurdish.
Ihsan Bal, professor at Ankara’s Police Academy and a security
expert, said: "The opening taking place in the last two years has
been substantial; this democratisation will also affect the Alevis,
Greeks and Armenians. Whether Turkey can handle all this simultaneously
is another question."
There is disagreement among Turks on this. Some say the government
has handled the affair ineptly. Others see it as a courageous advance,
especially since the high costs of policing the region and containing
the PKK risks losing many votes. Many Turks note that the Kurdish
party, the DTP (Democratic Society Party) with 21 seats, which was
closed down by the Supreme Court on 11 December, had remained silent
on the crucial issues of Turkish national life; they believe the
government should invite back exiled diaspora Kurds to stop the cult
of the imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.
As Bal explained: "There has been some real reform in the prisons
and among the police." And with the revelations of the Ergenekon case
(see Turkey’s soft power successes), "the public has become aware of
what was happening in the ‘deep state’, as the Gladio formations of
the 1970s gave way to a gang culture that has infiltrated all parts of
Turkish life. In the last two years, we have at least begun to touch
the untouchables. Turkey now realises it’s not shameful, but to its
credit, to recognise past mistakes: it’s given it new credibility in
the world."