Day of non-identical twins: Kosovo, Abkhazia…

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin)

By an odd coincidence, February 17 has linked two unrecognized (or
semi-recognized) non-identical twins – Kosovo and Abkhazia. Two years
ago, on February 17 Albanians unilaterally proclaimed the independence
of the territory that Serbia considers its own and calls "Kosovo and
Metohija." On February 17, 1810, that is, 200 years ago, the Abkhazian
principality joined the Russian Empire of its own free will.

Its incorporation into Russia has several interpretations among the
highly volatile Russian scholars. Some historians maintain that it was
the ruling dynasty that joined Russia, after which almost half of
Abkhazians left the country. However, voluntary accession is a viable
version since the other half stayed.

In any event, Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh, who is currently in
Moscow on an official visit (February 16-18) and his host President
Dmitry Medvedev, have something to celebrate. Thus, in honor of the
memorable date, Abkhazia offered Russia to run its railroad and Russia
agreed.

For Kosovo the anniversary is marred by the legal proceedings in the
International Court of Justice in The Hague regarding its declaration
of independence. Since the past year the court has been debating this
issue at Serbia’s request (in the UN it was supported by 77 countries,
with 74 abstaining and six voting against it). The verdict will be
passed in late spring or summer.

Importantly, the verdict will be merely consultative but not legally
binding. However, even these proceedings are enough to keep tensions
between three camps – Kosovo’s supporters, opponents, and all other
non-identical twins – Abkhazian, Kosovar and Ossetian proto-statehood.

The verdict may have the following consequences. If the court decades
that Kosovars had a legal right to their declaration of independence
(which is not likely), dozens of movements, groups and territories
will be inspired to step up their struggle for independence and
recognition. If the court rules that they did not have that right
(which is also unlikely), the Kosovo issue will be in limbo again. But
in this case dozens of movements, groups and territories will also be
inspired to intensify their struggle for independence and recognition
but for a different reason: "If the UN is so unfair, then…"

There are also more global problems linked with the entire system of
UN functioning. Law experts fear that if The Hague recognizes the
legality of Kosovo’s independence, the UN ability to conduct
peacekeeping missions will be endangered. Unstable states with
separatist attitudes may refuse to accept the UN peacemaking mission
because Kosovo created a very bad precedent: First UN troops enter a
territory and then this territory proclaims its independence.

Judges in The Hague Court will have a hard time. They are going into
such wilds of jurisprudence from which only very educated people can
emerge unscathed. But they can make a compromise decision, for example
that the Albanians had the right to proclaim independence but they
didn’t approach the issue correctly, and the Serbians are right about
some things but wrong about others, etc. In law, conformism is more
often called "broad interpretation." This is what the court is most
likely to do. It has an unlimited range of instruments for this
purpose.

International law has two main theories on recognizing statehood –
declarative and constituent. Both are equally applicable to Kosovo,
Abkhazia, Ossetia, etc. In general this law is tailored in such a way
that skillful lawyers can pull it in any direction and make any issue
almost fully transparent or totally ambiguous. Debates in the UN bear
out that this applies to resolutions on Kosovo.

The advocates of "declarative statehood" are convinced that for its
recognition it is necessary to have a fixed territory, a permanent
population, a government and an ability to enter relations with other
states. Supporters of "constituent statehood" believe that to achieve
independence it is enough to be recognized by other states, or even by
one state. President Medvedev quoted this theory in regard to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, although this does not at all mean that he supports
it. This is just an example.

International law is not a hadron collider or open heart surgery. The
precision of hadron particles or sharp scalpels can only harm rather
than be helpful there. As it often happens in international law, it is
possible to choose the most befitting instrument for the specific
geopolitical, historic, diplomatic, military, economic and disputed
territorial conditions. This is what interpretation of an ambiguous
decision is all about.

The trouble is that non-identical twins like Kosovo or Abkhazia can
also interpret the decisions of The Hague Court the way they see fit,
and there are many more of them than it may seem at first sight.

Unrecognized states (or recognized by many or several countries, or by
one state) include Kosovo (recognized by 65 out of 192 UN members),
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (recognized by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela
and Nauru). There are also other states like Taiwan, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Somaliland, Transdnestr, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
Armenia (unrecognized by Pakistan), the Palestinian Autonomy, Israel
(unrecognized by 20 Muslim countries), South Korea (unrecognized by
North Korea) and North Korea (unrecognized by South Korea), the
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (West Sahara), the Czech Republic and
Slovakia (still unrecognized by Lichtenstein, and the other way round)
because of a territorial dispute.

The number of separatist or autonomy movements in the world is
countless. Most of them are based in Europe: 25 big, medium and small
ones from Albania to Germany, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. Africa is
the runner-up with 24 groups, and Asia is third with 20. There are 21
such movements in North, Central and South America. There are
separatist groups even in the U.S. Caribbean islands, which would like
to break away from the metropolis. All of them are watching The Hague
Court.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.