WRONG TIME FOR ARMENIAN GENOCIDE BILL

World Politics Review
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March 3

Demonstrating a predictable lack of strategic foresight, the
U.S. Congress plans to renew its obsession with the Armenian genocide
tomorrow, when the House Committee on Foreign Affairs will hold its
mark-up session for the Armenian Genocide resolution. In 2007, the
resolution — which "[calls] upon the president to ensure that the
foreign policy of the United States reflects appropriate understanding
and sensitivity concerning . . . the Armenian Genocide" — passed out
of committee but never reached a vote on the House floor, following a
strong pushback effort from the Bush administration. The supporters
of this year’s iteration hope the Obama White House will prove less
resistant to its foreign policy being held hostage to Congress’s
parochial interests.

While there is little doubt outside of Turkey that genocide was
perpetrated against the Armenians in the 1910s, the resolution
threatens to undermine U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and South
Caucasus at exactly the wrong time. Turkey and Armenia are currently
in the midst of a slow-going rapprochement, an effort broadly opposed
by the Armenian diaspora in the U.S., but supported by the Obama
administration. Meanwhile, Washington needs Ankara onside with regards
to Iran, especially as the U.S. pushes for a new sanctions resolution
in the U.N. Security Council, where Turkey holds a non-permanent
seat. The Armenian Genocide resolution would scuttle both efforts.

Turkish-Armenian rapprochement has progressed in fits and starts for
more than two years, but it appears to have again stalled. Since
signing two protocols in October 2009 that outlined the path
toward normalizing diplomatic relations and opening borders, the
two neighbors have made little tangible progress. Armenian President
Serzh Sarkisian has made it clear that the country’s parliament will
not ratify the protocols until Turkey does so first. For its part,
Turkey has belatedly linked ratification of the agreements to progress
in resolving the stalemated conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic
Armenian province seeking independence — with Armenia’s support —
from Azerbaijan. Ankara had long conditioned normalizing ties with
Armenia on a resolution of the dispute, but agreed to forgo the demand
in signing last October’s agreements. Ankara reversed course once again
in response to vocal opposition to the agreements from nationalists
at home and longstanding ally Azerbaijan abroad. Armenia rejects the
renewed linkage, rightly pointing out that neither protocol mentions
Nagorno-Karabakh.

The smart money is now on a breakdown in the process. However,
Turkey and Armenia have surprised in the past. In September 2009,
most analysts believed the process had ground to a halt, only to be
proven wrong weeks later when the two governments signed the protocols
at a ceremony in Zurich. With Armenian Remembrance Day approaching
on April 24, Turkey may again feel the need to demonstrate progress
in order to reduce the likelihood of President Barack Obama using
the word "genocide" in his statement on that day.

In this context, the Armenian Genocide resolution is a unilateral
provocation, not a constructive application of pressure. It is
driven by a domestic constituency that would broadly prefer to see
the incipient Turkish-Armenian rapprochement fall apart. Ankara
knows this and views it as brinksmanship on the part of Yerevan —
which, truth be told, has far less sway over the Armenian diaspora
than Ankara claims. But if the resolution were to pass in the House,
Turkey would likely walk away from the process altogether, feeling
betrayed by its Armenian interlocutors.

More importantly, the resolution has the potential to undermine U.S.

efforts to halt Iran’s uranium enrichment and other nuclear
activities. Turkey has proven a fickle partner in this endeavor,
positioning itself as a potential broker between Iran and the West by
cultivating ties to Tehran, often to the befuddlement of the U.S. and
Europe. However, the passage of the Armenian Genocide resolution
would give the Turks even less incentive to work with its NATO allies
on Iran, especially in the U.N. Security Council where the P5+1 need
nine votes to pass another round of sanctions. Given Turkey’s cordial
relations with Iran, a Turkish vote for the next round of sanctions
would send a clear signal to Tehran that its policies have left it
more diplomatically isolated than ever. However, if Congress pushes
forward on the Armenian Genocide resolution, Turkish support for
stronger Iranian sanctions would prove even more fleeting than they
have to date.

Given its strategic location, Turkey has a stake in a number
of other U.S. foreign policy goals: political reconciliation
and normalization in Iraq, the reunification of Cyprus, European
energy security, security stabilization of the South Caucasus, and
the Arab-Israeli peace process, among others. For the most part,
Turkey under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AK Party has not
worked at cross-purposes to U.S. interests in the neighborhood. But a
domestically self-serving resolution on the Armenian genocide would
further complicate the bilateral U.S.-Turkish relationship to the
detriment of the Obama administration’s foreign policy in the region.

The resolution is a luxury at a time when the U.S. needs its leaders
to show a statesman-like grasp of the national interest.

The exercise of foreign policy is, ultimately, an exercise in
prioritization. The U.S. has more important considerations in the
Middle East and the South Caucasus than shadowboxing with the past.

Matt Stone, a Washington-based energy consultant, is an adjunct policy
fellow in International Studies at the University of Arizona.

Photo: Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan, Yerevan, Armenia, September 2008 (Martin Shahbazyan).