Council on Foreign Relations

March 5, 2010

First Take – Congress, Genocide, and a Turkish Rift

Author:

Steven A. Cook < ml>,
Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies

The mass killing of up to 1.5 million ethnic Armenians by Ottoman Turks in
1915 is one of the darkest moments of the twentieth century. It continues to
reverberate almost one hundred years later. The U.S. House Foreign Affairs
Committee’s narrow vote on March 4 to acknowledge those massacres as
genocide could undermine relations with the Republic of Turkey, a critical
strategic U.S. partner in Iraq, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the
Balkans, and the Middle East.

If the non-binding resolution goes to the entire House and is passed, the
fallout for U.S.-Turkey relations will be significant. It will likely
further complicate the normalization of Turkish-Armenian ties and ultimately
set back Turkey’s own scrutiny of the events in 1915, which many scholars
agree was genocide.

The Foreign Affairs Committee passed similar resolutions recognizing the
Armenian genocide in 2005 and 2007 by far wider margins of support, only
to be stalled and ultimately withdrawn over concern about U.S.-Turkey
bilateral ties. Both times, Ankara signaled that passage by the full House
would lead to a deterioration of bilateral ties. Ankara has already recalled
its new ambassador to the United States, and lawmakers should expect Turkey
to reconsider Washington’s use of Incirlik Air Base–an important logistics
hub for U.S. forces going into and potentially out of Iraq. It could also
possibly downgrade its role in Afghanistan, which is unpopular in Turkey
anyway.

The House’s action would also make it even more difficult to convince the
Turks, who hold a non-permanent UN Security Council seat, to support a new
round of sanctions on Iran. Given important economic issues, in particular
the large amount of natural gas that Turkey imports from Iran, getting
Ankara onboard for punitive actions against Tehran was already going to be a
challenge, but an Armenian genocide resolution would make it nearly
impossible. The Foreign Affairs Committee’s decision will also do much to
further impair the image of the United States in Turkey. Unlike many
countries around the globe, Turkey has not experienced a positive "Obama
effect."

Turkey and Armenia achieved a breakthrough in relations last summer and the
initialing of protocols for the normalization of relations between Ankara
and Yerevan. Yet nationalist politics on both sides, and the continued
Armenian occupation of the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, a
close ally of Turkey, have impeded the ratification of the protocols. Turkey
is likely to put ties with Armenia in a deep freeze should the House move
forward with the genocide resolution. This is unfortunate not only because
of the new round of tension that is likely to result, but also because
Armenia, which has posted strong macroeconomic growth rates in the last five
years, would lose out on the expected boost from access to the Turkish
economy and investment.

Finally, although Turkish society is often portrayed (for good reason) as
insular and nationalist, the reality is far more complex and nuanced. As
Turkey has become more modern and democratic, important voices have emerged
to challenge long-held orthodoxies.

Over the last few years, a number of journalists and academics have begun to
question the official narrative of the events of 1915 to try to come to
terms with the Armenian question. These individuals have come to recognize
that the perennial neuralgia of the Armenian genocide is not good for either
Turkey’s foreign relations or domestic politics. It is important to
underscore that this opening has been modest at best and is vulnerable to
political shocks. The nationalist backlash that is likely to come with
congressional recognition of the Armenian genocide will effectively shut
down this inchoate dialogue, indefinitely delaying Turkey’s own efforts to
come to grips with the events of 1915.