ARMENIAN GENOCIDE RESOLUTION AND THE FATE OF NABUCCO

Hurriyet
March 8 2010
Turkey

Two separate developments took place last Thursday at approximately
the same time which, at first sight, seemed totally unrelated.

Indeed, the fact that the Turkish Parliament’s ratification of the
intergovernmental agreement on the Nabucco project was followed by
the adoption of the resolution based on the Armenians’ claims of
genocide by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House
of Representatives was a pure coincidence.

Yet you can be sure that both developments that took place in two
capitals, thousands of miles away from each other, were monitored with
the highest interest in several capitals, like Vienna, Budapest, Rome,
Baku and Moscow. Because Turkish-Armenian relations and the issue of
the recognition of the 1915 killings of Armenians at the hands of
the Ottomans as genocide play an important role in the fate of the
Nabucco project, at least in the short term.

While none of the involved parties would accept, there is a clear
race to build the next major pipeline that will carry natural gas to
Europe. In the long run, Europe’s future energy needs might require
having both of the major pipelines that are now on the agenda. Yet
in the short and middle run, the outcome of the race will affect the
dominance of the European energy supply by Russia.

If the Nabucco project, designed to bring Caspian as well as Middle
Eastern natural gas to Europe via Turkey and the Balkans is realized
sooner rather than later, it will reduce European dependence on
Russia, striking a blow against Russia’s dominant position in the
European market.

Yet if the South Stream project, which will carry Russian gas under
the Black Sea to Europe, is realized before the Nabucco project,
then Moscow could take a deep breath.

Turkey’s ratification of the Nabucco agreement is expected to be
followed by Romania very soon, and thus, the ratification process of
the agreement will be completed. One of the next major steps is the
transit agreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which in the short
run will be the major supplier.

Yet this is where the "Armenian" issue makes its entrance to the
process. It is no secret that Baku is extremely anxious about the
prospect of normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia
before there is a solution to Nagorno-Karabakh, which is under
Armenian occupation.

Even an interim agreement between Baku and Yerevan on Armenian
withdrawal from Azeri territories surrounding the Karabakh region does
not seem in sight. And Turkey does not want to pass the normalization
protocols through the Parliament unless there is some kind of progress
on the Karabakh issue.

The Armenian resolution is lingering above its head and April 24, the
day Armenians want the U.S. president to make a "genocide statement"
is nearing. Yet it is obvious the ruling Justice and Development
Party will not send the protocols to the Parliament under these
circumstances unless a small-scale miracle takes place in the talks
between Baku and Yerevan.

Baku has so far refrained from fully committing itself to the Nabucco
project. It wants to be sure that Turkey will not open its borders
to Armenia before there is progress on Nagorno-Karabakh.

So the current imbroglio is delaying the transit deal between Turkey
and Azerbaijan and thus slowing down the Nabucco project. But how
long can Ankara and Baku afford to wait before finalizing a deal?

Ironically, maybe a major leap forward in the realization of the South
Stream project might provide the incentive to move ahead on Nabucco.