Hurriyet, Turkey
March 12 2010

The death of the official Armenian initiative

Friday, March 12, 2010
CENGÄ°Z AKTAR

With the adoption of the House Resolution on Thursday, March 4, in the
United States House of Representatives’ Foreign Relations Committee
regarding the Armenian Genocide, along with the adoption of a motion
Thursday in the Swedish Parliament, Turkey’s official denialist
positions have been hard hit. But the worst casualty of all is the
death of the Protocols signed between Armenia and Turkey in order to
normalize relations.

The adoption of the House Resolution in the U.S. subcommittee was
already the last nail in the coffin of the Protocols. Now with the
Swedish motion they can be considered as definitely dead. The result
means Armenia, Turkey and the remaining Caucasus countries actually
all lost.

When the Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers showed up in the Swiss
city of Zurich last fall, signing the Protocols was extremely
important for the parties and sponsor countries. The blueprints were
remarkable examples of diplomatic style that didn’t set any
preconditions nor spell out any contentious issue specifically. But
politicians got involved in them immediately.

The ratification process was hard hit first thanks to remarks by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an who, despite his poor insight on foreign
affairs, cannot help himself but speak out exactly like at home. He
tied up the Protocols’ ratification in Turkish Parliament with finding
a solution to the Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. So
it became clear that no ratification could take place in the Turkish
Parliament before the U.S. voting. That undoubtedly played a role in
the Genocide Bill being passed in the Foreign Relations Committee and
now in the Swedish Parliament.

Before the voting in U.S., Turkish politicians got completely involved
in the issue. Delegations armed with excessive self-confidence, sure
of their denialist certitudes but basically unfamiliar with the issue,
headed to Washington. The meaning of the voting was exaggerated;
Turkish public opinion was ill-informed to a degree that today people
in Turkey think that `the U.S. has approved the Armenian Genocide.’

However, as in the past similar cases, the bill may not even reach the
House floor. Due to the negative atmosphere created, the intentions to
settle scores among Turkish politicians and the opposition’s attempts
to turn this event into an advantage, the Protocols’ approval now
cannot be thought of separately from the Genocide Bill in U.S. and the
decision of the Swedish Parliament.

What happens next?

What will happen when the Protocols are shelved after all this
swaggering and bursts of pride?

Today, in the eye of the U.S. administration, Turkey gives the image
of an unreliable partner that is compelled to increase the dose of its
blackmail every time to impress lawmakers. The national outburst
coupled with the Swedish vote will probably add to that.

Secondly, in a wider perspective, the main aspect of the answer to the
hot question of recent times `Is Turkey turning its face to the East,
to the Islamic World?’ was the Armenian initiative.

Since this no longer exists, we are left with the images of the
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir’s visit to Turkey and connections
with Hamas and the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Concurrently, the prestige of Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu, who
has receive praise from every quarter for his various initiatives, has
suddenly fallen apart. While opening embassies in far-off capitals,
Turkey is calling back its envoys from the capitals of its allies and
friends.

Thirdly, Turkey, eager to play the mediator for every single conflict
around the world, appears to grossly failing in its attempt to settle
its domestic problems, i.e. the Armenian, Kurdish and Cyprus
conflicts.

Fourthly, in 2007, for the first time after ninety plus years, Turkey
has tried to take a different course to deal with the Great Disaster,
an event that tore apart Anatolia and annihilated Armenians and other
non-Muslims living there. The long-established official policy was
based on the denial of the disaster but hardly found any international
audience. As the 100th anniversary of 1915 approaches, the Turkish
establishment has become more irritated and worried. But with the
death of the Protocols, efforts to find a way out did not give any
sound results. Worse, with the failure of the Protocols, the
traditional, tough, denialist and defensive positions are resurfacing.

Civil diplomacy is key

In the end, what is to remain in mind is that the Turkish government
is a shrewd, visionless, conservative one that only tries to make
advantage of the situation but never compromises.

This being said, owing to its geopolitical position, Turkey remains a
critical country. So the above mentioned odds will sooner or later be
balanced out by its allies. That is to say, contrary to what Foreign
Minister DavutoÄ?lu claims, Turkey is still not the one who takes the
initiatives and is in control of developments around itself. The
Protocols fiasco is a proof of continued passiveness.

But it is also a proof that not the states but societies will build
the future. Even when there were no Protocols around, there were
countless relations between Armenians and Turks. The most tangible
result of the Protocols would have been the reopening of the border
gate on Turkish side because exchanges could have been easier. If the
gate remains closed, this will not have a negative effect on the
already existing relations. Civilian diplomacy, which continues
without state interference, will maybe someday affect the official
diplomacy lagging behind.

After all, what is fundamental and permanent is the individual and
social conscience.

And the relations between Armenians and Turks are a matter of
conscience that cannot be left to politicians and parliaments only.