Commonwealth Of Militarized States

COMMONWEALTH OF MILITARIZED STATES
by Vladimir Mukhin

WPS Agency
What the Papers Say (Russia)
March 17, 2010 Wednesday
Russia

NOT EVEN THE CRISIS COMPELLED POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES TO RESTRICT ARMS
SPENDINGS; Militarization of the post-Soviet zone continues.

Post-Soviet zone retains an alarming conflict potential. Military
budgets of CIS states and Georgia show that armed conflicts are
particularly likely in the South Caucasus and Caucasus. As a matter of
fact, not even the CIS countries located far from areas of potential
conflicts economize on their regular armies. The impression is that
everyone is making preparations for an all-out war.

Post-Soviet countries’ aggregate GDP dropped 7% but their aggregate
arms spendings in USD increased 5% from 2009 and 15% from 2008.

Leaders in the regional arms race are Georgia (4.56% of the GDP),
Armenia (4.07%), Azerbaijan (3.95%), and Uzbekistan with Ukraine (3.5%
each). Along with that, only economies of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan
displayed certain growth in 2009. All other countries finished the
year worse off then they had been. In Armenia, this deterioration
amounted to 15% – the worst throughout the Commonwealth.

It is fair to add meanwhile that these figures do not allow for
military aid to foreign allies. For example, military potential of
Armenia is augmented by the Defense Army of Nagorno-Karabakh. Sum total
of their arms expenditures therefore reach $600 million, according
to some estimates. It is logical of course because Karabakh conflict
resolution process is stuck. Besides, leadership of Azerbaijan keeps
making statements on a military solution to the problem, convinced
as it is that the Armenians occupy 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan.

Military potential of Azerbaijan is estimated at $9-10 billion
(9-10% of the GDP). Oil export revenues, intensive development of war
industry, and considerable mobilization designation reserve permit
Baku to boost this potential in case of need. No wonder the OSCE is
upset. Goran Lenmarker, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Special Envoy
for Karabakh, commented the other day that Azerbaijan should sequester
its military budget as part of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution
process. Lenmarker added that the procrastinated conflict was affecting
"economies of Armenia and Azerbaijan and people".

The Georgian GDP dropped in 2009 (the drop estimated at more than
$1 billion) but Mikhail Saakashvili’s regime does not appear to be
concerned. It spent $519 million on weapons and military hardware
in 2009 – and this figure does not even count military aid from the
United States and NATO. U.S. Undersecretary of State James Steinberg
said while visiting Tbilisi last month that the United States had kept
its promise of $1 billion worth of military aid to Georgia given in
the wake of the August war.

NATO is another generous contributor to Saakashvili’s war machine. The
Georgian-NATO Commission met in Brussels last week to discuss the 2010
program of cooperation. Deputy Premier Georgy Baramidze commented
that the program stood for continuation of democratic reforms and
reforms in the spheres of defense, economy, security, etc.

All things considered, it is hardly surprising that the Russian
leadership suspects Georgia capable of launching another offensive.

Fortunately, Moscow has been taking counter-measures. Military
infrastructure is being developed in runaway Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Sum total of Russian military and economic aid to these
self-proclaimed sovereign states exceeds Georgia’s military budget.

Visiting Sukhumi last year, Premier Vladimir Putin promised 15-16
billion rubles for development of military bases and border protection
infrastructure in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2010.

Where Central Asia is concerned, Uzbekistan remains a heavy spender.

Its military budget this year will exceed the Kazakh even though the
Kazakh GDP is more than two Uzbek ones. In any event, Uzbekistan will
spend 3.5% of the GDP on weapons and military hardware and Kazakhstan
only 1%.

Tashkent’s motives are quite understandable. First, ethnic tension in
Uzbekistan is considerable. Neither does overpopulation make things
any easier despite economic successes. These potential threats
to the regime are negated by the extensive and powerful apparat
of repressions. Second, Tashkent is constantly at odds with its
neighbors, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Also importantly,
the Uzbek regime is aiding NATO contingents in the Uzbek-populated
northern provinces of Afghanistan. It is said that Islam Karimov is
after control over the adjacent Afghani provinces, and that requires
powerful military resources indeed.

Even Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the poorest post-Soviet countries,
spend a great deal of weapons and military hardware. Their military
potentials heavily rely on aid from Russia, China, and some NATO
countries operating in Central Asia.

Military spendings of neutral Turkmenistan and Moldova this year remain
more or less unchanged since 2009. On the other hand, installation
of the so called "democratic coalition" in the corridors of power in
Kishinev may change everything yet. Made the defense minister last
year, Vitaly Marinuca announced that the demilitarization launched
by ex-president Voronin was a folly.

Marinuca added that the Pentagon had promised him some extensive
military personnel training programs.

Ukraine intends to up its military budget to $5.2 billion but that
remains to be seen yet. The 2010 budget was never adopted due to the
political chaos. What meager funds make it to the Ukrainian Armed
Forces are clearly insufficient for their current needs, much less
for development.

Crisis or not, Belarus kept its military budget on the last year
level (more than $900 million or 1.5% of the GDP). Several years ago,
official Minsk had boasted that by 2010 its military budget would
equal 2% of the GDP but that turned out to be one promise it never
kept. Anyway, military budget of the Russian-Belarussian union this
year will amount to $63 million or 39% of the whole budget.

Russian military expenditures in absolute figures will increase 3.4%
this year. The GDP fall and the higher dollar/ruble exchange rate,
however, show them drop almost $1.5 billion from what they were
in 2009.

Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No 51, March 17, 2010, pp. 1-2