NATIONALIST CREDENTIALS
Hurriyet
March 21 2010
Turkey
Much has been said and written on the remarks by Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan on the possible deportation of undocumented Armenian
workers from Turkey. I agree with all those who have called these
comments deeply offensive and morally and politically unacceptable.
The prime minister should be ashamed and, yes, it would be a sign of
regained self-control, if he would apologize.
I have the impression, watching the damage control efforts by some
leading Justice and Development Party, or AKP, politicians, that many
in his own party think their number one has gone too far. Maybe even,
deep down, the AKP leader has acknowledged that he grossly overstepped
the limits of decent political discourse. That would explain his
ongoing efforts, unconvincingly, to talk his way out of his gaffe.
After all the public indignation, one question remains unanswered. Why
did he make this comment? I am not convinced by the critics who claim
that it is the authoritarian personality or the hot-tempered character
of the prime minister or his infamous lack of diplomatic skills that
explain the faux pas.
I am afraid his remarks are part of a bigger plan. Of course,
his threat to retaliate against American and Swedish lawmakers by
expelling poor Armenian women, was ill-considered. But the effort to
show that he is tough on people and countries that hurt the feelings
of many Turks is well thought-out. And it is no coincidence, that it
is Turkey’s Armenia policy that is being used to bolster the AKP’s
nationalist credentials.
When Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu signed the Turkey-Armenia
protocols last October, I praised the vision and the courage of the
government. But I also warned that they were picking another fight
with the same determined, nationalist opponents. The people who opposed
the Armenian opening, then, were the same people who strongly objected
to the Kurdish opening, the reform of the judiciary, the changing of
the Constitution or pushing back the influence of the military. They
still do so today.
My fear is that the government has come to the conclusion that the
attempt to make a new start with Armenia is one fight too much. They
want to get out of this one in order to hopefully win some of the
other up-hill struggles they’ve got themselves in to.
That would explain why, since the signing of the protocols, the
prime minister and some other AKP leaders, with the exception of the
foreign minister, have done their utmost to frustrate the rapprochement
between Turkey and Armenia. By linking the ratification in parliament
to a solution of the Karabach conflict. By blowing a ruling of the
Armenian Constitutional Court out of proportions. By threatening to
stop the whole process after the adoption of genocide recognition
resolutions in the American and Swedish parliaments.
The last act in this well-calculated endeavor to get out of this
undertaking was the shot-from-the-hip last week. In the eyes of the
governing party, the Armenian opening has become a liability. It
could put a good result at the next elections in danger because the
nationalist part of the AKP electorate does not like it and because
the opposition parties would undoubtedly try to exploit this bid for
reconciliation as another proof of the AKP’s lack of true patriotism.
One year before the elections, electoral opportunism has taken
precedence over long-term benefits. Let’s face it. What would the
AKP lose if they give up on the Armenian initiative? Yes, they would
lose respect and admiration abroad. But the AKP strategists realize
that foreign praise does not win you national elections.
Turkish democrats would be disappointed, of course. But would they, as
a result, vote for parties that have even worse democratic credentials?
The fight to win the 2011 elections has started and Turkish-Armenian
relations are the first casualty.