WAS POLITICAL MESS OVER ARMENIAN GENOCIDE MEASURE AVOIDABLE?
Jason Epstein

The Cutting Edge
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Mar ch 22 2010

The Armenian Genocide Back to Slices

Did a lack of decisiveness at the White House result in a missed
opportunity to end the near-regular Congressional charade of judging
the horrific events in Eastern Anatolia of nearly 100 years ago?

Not surprisingly, the recent passage of the resolution labeling as
genocide the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians by a panel
in the House of Representatives caused Turks across the political
spectrum to express their outrage. The Foreign Ministry recalled envoy
Namik Tan for consultations, less than two weeks after he arrived in
Washington as the new ambassador. A senior ministry official predicted
that any hope of near-term progress on the Turkey-Armenia Protocols,
a bold attempt to by the two governments to resolve contentious
bilateral and regional issues, was gone. "So much for the new era
of US appreciation for the sensitivities and cultural nuances of
America’s allies," a Wall Street Journal editorial quipped.

Interestingly, the resolution passed the House Foreign Affairs
Committee by only a single vote, 23-22. Not only was the outcome
closer than an identical one from two years ago (27-21), but Chairman
Howard Berman (D-California) held the vote open for an astonishing
90 minutes in order to ensure that he had just enough votes to keep
the measure from going down in flames.

As both a senator and presidential candidate, Barack Obama repeatedly
called the events of 1915 a "genocide." However, President Obama has
not uttered the offending term, even when addressing the Turkish
Parliament 11 months ago. Moreover, in his Presidential Message
of April 24, the date that the American government recognizes the
Armenian deaths, the President again demurred. All indications now
are that his message next month will also not include the phrase. For
acting with such restraint, he deserves significant credit.

However, neither he nor his advisors commented on the resolution until
the very last minute, even though it had been re-introduced in both
houses of Congress over one year ago.

One week before the scheduled vote, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
hinted that the State Department still opposed to the resolution,
although she did not use explicit language.

Two days before the vote, the National Security Council spokesman
had no comment as to whether the White House would issue a statement,
let alone actively lobby against the resolution.

The night before the vote, Clinton telephoned Chairman Berman, urging
him to call it off, to no avail.

One day after the vote, a senior unnamed White House official told
a Washington Post reporter that an agreement had been reached with
Congressional leaders to ensure that the full body will not vote on
the resolution.

No wonder that an American journalist covering the issue described
the administration’s position as "addled."

A defeat of the resolution, which the Washington Post editorial
board once described as "worse than irrelevant," would have made
clear that Congress was not interested in peddling a measure that
unabashedly seeks to undermine, not just the strategic relationship
between the United States and Turkey, but eviscerate any possibility
of reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia.

Furthermore, Washington has not addressed one of the principal barriers
to the successful implementation of the Turkey-Armenia Protocols:
Azerbaijan’s concern that the Armenian seizure of its territory is
being ignored. After all, the closing of the border between Turkey
and Armenia in 1993 was a result of the conflict over the Armenian
occupation of Karabakh and surrounding territory, not the genocide
claims.

Azerbaijan is a pro-Western country, despite being sandwiched
between Russia and Iran, and has sent soldiers to Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Kosovo at the request of the United States and NATO. A major
hydrocarbon producer, Azerbaijan may one day end Europe’s addiction
to the current Russian energy monopoly with the Nabucco natural gas
pipeline project. Incredibly, the White House has not appeared too
interested in Azerbaijan’s strategic importance: on the one hand, it
has reportedly pressured Ankara to pursue parliamentary ratification;
on the other, it has not even bothered to send up the name of its
next ambassador to Baku to the Senate for confirmation, eight months
after the previous envoy departed.

Since man has yet to figure out a way to turn back time, we will
never know if a more strident effort from the White House against the
Armenian resolution would have persuaded a single Foreign Affairs
Committee member to switch their vote from "aye" to "nay," thereby
frightening its supporters, both in Congress and the grassroots,
from pushing another such vote for a decade or more.

What is known is that the Committee’s action did additional harm
to America’s image in Turkey and Azerbaijan, an outcome that surely
was not desired by an administration purportedly looking to repair
Washington’s relations in Muslim capitals.

Cutting Edge commentator Jason Epstein is President of Southfive
Strategies, LLC, in Washington, DC. He may be reached via e-mail
at feedback@southfive.com.