Eurasia Review
March 28 2010
Armenian Foreign Policy Between Russia, Iran And U.S.
Sunday, March 28, 2010
By Mikayel Zolyan, Yerevan for Caucasus Analytical Digest
The nature of Armenia’s relationship with the USA is quite complex.
For years Armenia had to cope with a serious dilemma in defining its
foreign policy. On the one hand, ever since its independence Armenia
has closely cooperated with Russia, on which it is heavily dependent
in such areas as security and economy. Armenia’s good neighborly
relations with Iran are also vital from the point of view of Armenia’s
economy and national security. On the other hand, Armenia is also
striving to forge close contacts with the West, including the USA and
Europe. While the Armenian government has repeatedly stated that it is
not planning to apply for NATO membership, it is closely cooperating
with NATO, and the level of this cooperation is comparable to those of
Armenia’s neighbors. This policy of simultaneously advancing relations
with Russia and the West is called `complementarism,’ a term
associated with Vardan Oskanian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from
1998 to 2008. However, though the term `complementarism’ originated in
the late 1990s, the idea behind it has been the main paradigm of
Armenian foreign policy since its independence.
Balancing between Americans and Russians: Armenia’s `complementarism’ policy
Armenia and Armenian issues have never been among the major priorities
for American foreign policy. However, from the point of view of the
United States, Armenia has a significance somewhat disproportionate to
its small size, scarce resources and low level of economic
development. This significance can be attributed to two main factors:
Armenia’s geopolitical location in an important borderland between
Europe, Central Eurasia and the Middle East and the existence of an
influential Armenian
Diaspora in the US.
The first time Armenia became a foreign policy issue for the US was
during World War I, when American diplomats did whatever was possible
to save the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire from extermination
by the Ottoman government. Throughout the two years of its existence
(1918`1920), the Republic of Armenia received humanitarian aid and
political support, earning President Woodrow Wilson consideration as a
friend of Armenia and Armenians. At one point Wilson’s administration
even had plans to put Armenia under the government of the United
States as a `mandate territory,’ but these plans were soon abandoned.
American assistance to Armenia, which remained mostly within the
limits of humanitarian aid, could not save the short-lived republic
from being occupied and divided by the Turkish Kemalist movement and
the Russian Bolsheviks. During the Soviet years, Armenian political
parties and organizations, banned in Soviet Armenia, thrived on
American soil. During the first years after the break-up of the USSR,
the USA offered massive humanitarian assistance to Armenia, which was
ravaged by the 1988 earthquake and suffering from the war with
Azerbaijan and the economic blockade imposed by Turkey. Throughout the
1990s global and regional settings seemed to favor the Armenian
`complementarism’ policy.
Through the 1990s relations between Russia and the West were mostly
constructive: while Russia cooperated with the West on many global
issues, the West did not explicitly challenge Russia’s influence in
the post-Soviet countries. However, in the beginning of the 2000s the
nature of the relations between the USA and Russia began to change,
due to multiple factors, ranging from the transition to a more
authoritarian regime in Russia to the American occupation of Iraq.
Russian`American relations were further complicated by `the colored
revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine and the warm welcome that these
revolutions found in the USA. The American support for the `colored
revolutions’ was perceived by the Russian elites as a direct
encroachment on Russian interests, and the competition between the two
global powers intensified, which complicated matters for Armenia and
put in doubt the future of the `complementarism’ policy. The latest
test to Armenia’s complementarism doctrine came in August 2008 with
the Russian-Georgian war. Armenia, however, managed to avoid choosing
sides in the confrontation and even successfully resisted the Russian
pressure to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
One of the most interesting aspects of `complementarism’ is Armenia’s
security policy. Armenia is a member of the Russian-dominated
Collective Security Treaty Organization and hosts Russian military
bases. However, even here Armenian authorities have sought to balance
Armenia’s extensive cooperation with Russia in the sphere of security
by steps in the direction of cooperation with the USA and NATO.
Although these steps have been largely symbolic, they were quite
significant as they sent an important message of openness for
cooperation.
One of these steps was the participation of an Armenian regiment in
the NATO peace keeping operation in Kosovo. Another example of that
cooperation is Armenia’s decision to dispatch an Armenian non-combat
unit to Iraq. In spite of the relatively small scale of the mission,
this has been quite a significant step, when measured against the
general context of Armenian foreign policy, and especially the
existence in some countries of the Middle East (including Iraq) of
large Armenian communities vulnerable to terror and radicalism. A new
affirmation of Armenia’s determination to cooperate with the USA came
in late 2009, when the Armenian government sanctioned the
participation of a small Armenian military regiment in the peace
keeping operation in Afghanistan.
Another test of the policies of `complementarism’ is Armenia’s
relationship with Iran. While historically Iran has often been
perceived as a threat, today Armenia enjoys a close relationship with
the country. Reconciling the need to maintain good relations with Iran
and Armenia’s partnership with the USA was relatively easy in the
1990s, when moderates and reformers like Rafsanjani and Khattami
dominated Iranian politics. However, the balancing act became more
difficult when relations between Iran and the US (and the West in
general) deteriorated under Bush and Ahmadinejad. In general, though,
the West has viewed Armenia’s cooperation with Iran with
understanding, since Armenia’s geopolitics and conflicts with Turkey
and Azerbaijan make good relations with Iran a strategic necessity for
Armenia. In its turn the Iranian leadership has been keen to preserve
the good relationship with Armenia and resisted calls from some
radicals to openly support Muslim `brothers’ in Azerbaijan against
Armenia in the Karabakh conflict. Of course, Iran has a number of
unresolved issues in its relationship with Azerbaijan that influence
its policies in the South Caucasus.
The USA as a Mediator: Turkish-Armenian Relations and the Karabakh Conflict
One of the most important issues from the point of view of American
policy vis-a-vis Armenia and the region in general is the issue of
Armenian-Turkish relations. The US has been involved in efforts to
break the ice in Armenian-Turkish relations for a long time.
Complementing calls on both sides to normalize relations, the US
intervention included unofficial mediation efforts and track two
diplomacy, as in the case of the American-sponsored Turkish-Armenian
Reconciliation Committee (TARC), an informal group that consisted of
former diplomats from Armenia and Turkey. Since 2008, especially in
the wake of the Russian-Georgian war in August, the USA actively
supported the so-called `football diplomacy’ and the Armenian-Turkish
normalization process.
When Barak Obama visited Turkey in April 2009 he made a reference to
Armenian-Turkish relations and called for opening the border that had
been sealed by the Turkish government in the early 1990s. The April
23, 2009, Armenian-Turkish statement about the existence of a roadmap
for normalization came about in part thanks to the serious involvement
of American diplomacy, including a late night telephone call Serzh
Sargsyan received from Vice President Joe Biden. Similarly, when in
October 2009 the signing of Armenian-Turkish normalization protocols
was under threat, the mediation by US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton together with her Russian colleague Sergey Lavrov, was
instrumental in securing the signatures of both Armenian and Turkish
sides.
While American involvement in Turkish-Armenian relations has mostly an
indirect and informal character, in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, the USA officially plays the role of mediator as one of the
co-chairs of the Minsk Group. Both sides have criticized the mediators
in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process and sometimes have blamed them
for the fact that no political solution to the conflict has been
reached so far. However, it is difficult to deny the positive role of
the mediators in preventing the conflict from reemerging as a
full-scale violent confrontation. The US government position on the
Karabakh issue is quite complex. On the one hand, US diplomats have
often repeated that the US does not consider Nagorno-Karabakh an
independent state and recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,
something that invites criticism in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as
well as within the Armenian-American community. On the other hand, the
US has offered millions of dollars in humanitarian aid to
Nagorno-Karabakh, in spite of protests coming from Azerbaijan.
Armenian Americans: Realities and Myths
As noted above, one of the factors that determines Armenia’s
significance for American foreign policy is the existence of an
important Armenian-American community.
Though relatively small compared to some other ethnic communities
within the USA (estimates usually put the number of Armenians in the
USA at over one million), the Armenian community is well-organized and
vocal in the defense of its interests and priorities. The Armenian
community’s significance is boosted by the fact that Armenians are one
of the most established and well-integrated ethnic communities of the
US. The roots of the Armenian American community go back to the late
19th and early 20th centuries, when thousands of Armenians fleeing
massacres in the Ottoman Empire found refuge in the USA. Since then
generations of Armenians have successfully integrated into American
society while keeping a strong attachment to their historical
homeland. Large numbers of Armenians can be classified as middle
class, and some Armenians have successfully entered the top levels of
American government, business and culture.
The Armenian community in the USA maintains close connections with
Armenia. The idea that contributing to the historical homeland is a
moral obligation for American Armenians is quite widespread. While in
most cases these contributions take the form of financial assistance
and charity, there have also been certain cases, when prominent
Armenian Americans relocated to Armenia, as did Raffi Hovannisian, a
lawyer from California, who became the first minister of foreign
affairs of independent Armenia and who is an influential figure in
contemporary Armenian politics.
For decades the focus of American Armenians has been winning official
recognition by the US government that the extermination of Armenians
by the Ottoman government in 1915 constituted an act of genocide. This
campaign usually focuses on two main goals: ensuring that the US
president uses the term in his address to Armenian Americans on April
24, the day when Armenians around the world remember the victims, and
passing a Congressional resolution, which would officially recognize
the mass killings of 1915 as genocide. Though Ronald Reagan used the
word `genocide’ in referring to the Armenian genocide in 1981, most US
presidents have avoided the term since then. A constant source of
bitterness for American Armenians is the fact that virtually all
successful presidential candidates have given the promise to recognize
the genocide during the election campaign in order to gain the votes
of American Armenians, and later reneged on that promise, fearing an
angry reaction from Turkey.
During the latest election campaign, Barak Obama issued several strong
statements advocating the need to recognize and condemn the genocide
officially. Although it can be argued that Obama has come closer to
fulfilling his promise than most of his predecessors ` in his April
24, 2009, address to the Armenian community, he announced that his
views on the issue are on the record and have not changed and used the
Armenian term Eghern (literally ` `a great crime, a man-made
catastrophe’), which is comparable to using the Hebrew term `Shoah’ to
describe the Holocaust ` many American Armenians were bitterly
disappointed by Obama’s decision to avoid the use of the English (and
international) term genocide. The issue of official recognizing the
genocide has long since gone beyond being an issue that concerns only
American Armenian voters and the American government.
Turkey has reacted angrily to the genocide recognition campaign and
repeatedly warned that the damage done to American-Turkish relations
by the recognition would be irreparable. Moreover, the Turkish
government spends millions of dollars in awareness campaigns and
lobbying in an effort to counter those carried out by American
Armenian organizations. Ironically, contrary to the hopes of the
Armenians and fears of the Turks, an official recognition of the
genocide by the American government is unlikely to have any immediate
practical effect, while the ongoing genocide recognition campaign is
an effective tool of spreading awareness about the genocide and
putting pressure on the Turkish government to come to terms with its
country’s past. In any case, the activities of the Armenian community
are among the factors that, along with geopolitical considerations,
have influenced the US government’s interest in the normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations.
However, it would be wrong to overestimate the influence of the
so-called `Armenian lobby’ over the formulation of American policy
towards Armenia and the region. Besides, it is important to remember
that on certain issues there are important differences and divisions
between the government of Armenia and some Diaspora organizations, as
well as between different segments of the Diaspora itself. A recent
example of these differences is the mixed reaction with which Diaspora
Armenians reacted to Serzh Sargsyan’s initiative of normalizing
relations with Turkey and the signing of the Armenian-Turkish
protocols. Sargsyan, who visited Los Angeles prior to signing the
protocols, faced a cold reception from some influential Armenian
American organizations and massive street protests by local Armenians.
While some American Armenian organizations, such as the Armenian
Assembly of America (AAA) have cautiously supported the normalization
of Turkish-Armenian relations, others, such as the Armenian National
Committee of America (ANCA), have criticized the Turkish-Armenian
process and the American government’s role in it.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the nature of the relationship between Armenia and
the USA has been quite complex. Armenia has managed to combine an
alliance with Russia and good relations with Iran with a close
partnership with the USA and a drive to participate in European
integration.
Global and regional trends, as well as internal developments might
influence Armenia’s policy, pushing it from one side of this spectrum
to the other. The current trend of `reset’ in the relations between
the USA and Russia offers certain hopes that Armenia’s
`complementarism’ policy might bear fruit. Normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations is one of those issues, in which the
positions of the American and Russian governments largely coincide, at
least at this point. Armenia’s `complementarism’ policy is also
dependent on the future of Iranian-American relations: the fate of the
Obama administration’s initiatives on Iran and the outcome of the
post-election struggle in Iran will certainly influence Armenia’s
position between Iran and the West. However, even taking into account
all these factors, the long term foreign policy strategy of Armenian
elites is unlikely to change. Armenia’s history, geopolitics and
current situation suggest that for years to come Armenian foreign
policy will be dominated by the need to find a balance between
stronger neighbors and global powers.
About the Author: Mikayel Zolyan is assistant professor at Yerevan
State Linguistic University. He received his Ph. D. in history from
Yerevan State University and has studied at the Nationalism Studies
program of Central European University in Budapest.
Source:
This article first appeared under the title of "My Friend’s Enemy is
my Friend: Armenian Foreign Policy between Russia, Iran and the United
States" (PDF) and was published in the 15 Feb 2010 edition of the
Caucasus Analytical Digest on pages 2-5. The article is reprinted with
permission.
The Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD) is a monthly internet publication
jointly produced by the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Tbilisi, the
Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen,
the Resource Security Institute in Washington, DC and the Center for
Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich with support from the German
Association for East European Studies (DGO).
Recommended Reading:
Alexander Iskandaryan, `NATO and Armenia: A Long Game of
Complementarism,’ Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 5, April 16, 2009.
armenian-foreign-policy-between.html