TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST: AMBITIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

International Crisis Group
April 7 2010

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Turkey is launching initiative after ambitious initiative aimed
at stabilising the Middle East. Building on the successes of its
normalisation with Syria and Iraq, it is facilitating efforts to reduce
conflicts, expanding visa-free travel, ramping up trade, integrating
infrastructure, forging strategic relationships and engaging in
multilateral regional platforms. For some, this new activism is
evidence that Turkey is turning from its traditional allies in Europe
and the United States. In fact, its increased role in the Middle East
is a complement to and even dependent on its ties to the West.

This report assesses Turkey’s growing engagement with the Middle East
within the broader frame of Turkish foreign and trade policy. The
process is still in its infancy, faces official scepticism in Arab
governments and has divided opinion among Turkey’s Western allies.

Yet, the attempts to grow the regional economy, create interdependence
and foster peace have positive potential. At a time when negotiations
to join the European Union (EU) have faltered, Ankara has adopted
early EU gradualist integration tactics for post-Second World War
peace in Europe as a model for strengthening long-term stability and
healing the divisions of the Middle East.

Turkey’s self-declared "zero-problem" foreign policy to end disputes
with its neighbours has worked well in Syria and Iraq, and its
facilitation role in some Middle East conflicts has booked some
success, for instance in hosting Syria-Israel proximity talks in 2008.

Ankara has been less effective, however, in intractable matters
like the dispute between Fatah and Hamas. The sharpening tone of
Turkey-Israel relations has raised Turkish leaders’ popularity among
Middle Eastern publics but has undermined trust among traditional
allies in Washington, Brussels and even some Arab capitals.

Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP)
leaders’ rhetoric, and their new regional activism extending from
Persian Gulf states to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Organisation of
the Islamic Conference (OIC), have given rise to perceptions that they
have changed Turkey’s fundamental Westward direction to become part of
an Islamist bloc, are attempting to revive the Ottoman Empire or have
"turned to the East". These are incorrect. The basic trends in the
country’s regional activism seen today were well established before
AKP came to power, and NATO membership and the relationship with the
U.S. remain pillars of Turkish policy.

While Turkey is bitter over attacks by France, Germany and others on
its EU negotiation process between 2005 and 2008, half of its trade
is still with the EU, and less than one quarter of its exports go to
Middle East states – a proportion typical for the past twenty years.

The global nature of Turkey’s realignment is underlined by the fact
that Russia and Greece have been among the biggest beneficiaries of
its regional trade boom.

Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has been shifting
its foreign policy priority from hard security concerns to soft
power and commercial interests and moving away from being a kind of
NATO-backed regional gendarme to a more independent player determined
to use a plethora of regional integration tools in order to be taken
seriously on its own account. Turkey’s U.S. and EU partners should
support these efforts towards stabilisation through integration.

Ankara has many balls in the air and sometimes promises more than it
can deliver, over-sells what it has achieved and seeks a role far
away when critical problems remain unsolved at home. Turkey’s new
prominence is partly attributable to confusion in the region after the
U.S. invasion of Iraq, a situation that is not necessarily permanent.

Some Middle Eastern governments are also wary of the impact on their
own publics of emotional Turkish rhetoric against Israel or about
implicit claims to represent the whole Muslim world.

Turkey should sustain the positive dynamics of its balanced
relationships with all actors in the neighbourhood and its efforts
to apply innovatively the tactics of early EU-style integration
with Middle East neighbours. While doing so, however, it should
pay attention to messaging, both internationally, to ensure that
gains with Middle Eastern public opinion are not undercut by loss of
trust among traditional allies, and domestically, to ensure that all
Turkish constituencies are included, informed and committed to new
regional projects over the long term. Also, it will gain credibility
and sustainability for its ambitions if it can solve disputes close
to home first, like Cyprus and Armenia.

Middle Eastern elites worry about any sign of Ankara turning its back
on its EU accession process. Much of their recent fascination with
Turkey’s achievements derives from the higher standards, greater
prosperity, broader democracy, legitimacy of civilian rulers,
advances towards real secularism and successful reforms that have
resulted from negotiating for membership of the EU. At the same time,
Turkey and its leaders enjoy unprecedented popularity and prestige in
Middle Eastern public opinion, notably thanks to their readiness to
stand up to Israel. Turkey’s new strength, its experience in building
a strong modern economy and its ambition to trade and integrate with
its neighbours offer a better chance than most to bring more stability
and reduce the conflicts that have plagued the Middle East for so long.