THE ARMENIAN ‘GENOCIDE’ ISSUE AND CHANGING TURKISH DIPLOMACY
by CENAP CAKMAK

Today’s Zaman
April 14 2010
Turkey

A discourse of active diplomacy and the development of political
solutions, such as the signing of protocols and statements between
Armenia and Turkey, is what Turkey should have pursued much earlier.

Turkish foreign policy has long ignored the Armenian genocide dispute,
adopting an indifferent approach to claims raised by the Armenian
diaspora and ambitious efforts to ensure the recognition of mass
killings in the early 20th century in Ottoman territories as a crime of
‘genocide.’

Negligent foreign policy design has up until recently remained silent
regarding these efforts, suggesting that the makers of Turkish foreign
policy did not consider this a problem at all. Apparently Turkey is
now paying the price for the long-standing negligence and historical
mistakes as it becomes evident that the genocide claims have developed
to undermine Turkey’s prestige in world politics and its ambitions
to become a leading actor in the international arena.

This determination, above all, indicates that Turkey admits the
existence of the problem; and for this reason alone, the recent
initiatives are important and deserve further attention. The greatest
mistake that Turkish foreign-policy makers made with respect to the
Armenian genocide dispute so far was that they gave an impression that
suggested there was no such problem for Turkey. In fact, this state
of negligence is a general problem from which Turkish foreign policy
has been suffering for decades. In other words, the administrators
of the Turkish foreign policy apparatus assumed the absence of the
problem rather than taking the proper measures to address it. In the
absence of diplomatic efforts by Turkish foreign policy actors, the
problems have grown into serious threats in the venues where Turkey
has remained inactive. This is also more or less the case with the
Armenian genocide dispute. Turkey has for a long time not acknowledged
the existence of an Armenian genocide issue; however, it developed a
superficial policy to deal with the problem when it observed that the
number of countries recognizing the claims has grown, implying that
this could become a visible threat to its national interests. The
late recognition of the problem and the ungrounded response to the
emerging threat have led to some mistakes.

Some major mistakes

1- Failure to discuss the issue within an objective context: With
respect to the genocide claims, Turkey has historically voiced a
pretty disturbing discourse in an attempt to defend its position,
which has attracted a great deal of reaction. This further ensured the
consolidation of the Armenian claims and the growth of international
support for the cause seeking recognition of an Armenian genocide.

Promoters of the Armenian genocide claims, i.e., the Armenian diaspora,
were able to advance their cause because of this disturbing attitude
and to present Turkey as a country denying committing the worst
crime. In other words, Turkey failed to ensure a technical discussion
of the issue, giving the impression that it ignored the anguish of the
people who lost their relatives and the memories of those who died in
deserts in the early 20th century. This eventually drew the reaction
and attention of the world. However, had the makers of Turkish foreign
policy adopted a more selective and careful discourse, explaining
that the Armenians who vanished during the process of deportation were
Ottomans whose death was a great loss for the cultural diversity and
fabric of this land and argued that the killings could not be viewed
as genocide from the perspective of international law, Turkey would
have been far from its current poor image. However, the Turkish side
has relied on a fairly nationalistic discourse which it pursued to
blame the Armenians for what happened back then; some racist circles
even implied that the Armenians who perished in that period got what
they deserved.

2- Reliance on legally unconvincing arguments: Turkish foreign
policy, unable to give a consistent and coherent stance vis-a-vis
the Armenian genocide claims, has tried to respond to these claims by
relying on some superficial legal arguments that could be considered
inconsistent with the general rules and principles of international
law. This seriously undermined Turkey’s credibility. The arguments
and theses drafted without reviewing international literature on
the crime of genocide and grasping the overall trends in recent
developments in international criminal law did not serve Turkey’s
interests and cause; quite the contrary, they contributed to the
claims held by the Armenian diaspora. Emphasis on the argument that
the crime of genocide is not retrospective was strategically wrong,
and this argument drafted in reliance of a controversial issue from
a legal standpoint further raised doubts as to whether Turkey is
really well equipped to deal with the legal aspect of the issue. Even
if it is agreed that the crime of genocide is not retrospective,
relying on such a controversial argument and thesis would imply that
Ottoman Turkey might have committed genocide but it is impossible
to investigate the validity of such claims; this may be viewed as
indirect acknowledgement of the Armenian assertions.

Eagerness to carry the issue to international legal mechanisms

In addition, Turkey’s eagerness to take the issue to the adjudication
of international legal mechanisms does not refer to a well-crafted
initiative. It is not a coherent and effective approach to point
to a vague international judicial institution as if there is an
international court or mechanism of arbitration ready to take care of
the problem. It may seem appealing to argue that the Armenian genocide
claims should be taken to international adjudication; however, those
who refer to this option should also be able to name the institution
that could address the dispute and the international instrument that
this institution could rely on in the settlement of this dispute.

3- Failure to take political action despite the political nature of the
issue: The Armenian genocide claims are, to a large extent, political;
the involvement of foreign parliaments in the issue proves this. Turkey
has been well aware of this. In fact, it should be noted that the
Turkish side has made frequent references to the political dimension
of the issue. However, paradoxically, despite this awareness, Turkish
diplomacy has never considered any political measures to tackle this
problem. The diplomatic ability and creativity of Turkey’s foreign
policy establishment has been limited to the promotion of lobbying
activities to ensure that the US Congress does not a pass a resolution
recognizing the claims. However, what really needs to be done is to
lay the foundations of a position in which recognition of the Armenian
claims would not make any difference to Turkey’s bilateral relations
with the US and its overall standing in world politics.

Obviously, this is not an easy task. In addition, the achievement
of such an environment requires the existence of a proactive style
of foreign policy. However, it seems that there is no other way to
handle the Armenian genocide dispute. Turkish foreign policy, which has
preferred adopting a defensive stance regarding the Armenian genocide
claims and has abstained from developing an influential political
style, failed to offer an attractive diplomatic solution. However,
what should have been done was to rely on a discourse of active
diplomacy and the development of political solutions instead of some
incoherent legal arguments that proved futile; this is in fact what
is being done in this new era. The protocols signed with Armenia
could be viewed from this perspective although whether they will
create some useful results still remains uncertain. This stance,
developed outside the context of the genocide discussions, has forced
the Armenian side to make additional moves despite the fact that
it bears some risks. In the end, these moves will require political
responses from the parties to the issue and will lead the way to the
achievement of a definitive solution.

* Assistant Professor Cenap Cakmak teaches international law and
politics at EskiÅ~_ehir Osmangazi University and works as a senior
researcher at the Wise Men Center for Strategic Research (BÄ°LGESAM)