FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief
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Thursday 22 April 2010
TURKEY: WHAT CRIMINAL TRIALS DO AND DON’T REVEAL
It was expected that Turkey’s trial of those accused of murdering three
Malatya Protestants would end last week, Güzide Ceyhan notes in a
commentary for Forum 18 News Service <;. But an
indictment related to Operation Cage – an alleged Navy plan targeting
Turkey’s non-Muslim communities – has been added to the case file but not
yet merged with the case. The murders of journalist Hrant Dink, Catholic
priest Fr Andrea Santoro and the three Malatya Protestants – Necati Aydin,
Tillman Geske and Ugur Yüksel – are expressly identified as helping Cage
realise its purposes. This Operation aimed to destabilise the AKP
government by both targeting non-Muslims and encouraging protests about
their targeting. But what have the criminal trials – very important as they
are – really revealed? The tragic irony is that even if Cage is fictitious,
freedom of religion or belief for all in Turkey is both limited and under
threat. The government has focused on the issues which can most damage the
AKP, i.e. possibly Ergenekon-related violent attacks on non-Muslim
individuals. But Turkey’s many other serious challenges to freedom of
religion or belief have not been resolved. The government needs to take
action now on those challenges, whether or not they feature in trial
proceedings.
TURKEY: WHAT CRIMINAL TRIALS DO AND DON’T REVEAL
By Güzide Ceyhan
Turkish Protestants and human rights defenders expected that the Malatya
murder trial hearing on 15 April would be the last in their three-year long
pursuit of justice for the savage killings of Necati Aydin, Tillman Geske
and Ugur Yüksel. The three were murdered in April 2007 in the Christian
publishing house where they worked. In the previous hearing on 19 February,
the prosecutors had asked for life sentences three times over for the five
young men – Emre Günaydın, Cuma Özdemir, Abuzer
Yıldırım, Hamit Çeker and Salih Gürler – who are imprisoned
and accused of the murders.
However, an indictment related to Operation Cage Plan – an alleged Navy
plan targeting Turkey’s non-Muslim communities – has been added to the case
file. The files have not been merged yet, as the judges have to first
investigate the added file, and then determine whether a reasonable
relationship exists between the murders and the alleged plan. The
prosecutors have requested that claims for the merger of the two cases be
rejected at this stage "because there is no evidence indicating a concrete
connection between the two cases". The judges have decided to postpone the
decision to the next trial to take place on 14 May (see Compass Direct 21
April 2010 < urkey/17583/>).
Operation Cage
The Operation Cage Plan was found on a CD seized in April 2009 from the
office of a retired Naval Major, Levent Bektaş, who is a suspect in
the Ergenekon case (see F18News 21 October 2008
< e_id=1206>). An English-language
translation of the Plan is at .
The plan reveals that prominent Turkish non-Muslim figures were targeted
for assassination, to diminish international and domestic public support
for the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). The murders of
Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink, Catholic priest Fr Andrea Santoro
and the three Protestants in Malatya are expressly identified in the plan
as having helped achieve this goal, by encouraging the view that
non-Muslims living in Turkey were killed by fundamentalist religious
groups.
However, the Plan goes on to say that "propaganda (..) staged by the AKP"
has successfully attributed these crimes to Ergenekon (see F18News 10 July
2007 < 990>).
The Cage Plan targeted non-Muslims generally, but the only named targets
were Christian by faith or background. Groups such as Baha’is and Jehovah’s
Witnesses were not specifically identified in the Plan. The logic behind
Cage choosing these targets seems to be that planners thought this would
evoke most responses outside Turkey, and thus more negative foreign
coverage and reactions against the AKP.
Chance to reveal what lay behind murders and advance justice
The media supportive of the AKP government strongly supports the view that
all these murders were indeed arranged by Ergenekon, as the Cage Indictment
states. The Indictment, prepared by state prosecutors, was accepted by
Istanbul’s 12th Criminal Court in March 2010. However, throughout the legal
proceedings of the case against Fr Santoro’s murderer – O.A. who was 15 at
the time of the murder on 5 February 2006 – no actionable connection to any
other instigators or larger plot was established in the trial, beyond a
climate of intolerance (see F18News 9 February 2006
< e_id=724>).
It is certainly not implausible that there could be more behind Fr
Santoro’s murder than an isolated individual’s action, as some in Turkey
strongly suspect. It remains unclear, for example, why Turkey’s National
Intelligence Organisation (MIT) secret police had a flat facing the Trabzon
church where Fr Santoro was murdered (see F18News 10 July 2007
< e_id=990>). And it has yet to be
seen whether the Cage Indictment will have any legal implications for Fr
Santoro’s case. The High Court of Appeals on 4 October 2007 confirmed an
18-year jail sentence imposed on O.A.
Since the beginning of the Malatya trial, the families of the victims,
lawyers for the victims (who are not Christians), and the Protestant
community have become convinced that the killings were part of a bigger
plan involving many actors targeting the Christian community as a whole
(see F18News 21 October 2008
< e_id=1206>). The prospect of the
merger of the two cases has thus created hopes that this may make it
possible to investigate the background of the murders, and bring to justice
all those responsible.
Cage’s aims
One of the methods of creating a perception of hostility and insecurity for
non-Muslims, described in the Cage Plan, is disinformation against
non-Muslim minorities. Accordingly, websites and other media and
communication tools were to be used to spread the perception that
non-Muslims constitute a threat to the nation and are divisive. This it was
hoped would lead to hostile acts against non-Muslims.
The Plan also aimed at taking advantage of many people’s fears of the AKP
and its religious roots. Such people who could be used for this included
members of vulnerable groups in Turkey, prominent writers opposed to the
AKP, influential foreign non-Muslims, secular and democratic-minded Turkish
citizens worried by the threat of enforced sharia (Islamic law), and
religious leaders of non-Muslim communities. The instigators of Cage hoped
that such people would make statements that their communities are under
threat in Turkey.
Clearly, the plan aimed to orchestrate many people to create the perception
that non-Muslims are under threat in Turkey because of the rise of Islam
and particularly the AKP. Hence, many people played a part in the execution
of Cage without actually knowing about it and embracing its purposes.
Cage’s goal – if the plan is authenticated – was to use the apparently
contradictory ends of both inciting hostile actions against non-Muslims,
and inciting condemnation of this hostility, to undermine the stability of
the AKP government.
Tragic irony
The tragic irony is that even if Cage is an entirely fictitious plan,
non-Muslims in Turkey – as well as Muslims – have good reason to think that
freedom of religion or belief in Turkey is both limited and under threat.
The actions and policies of the state – independent of Ergenekon and Cage –
allow no other conclusion to be drawn (see the F18News Turkey religious
freedom survey at < 1379>).
After Ergenekon arrests attacks decline
It has been noticeable that, after the start of arrests related to
Ergenekon, the media became less hostile to vulnerable religious
communities, particularly Christians. This is noted in the 2009 Report on
Human Rights Violations prepared by the Association of Protestant Churches,
published on 30 January 2010 (text in English at
< ion=com_content&view=article&id=1153&I temid=470>).
The Report pointed out that 2009 saw a "decrease in defamatory and false
information directed towards Christians by heavily biased publications".
However it also notes Protestant concern that "frequent hate and slander
filled publications continue in local media and on the internet". The Cage
Indictment exposes a plan to utilise the media for hostile and defamatory
coverage against non-Muslim communities, and such hostile coverage does
indeed happen (see F18News 22 October 2009
< e_id=1365>).
However, proving a connection between orders given by named persons and
this hostile coverage has not been possible. The exposure of the Cage Plan
is on its own unlikely to help identify such a connection. Indeed, people
may have acted as if they were following the Cage Plan without knowing
about Cage, out of a genuine – but irrational and unfounded – fear that
"missionary activities" are a threat to Turkey (see the F18News Turkey
religious freedom survey at
< id=1379>).
It is not possible to know exactly what actions planned by those who
produced Cage have been carried out, and what actions are unrelated to
those people. For instance, it is known that assassinations were plotted
against the Armenian Patriarch Mesrob Mutafyan, the leader of Sivas’
Armenian community Minas Durmaz Güler, and Ali Balkiz and Kazim Genç in the
Alevi community. However, it has not yet been established that these were
directly orchestrated by the Cage planners, or whether it is a result of
the already existing social intolerance.
Indeed, the Interior Ministry issued a Decree asking for reinforced
protection of non-Muslim citizens and requesting increased alertness for
intelligence that might reveal planned attacks (19/06/2007, No. 508).
Efforts have since been made to prevent attacks on non-Muslim citizens from
happening again, and it is clear that these efforts have been successful to
some degree with the uncovering of several plots (see the F18News Turkey
religious freedom survey at
< id=1379>).
Government hasn’t addressed underlying issues
Yet it is important to note that the government focused its efforts mainly
on preventing violent attacks on non-Muslim individuals and their property;
the many other existing freedom of religion or belief issues were not
addressed. What does this imply? Some suspect that the government’s real
concern is to prevent attacks that would damage its reputation
internationally.
There is almost a perception, with almost a feeling of relief, among
vulnerable religious communities that the brutal murders were just a plan
by a small violent group within the military – an isolated event, not
reflecting any negative attitudes towards Christians and other religious
communities in Turkey. Indeed, the AKP government seems to be trying to
show that they embrace positive policies in favour of freedom of religion
or belief in Turkey.
However, the European Commission Turkey 2009 Progress Report has
highlighted many serious freedom of religion or belief problems, which have
either hardly or not at all been been raised in criminal trials. These
issues must be resolved to turn rhetoric on religious freedom into reality
(see
< df/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf>).
The issues requiring resolution include: the property disabilities and
confiscations faced by communities as varied as the Alevi Muslims,
Catholics, the Greek Orthodox, Protestants, the Syrian Orthodox Church and
the Jehovah’s Witnesses (see F18News 27 October 2009
< e_id=1368>); the lack of legal
status of religious communities themselves under the Foundations and other
laws (see F18News 13 March 2008
< e_id=1100>); the non-existent
legal possibility of conscientious objection to military service (see
F18News 17 March 2010
< e_id=1423>); and compulsory
intolerant religious education in public schools (see the F18News Turkey
religious freedom survey at
< id=1379>).
Intolerance of freedom of thought, conscience and belief remains
Sadly, irrespective of who was behind Ergenekon or Cage, Turkish society
does not demonstrate a tolerant or respectful attitude towards people of
different religious communities. An interesting study conducted by
Istanbul’s Sabanci University in 2009, "Religiosity in Turkey- An
International Study", reveals that of those who joined the study, 66 per
cent said that members of other religions should not be allowed to expound
their ideas by organising meetings open to the public. Indeed, 62 per cent
said they should not be allowed to give out books that explain their views.
The survey is available in Turkish from
< ;.
The sample used in the Survey was determined according to the standards
established by the Turkish Statistical Institution, and represented a wide
geographical range and randomly selected participants. A Protestant who
wished to remain anonymous concurred with the result of the Survey, stating
that "this is exactly our experience. Commitment to freedom of religion is
often in general terms supported by people. But when it comes to specifics,
there is a strong resistance to allowing the teaching of one’s religion,
the establishment of churches, etc. This resistance comes both from
officials and from ordinary citizens."
Unfortunately, many Turks do indeed have a deep-rooted hostility to
Christians and other religious minorities (see F18News 15 April 2008
< e_id=1115>). Powerful forces in
the "deep state" have built on and support this intolerance (see F18News 22
October 2009 < 1365>).
Conclusion
The Cage Indictment exposes an undercover plan by the "deep state", which
aims to use the Dink, Santoro and Malatya murders and public opinion
manipulation to create the view that non-Muslim Turkish citizens are
targeted by fundamentalist religious groups. The file is like Pandora’s Box
and has raised far more questions than answers. If it is merged with the
Malatya case, there is no doubt that it will take the case to another level
where it might be possible to address the broader issues that led to the
murders. However this will take many more years, as it will be added to a
cluster of cases around the Ergenekon case, which itself raises many issues
related to the right to fair trial with prolonged imprisonments without any
verdict and legal means of retrieval of evidence. The results and impact of
these cases are impossible to accurately predict.
And the government still needs to take action now on the other real
challenges to freedom of religion or belief in Turkey, irrespective of
whether they feature in trial proceedings. (END)
PDF and printer-friendly views of this article can be accessed from
< e_id=1434>. It may freely be
reproduced, redistributed or quoted from, with due acknowledgement to Forum
18 <;.
For more background, see Forum 18’s Turkey religious freedom survey at
< id=1379>.
More analyses and commentaries on freedom of thought, conscience and belief
in Turkey can be found at
< mp;religion=all&country=68>.
A compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments can be found at
< id=1351>.
A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
< s/atlas/index.html?Parent=mideast&Rootmap=turk ey>.
(END)
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