TURKEY: DAVUTOGLU’S TO-DO LIST

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26 April 2010

Following his trip to the United States, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu traveled to Azerbaijan April 19, after which he will travel
to Iran. Though Ankara and Washington are pursuing a fresh diplomatic
attempt to simultaneously restore Turkish-Armenian ties and resolve
territorial differences between Azerbaijan and Armenia, they will
continue to face heavy resistance from both Baku and Moscow in their
efforts. Meanwhile, Turkey will use the Armenian-Azerbaijan dispute
to involve Iran in another regional affair, thereby showing Ankara’s
capacity as a potential mediator between the United States and Iran.

Analysis Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu traveled to
Azerbaijan April 19 after departing from Washington, where he and
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with U.S. officials
to discuss the contentious issues of Turkish-Armenian diplomatic
normalization and a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh territorial
dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

During Erdogan’s stay, U.S. President Barack Obama was firm with
Erdogan in expressing Washington’s desire for Turkey to move forward
in signing the parliamentary protocols to reopen Turkey’s border
with Armenia. A stronger Turkish presence in the Caucasus would,
in the United States’ view, pose a counter to Russian influence in
the region and potentially expands trade and transit from the Middle
East to Central Asia without having to traverse Russian territory – a
growing strategic need for the United States as it seeks to militarily
extricate itself from Iraq and transfer resources to Afghanistan.

Turkey, however, has demanded in return that the United States, along
with France and Russia, first do their part within the Minsk Group
to pressure Armenia into conceding on Nagorno-Karabakh. Only then,
Turkey argues, can it effectively deal with Azerbaijan, which has been
alienated by the Turkish-Armenian negotiations and has consequently
grown closer to Russia, putting Turkey’s and Western Europe’s energy
diversification plans at risk. According to STRATFOR sources in
Turkey, Erdogan and Obama have come up with a preliminary proposal
that would entail Armenia publicly outlining a road map to withdraw
from a certain mountainous section of Nagorno-Karabakh. That way,
Turkey can distance itself from the Minsk Group’s efforts and show
at least some progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to move forward
with the Armenia protocols.

It is thus up to Turkey to convince Azerbaijan to go along with this
proposal (hence Davutoglu’s trip to Baku) and up to the United States
to convince Armenia to make this public concession. Success is not
assured in either effort, particularly given the history of past road
maps that have ended in stalemate and as Russia, which has significant
influence over Armenia and growing influence over Azerbaijan, will
be expected to scuttle this latest proposal.

Indeed, Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian has been called up for a
visit to Moscow April 20 to discuss the latest U.S.-Turkish push on the
protocols. STRATFOR sources in Armenia say Russia is urging Sarkisian
to push for legislation that would allow the president to withdraw
from an agreement with Turkey at any time without parliamentary
approval. Such a move would allow Russia more freedom to hamper the
talks when the need arises.

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is already angry at the United States for not
including it in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April
12, where Armenian, Turkish and U.S. officials met on the sidelines
to discuss this issue. Baku’s anger could be seen in Azerbaijan’s
cancellation of joint military drills with the United States planned
for May.

While the United States has been firm with Turkey on the issue of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey has been just as firm with the United
States in defending Iran. Davutoglu is scheduled to leave Baku for
Tehran to inform the Iranian leadership of the results of his meetings
in Washington. In defiance of the U.S.-hosted Nuclear Security Summit,
Iran hosted its own nuclear summit in Tehran April 17-18 and is
feeling confident about its ability to deflect U.S. pressure on its
nuclear activities.

For Turkey to demonstrate that it is playing a useful mediator role in
this conflict, it needs to show it can carry some influence with Iran.

For this reason, Turkey likely will entertain Iran’s efforts to get
involved in other regional disputes, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, as a way of recognizing Iran’s regional clout to earn
Tehran’s trust in the ongoing nuclear negotiations.

Moreover, involving Iran in the negotiations is a way to further dilute
Turkey’s responsibility over the Nagorno-Karabakh affair and provide
Ankara with more room to maneuver in its negotiations with Armenia. To
this end, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki announced April
19 that Iran will host a meeting among foreign ministers from Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Iran. Iran does not carry nearly as much influence in
this dispute as Turkey and Russia, but it is another foreign policy
arena for Tehran to project its influence with Turkey’s endorsement.