ARMENIA-TURKEY RAPPROCHEMENT COULD BECOME A KEY TO THE KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT
Ashot Safaryan

ArmInfo
2010-05-06 16:12:00

Interview of member of the Political Council of the opposition Republic
party Suren Surenyants with ArmInfo News Agency

Mr. Surenyants, what are the possible consequences of the Protocol
ratification process suspension by the Armenian Parliament?

I view the freezing of the Protocol ratification process negatively.

First, irrespective of Ankara’s destructive stance, Yerevan was the
first to suspend the ratification process, that finally brought the
rapprochement process to a deadlock, since Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan did not say a word in his April 22 message on possibility
of achieving new agreements with Turkey. The statements by the
authorities saying suspension of the ratification process prevents
undesirable development of events in the Karabakh settlement, are
absurd. Just on the contrary, by this step Yerevan will contribute to
more rapprochement of Ankara and Baku, that will not be to Armenia’s
advantage. For substantiation, I may exemplify the statements by
Foreign Minister of Turkey Ahmed Davutoglu saying the Karabakh conflict
will be a central subject of discussion with the Turkish leadership
during the forthcoming visit of Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev
to Ankara. This circumstance creates a very dangerous situation for
Yerevan. In fact, Moscow and Ankara will negotiate bypassing Armenia.

How much grounded the statements by the Turkish foreign minister are
if to take into account the Russian party’s silence?

I think that Russia’s Foreign Ministry would respond long ago if the
statements by Davutoglu were misinformation. However, more than a
week has passed but Moscow is silent.

So, does it mean that a link between Armenian-Turkish and Karabakh
processes is obvious?

Armenia-Turkey rapprochement and Karabakh conflict settlement
processes are interrelated irrespective of the Protocols’ texts. The
two processes in one and the same region cannot but be interrelated,
especially as Armenia is one of the subjects there. Our authorities
were mistaken when disoriented the society persistently denying the
link between Armenia-Turkey rapprochement and Karabakh settlement. The
Armenian authorities had to be honest with their own people and say
that normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations will promote the
Karabakh conflict settlement. In case of establishment of a dialogue
with Yerevan, Turkey would anyway take a more or less impartial stance
on Nagorno Karabakh if it wished to become one of the leading players
in the region. Turkey miscounted wishing to normalize the relations
with Armenia through the Karabakh problem. Actually I think that
Armenia-Turkey rapprochement could become a key to the Karabakh
conflict settlement.

Is the problem in Turkey to be really impartial?

If there is no Armenia-Turkey rapprochement process as such, Ankara’s
stance will be more severe. The impartiality of Turkey in Karabakh
issue is much conditioned by the level of relations with Armenia. For
instance, I can say for sure that Ankara’s stance was harsher before
singing of the Protocols in Zurich.

If preconditions were actually available in the Protocols, as the
opposition claimed, in particular, why Turkey did not ratify them?

Being a representative of the opposition, unlike others, I have
never thought that there are pre-conditions in the Protocols, there
are points in them which threaten our national security. Of course,
any papers or talks may have shortcomings, and the Armenian-Turkish
Protocols are not an exclusion. But this does not at all mean that
they could not promote normalizing of the Armenian-Turkish relations.

It’s another matter that the authorities of both states did not find
enough will to lead the process to its logical end.

Did it happen because of absence of support by the societies of the
two countries?

Absolutely! There is a problem of legitimacy of the authorities in
Armenia, which directly affects the quality of ruling. As for Turkey,
it has the Kurdish problem, difficulties in the relations between the
power and army and there is the Azerbaijani factor there. All these
facts make the authorities vulnerable.

What objective did the Armenian authorities pursue when suspending
the Protocol ratification process?

I am sure that such a measure was taken on the Russian party’s
instruction. The decision was made during the last Sargsyan-Medvedev
meeting. I have always thought that opening of the Armenian-Turkish
border is not beneficial to Russia. The more open borders Armenia
has, the better are relations with neighbours and the more our
country is independent. Presence of the Russian military base would
be inexpedient after opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. These
are serious arguments which make Moscow not to be interested in
establishment of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue, though it does not
have enough potential to hinder this process.

What steps will Washington further take against the background of
worsening of negotiations between Yerevan and Ankara?

Settlement of conflict situations in the South Caucasus was one of
the prior tasks of the US foreign policy from the very beginning. The
USA has always been consistent in stimulating the Armenian-Turkish
rapprochement and settling the Karabakh conflict. The USA will continue
the policy towards bolstering regional cooperation. We suppose
that Washington will make a new initiative shortly to promote the
Armenian-Turkish dialogue. It will try to reanimate the process of
Armenian-Turkish rapprochement through active negotiations.

Let us go back to the Russian-Turkish relations. Will Moscow wish to
lose the dominant role in the South Caucasus admitting Turkey there?

Moscow’s positions in the South Caucasus loosened much after the
August war of 2008. Being an arbitrator, it became a party to the
conflict. For this reason, today Russia is coming closer to Turkey
to preserve its role in the region. Both parties are trying to
coordinate their stances on a number of regional issues. According
to the logic of Russia’s actions, if sole dominance in the South
Caucasus is already impossible, agreements should be reached with
other influential players.