TURKISH POLITICIAN: EU APPROACH TOWARDS BLACK SEA A ‘MAJOR DISAPPOINTMENT’

EurActiv
en/enlargement/turkish-politician-eu-approach-towa rds-black-sea-a-major-disappointment-interview-494 049
May 11 2010

The EU lacks a concerted policy towards the Black Sea region and is
becoming increasingly fragile, inward-looking and even Islamophobic,
Suat Kiniklioglu, deputy chairman for external affairs in Turkey’s
ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party, told EurActiv Germany in
an exclusive interview.

Mr Kiniklioglu is deputy chairman for external affairs in Turkey’s
ruling AK Party. He is also spokesperson of the Turkish parliament’s
foreign affairs committee.

He was speaking to EurActiv Germany’s Michael Kaczmarek.

Mr Kiniklioglu: Turkey and Russia are the big powers in the Black
Sea area. What are Turkey’s main political and economic interests in
the region?

Turkey seeks a stable, predictable Black Sea region. Our neighbourhood
policy foresees the deepening of our political dialogue, increasing
our trade and encouraging direct people-to-people contacts in the
region. We have seen significant steps in these directions in the
last eight years.

The Black Sea region is a crossroads for energy supply into the EU.

Several new pipeline projects (e.g. Nabucco) are competing with one
another, yet the region does not seem to be a political or economic
priority in the EU’s external policy. Are other international players
(China, the US, Arab countries, etc.) more ambitious in the region?

What consequences might this have for the EU’s ambition to become a
global power?

The EU has failed to construct sound policy in the fields of
energy and foreign policy. Unfortunately, the EU constitutes a major
disappointment when it comes to having a concerted policy approach to
the Black Sea region. Regional states are increasingly aware of this.

We have an Ankara-based approach toward the Black Sea region
and continue to push our neighbourhood policy in the region. Our
neighbourhood policy seeks to establish more inter-dependencies in
the region and attract more investment from the region to Turkey.

The US has less interest in the region and we see a resurgence of
Russian influence in the region. If current trends continue, it is
highly unlikely that the EU will become a global power, so this is an
unnecessary question. Unless the question of Turkey’s full membership
is resolved and Turkey is a full member of the EU, the Union is not
likely to project power that would make it legitimate to call itself
a global power.

The countries of the region are fierce political and economic
competitors. Additionally, global players Turkey and Russia have their
own national agendas. Could the region ever speak to the EU or other
international players with one voice?

Despite a multitude of efforts to the contrary, the region has not
acquired a regional identity. The states in the region see themselves
through other references. They are either Balkan, Caucasus or Eurasian
states. Their Black Sea identity is a secondary form of identity and
is only utilised when it fits their interests.

It is only natural that Turkey and Russia – who are both kept at arm’s
length by the EU – have their own agendas. Why should Turkey align
its foreign policy objectives with a Union that does not itself have
a common agenda in the Black Sea? How can you reconcile the interests
of Poland and Latvia with those of the Germans and the Italians?

How can effective regional cooperation in the Black Sea region function
if bilateral problems in the region have not been solved?

Considering, for example, the tensions between Turkey and Armenia or
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, between Turkey and Greece, between
Russia and Georgia or on Transnistria, etc…

Regional cooperation is likely to remain limited given the
aforementioned identity issue, as well as the conflicting interests
at hand. Regional cooperation beyond limited action is a fallacy and
is unlikely to succeed.

The Black Sea region consists of EU members, EU candidate Turkey,
countries that participate in the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme
and perhaps want to join the EU later on, and Russia. How does the
different level of EU ‘participation’ shape the region? And how does
Turkey’s ambition to join the EU influence its politics in the Black
Sea region?

There is no doubt that the different levels create different
allegiances and priorities for the countries concerned. Turkey’s
ambition to join the EU has no relevance in shaping Turkey’s Black Sea
policy. Turkey’s Black Sea policy should be seen under the overarching
umbrella of our neighbourhood policy. If Turkey became a full member
of the EU, Ankara would align itself with a common European policy but
that looks distant at the moment. Turkey’s Black Sea policy is first
and foremost concerned with addressing Turkey’s national interests.

The AK Party is pushing for major constitutional reform in Turkey.

Critics say the aim is to weaken certain institutions that are
currently controlled by the opposition. Why do Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and your party insist on the reforms?

The constitutional reform package is aimed at making Turkey a more
transparent and normal democracy. We would have wanted to have broader
consensus in the parliament for the package. We have attempted to
construct it.

Unfortunately, Turkey’s opposition parties pride themselves on
opposing anything and everything without considering the content and
ramifications of the constitutional package.

In fact, the current package will serve the consolidation of Turkish
democracy. That said, comprehensive constitutional change will take
place after the next general election.

The members of the EU’s monetary union have to bail out Greece. Other
eurozone members like Spain or Portugal are under pressure. How does
this crisis of the EU and the euro zone influence public opinion on
Turkey’s EU ambitions?

Needless to say, these developments feed into the perception of a
fragile EU that is increasingly becoming inward-looking, Islamophobic
and in some cases outright racist. It feeds into the perception that
Europe fails to see that the gravity of global attention is shifting
east; that Europe is missing out on major historical trends that have
come about as a result of globalisation.

Turkish public opinion still favours Turkey to join the EU, but it
is no longer uncritical and has many questions to ask. We sincerely
hope that our Mediterranean friends will quickly recover from their
current situations, particularly Greece, which we genuinely consider
as an important neighbour, friend and ally.

The Belgian parliament recently voted to ban the burqa. In other
European countries, like France, Germany and Italy, politicians
are discussing banning the burqa, niqÄ~Ab or headscarf. How do the
Turkish public and politicians view the European discussions? How do
they affect public opinion on Turkey’s EU ambitions?

One of the greatest challenges facing our democracies is to find a
modicum between the need for a separation between the church/mosque
and the state and the desire of citizens to live and practise their
religions. Turkey also struggles to find an appropriate order that
satisfies these two needs. We do not condone provisions that foresee
curtailing the freedom of citizens who simply want to practice their
religious beliefs.

That said, we are also cognisant of the different versions of
secularism in a number of European countries. It is up to the
decision-makers and the publics of these countries to decide what
sort of order they feel are appropriate for their respective countries.