MEDVEDEV’S VISIT TO STRENGTHEN RUSSIAN-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT
Andrei Fedyashin
RIA Novosti
MOSCOW
When Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrived in Turkey on Tuesday
May 11, it was clear that the main outcome of his visit would be the
establishment of a High-Level Cooperation Council (to be co-chaired
by Medvedev), the signing of an agreement on one-month visa-free
travel for tourists, and cooperation in the construction of nuclear
power plants.
The first meeting of the council, to be attended by the Russian
president, is to formalize the agreement to launch a three-stage
roadmap for strategic cooperation in the political, trade and economic
spheres and between public organizations.
Medvedev will also meet with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The sides plan to sign a score of agreements and political documents,
which should advance bilateral cooperation to a higher level. Turkey
describes it as privileged cooperation and Russia as multifaceted
strategic partnership.
Europe is always slightly alarmed when a Russian president (or a
prime minister) goes to Turkey or a Turkish leader visits Russia. It
fears that Turkey may lean too closely towards Russia and that the
relationship could revive imperial ambitions in both Russia and Turkey.
Also, Europe sees a double danger in the fact that Russian-Turkish
political friendship is being reinforced with energy, oil and gas
deals.
Russian energy giant Gazprom supplies 63% of Turkey’s gas needs (the
third largest amount after Germany and Italy). The two countries
are building the Blue Stream gas pipeline along the Black Sea bed
and have decided to build a second line of the pipeline. Turkey
is also considering joining the South Stream project to transport
Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and on to Italy
and Austria.
Russia supplies approximately $1.8 billion worth of oil and between
$1.1 billion and $1.3 billion of refined oil products to Turkey
annually.
Russia is ready to contribute to the construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan
oil pipeline, which Turkey approved in 2006. The 550-km (342-mile)
pipeline is to link Samsun, a Turkish port on the Black Sea, with
the Kirikkale refinery located 15 km (9 miles) from Istanbul, where
it will be connected to the Kirikkale-Ceyhan pipeline.
The new pipe will annually transport 50-70 million metric tons of
oil from Russia and Kazakhstan to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean.
The question of who needs the oil and gas friendship more, Russia or
Turkey, and if they would have been friends without their pipeline
projects is impossible to answer because it is difficult to say where
pipes begin and politics end.
Turkey has been cleverly using the Russian card in its relationship
with the European Union. After it was denied entry into the
organization at the EU summit in Copenhagen in 2002, Prime Minister
Erdogan went to Moscow, and Turkey has used that political option
several times since then.
The EU’s unwillingness to admit Turkey is in fact pushing it into
Russia’s embrace. Officially, Turkey is continuing its accession
talks, which it started in 2005, but France and Germany have announced
that they don’t want to see a country with 60 million Muslims in the
EU. This has put off its entry into the EU for ten years, and it is
therefore not surprising that Turkey is looking for alternatives. The
best option is to strengthen its regional political and economic
prestige, which Turkey cannot do without Russia.
Turkey’s cooperation with Russia is turning it into the oil and gas
dispatcher hub of the whole Asia Minor, southern Europe (including
the Balkans) and the Middle East and strengthening its economic role.
At the same time, Turkey has been trying to become involved in the
South Caucasus policy in the past few years. Coordination of its
positions with Russia could produce very good results there.
The South Caucasus countries – Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia –
currently have no regional leader. Azerbaijan is leaning towards
Turkey, Armenia has embraced Russia, and Georgia has been seeking
rapprochement with NATO and the United States. When these countries
lean (or are prodded) towards different supports, it usually ends
badly, as proved by the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia
over South Ossetia.
So, if Turkey and Russia go over from coordinating their energy plans
to cooperating in the sphere of regional security, this could encourage
the region to create a common security system. Such a system should
clearly stipulate what its member countries may or may not do with
regard to their neighbors.
Since the OSCE, the EU and the UN have failed to ensure this, Russia
and Turkey could try to establish a regional forum to address this
task. In 2008, Turkey proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Pact, which would include the three South Caucasus countries plus
two regional heavyweights, Turkey and Russia.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.