ETERNAL MINORITIES? TURKISH POLITICS AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY
By Michael Werz , Sarah Jacobs
Center For American Progress
May 13 2010
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, right, speaks with
his party members at the Parliament on April 20, 2010. Solving the
minority questions and defining citizenship in a way that embraces
cultural and religious diversity will enhance Turkey’s role as a
model for its Eastern neighbors.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan today issued a decree
in the Official Gazette–a paper in which all laws must be published
before going into effect–stating that even though efforts have been
made toward democratization and improved relations with the nation’s
Greek, Armenian, and Jewish minorities, discriminatory problems remain
for lack of true implementation. In a country that has struggled
with the minority question for the better part of the 20th century,
this statement is a significant step in the right direction.
The day before, Turkish President Abdullah Gul approved a
constitutional reform package that includes provisions that allow
military commanders to be tried in civilian courts and grants
Parliament greater leverage in appointing judges. A referendum
on September 12 will decide the fate of these first steps of
constitutional reform.
These are two important new steps for Turkey–two of several taken
toward democracy and the recognition of its internal diversity
in recent years. The so-called "Kurdish Opening," later rebranded
as "Democratic Opening," was aimed at tempering conflict between
Turkey’s Kurdish minority and the military while also granting the
Kurdish community more of the rights available to all Turks. Some
of the proposed constitutional reforms also concern equal rights to
minority ethnic groups and political parties.
Another sign of the emergent debate was a recent demonstration in
the center of Istanbul:
On April 24, the anniversary of the ethnic cleansing in 1915 that
victimized the Armenian community during the waning years of the
Ottoman Empire, the legendary Taksim Square in central Istanbul
was an unusual sight. The civil society group "Say No to Racism and
Nationalism" had called for a public event commemorating this infamous
date in recent history. Several hundred people responded, including
more than 70 Turkish intellectuals. Parallel protests demanding the
recognition of the killings took place at the HaydarpaÅ~_a Train
Station and at the building of the Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos.
Only a few years ago, such displays of dissent with the official
version of World War I atrocities would have been unthinkable. The
same is true for the apology statement that was initiated by public
intellectuals in late 2008 and signed by more than 30,000 people.
The more Turkey moves to take on a leadership role in the new Levant,
an interesting question will arise. What will define national Turkish
self-perception when the Kurdish and Armenian questions are finally
settled and the deafening silence about ethnic cleansing in 1915 and
40,000 victims in Eastern Anatolia during the 1990s is overcome? With
decades of delay, Turkish society is beginning to address these
issues. The outcome is far from certain; this analysis outlines the
current debate in historical context.
Turkey has the opportunity to be a positive actor in the region. It
is in the interest of the United States, Europe, and the world
for Turkey to act as a mediator and leader in some of the most
difficult situations the world currently faces. If Turkey wants to
be taken seriously in this role and wishes for Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu’s policy of "zero problems with neighbors" to be a reality
rather than a political line–then it must at the same time see its
own diversity as a strength and not as predicament.
Since 1923, the Republic of Turkey has been a country of
contradictions. Succeeding the multiethnic Ottoman Empire and becoming
a land bridge between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey played an
integral part in Western 20th century history. After the nationalist
revolution, the country underwent a process of secularization in
fast motion under the country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The
Gregorian calendar was implemented in 1924, the abolition of religious
courts and schools followed, a purely secular system of family law was
established, and the Arabic script was replaced by the Latin alphabet
in 1928. Kemalism was a very peculiar form of secular nation building
at the expense of acknowledging diversity and was driven by the need
to neutralize differences in creed in the former multireligious empire.
As UC Berkeley Professor Dariush Zahedi and Gokhan Bacik, professor
of international relations at Zirve University, note, the military
was not meant to be the guarantor of secularism and national
integrity. Ataturk:
…had been a general in the Ottoman army and a field marshal in the
Turkish army, [but] set aside his military fatigues upon assuming the
role of head of state in 1923. He removed other military officers from
political posts, promoted civilian control of the armed forces, and
cautioned the military against intervening in political affairs. He
gave responsibility for developing the public’s understanding of
liberal, Western values to politicians, civil servants, school
teachers, journalists, and public intellectuals.
Only under President Ismet Inonu in the 1940s did the Turkish military
become an instrument to implement policies. Later, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization was not too uncomfortable with this arrangement,
and in "exchange for Turkey’s alignment with the Western bloc, an
increasingly strong military was accepted, which in 1960 carried out
the first of three Cold War-era military coups."[1]
Authoritarian politics and uncompromising, one-dimensional nationalism
maintained a tight grip on Turkish society for several decades,
denying the existent traditions of ethnic and religious diversity in
the country. But with the political and economic transformation during
the 1990s that contributed to the electoral success in 2002 of the
now-ruling Justice and Development Party, or its Turkish acronym AKP,
these unacknowledged traditions began playing a more important role
in public life. Indeed, not only the Armenian conflict re-emerged
on the domestic Turkish scene in a very different way; so, too, did
the minority conflict in Eastern Anatolia under the label of the
"Kurdish opening." The government took important steps to address
both issues by ending martial law in Kurdish regions and engaging
in negotiations with the Armenian government that aimed at reopening
the borders between both countries.
Even though the opening to the Kurds lost some momentum in recent
months, especially with the closure of the main Kurdish political party
by the Constitutional Court, it still might have passed an important
threshold over the last three years by granting more rights to the
Kurdish minority. Political scientist Umit Cizre argues that with these
initiatives the AKP has overcome its "chronic political insecurity"
and the restructuring of domestic power balances is irreversible.[2]
Indeed, a new era might have begun, albeit slowly and not without
setbacks.
After decades of whitewashing early 20th century history, policies
attempting to deny the region’s rich diversity appear to be old
fashioned and counterproductive today. As Turkey grows in importance
to its neighbors to the east and west, the current government feels
the pressure to reform their nation’s policies and actions to better
its internal relations with the vicinity that has changed dramatically
since the end of the Cold War and the invasion in Iraq.
Case in point: The AKP-led government over the past three years has
made serious attempts to end the Kurdish conflict that has dragged on
for decades and cost more than 40,000 lives. This decision has changed
the public discourse and helped to overcome the misplaced specter of
land-hungry Kurds descending on the predominantly Turkish parts of
the country–a long-time central motif of Turkish nationalism–even
though social and cultural diversity of Turkey is far more advanced
than ever admitted by the old nationalist guard.
Despite the violent challenge by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party,
or PKK, in the name of Kurdish nationalism, the historic tradition
of intra-Muslim intermarriage in Turkish society (broadly defined)
has thus far remained intact. Kurds intermarry with non-Kurds in
large numbers and live in mixed neighborhoods and cities. A 2009
poll by SETA and Pollmark–an Istanbul-based think tank close to the
foreign minister and a polling firm, respectively–provides plenty of
evidence of the close social proximity between Kurds and non-Kurds
in Turkey. Sixty-seven percent of Kurds polled, for example, said
they have close non-Kurdish relatives.[3]
The AKP is driving this Kurdish opening and at the same time is being
driven by economic and external factors out of its control. Some argue
that the willingness to reintegrate PKK guerillas into Turkish society
is necessary to realize the ambitious Nabucco pipeline project–a
natural gas pipeline from Eastern Turkey to Austria–and make Turkey
a future energy hub. But more realistically, the redeployment of
U.S. troops from Northern Iraq exerts much more pressure to neutralize
or integrate the PKK militants on the Turkish side of the border,
so that any attempt to revive the demand for an independent Kurdish
state is blocked.
Still, the Kurdish question and the PKK are not identical. More
important and more immediate domestic questions evolve around the
necessity of establishing a more inclusive and diverse notion of
Turkish citizenship. There are political considerations as well: 3
million Kurds live in Istanbul alone and the group is an important
reservoir of AKP voters. When the government tries to emphasize
"brotherly unity" between Turks and Kurds, the Islamic tradition comes
in handy. It provides a way to establish common ground and accept
a history of previously unacknowledged diversity without instantly
running afoul of the chauvinist Turkish heritage that is codified in
the constitution as well as in the entire education system.
The AKP can claim to represent the minority at least
partly–approximately 2 million out of 10 million to 12 million Kurds
voted for the current government. In addition, it is important to
acknowledge that close to half of the Kurdish population is under 18
years of age, which means the AKP gets effectively half of the whole
Kurdish vote.
In addition, almost three-quarters of the entire population of Turkey
agree that a quarter century of militarized responses to the PKK
have not worked, and more than half expect parties and institutions
to play an active role in solving the problem. Yet when it comes to
the constitutional changes necessary to provide equal rights, a vast
majority is against such reforms. Such contrary views in society are
hard to reconcile.
Yet these attitudes overshadow daily individual experiences within a
diverse society, which is why the commencement of a public discourse
signals the crossing of an important political threshold. Progress
might be quicker than expected because there is a lot of arrested
development with regard to public participation in matters that affect
society at large. The shift toward the so-called "Kurdish opening"
(or, as some refer to it, the "democratic opening" because it opts
for contributing to greater pluralism within Turkey) has produced
ambivalent results for the main actors, including the PKK.
On the one hand, jailed Kurdish leader and PKK founder Abdullah
Ocalan has gained considerable influence in the current process. On
the other hand, the reforms, if successful, will directly impact
the authoritarian structure of the PKK because the cult surrounding
Ocalan relies on an iconography that mirrors the political system
at large–a system that the current government set out to reform. A
solution of the Kurdish confrontation would increase the AKP’s appeal
to a broad part of the population as well as weaken the raison d’être
of increasingly nationalistic parties.
What’s more, all this is in line with the country’s constitution, which
grants equal rights to all individuals "without discrimination before
the law, irrespective of language, race or color"–even though policies
such as mandatory declaration of religion on identification cards still
exist. In contrast, constitutional antidiscrimination laws are still
disregarded in the school system where religion is part of the basic
curriculum. While a variety of religions are mentioned, curriculum
focuses heavily on Hanafi Sunni Islam inherently discriminating against
Turkey’s many non-Muslim students as well as Alevis who are not Sunni.
Even before Ataturk’s modernization, international laws were
established to protect the minorities of the region–most notably
the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 that set up the protection of religious
minorities inside Turkey–but such international agreements have not
been enforced and remained largely ineffective. The quest to establish
cultural pluralism that acknowledges the society’s past, present, and
future has also been challenging. The constitution leaves no room for
the languages spoken by minority communities: "The Turkish state is
an indivisible entity. Its language (rather than official language)
is Turkish."
For a long time, the Kurdish language was banned in public, a
prohibition lifted only during the presidency of Kurdish descendent
Turgut Ozal in 1991. In addition, the strictly enforced "Political
Parties Law" still forbids the use of all languages but Turkish in
political literature, campaigning, and meetings. And in the age of
Internet and global accessibility, Turkey has even attempted to limit
citizens’ ability to access minority opinions and "insults to Ataturk"
on YouTube.
Turkey’s rigid treatment of minorities has long been criticized by
the international community. But now that Turkey has emerged as a
leader in the region, the minority questions are complicating this
emerging power’s ability to become a stakeholder in the international
community. Turkey touts the normalization of its damaged ties with
neighbor Armenia, while Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
referred to the deportation of illegal Armenian immigrants. Turkey
claims to seek better diplomatic ties with Greece, yet continues to
limit the rights of Greek Christians living in Turkey.
The current debate about constitutional reform–whether to make it
harder to ban political parties, allow military personnel to be put on
civilian trial, enable the president and parliament to pick the members
of the Supreme Court, and reform the influential Board of Judges
and Prosecutors that has often clashed with the AKP government–is
the next big battlefield because many problems have to do with the
current constitution dating back to the era of the military junta
in the early 1980s. That constitution limits individual cultural and
political liberties and assures the military considerable political
influence through the controversial National Security Council.
To date, almost all opposition parties from the far-right Nationalist
Movement Party to the "old guard" Republican People’s Party seem to be
unified in an untimely rhetoric of unanimity that blocks attempts to
begin the all important conversation about how Turkey can be understood
as what it is: a nation of diverse citizens. Mustafa Akyol, a Turkish
political commentator, argues that what the country ultimately needs
is to "fix the fundamental design flaw of the Republic" by building
"a democratic state that respects the plurality of the society,
rather than an authoritarian one that imposes an official identity and
ideology."[4] This might be easier said than done, and yet it might be
the only way that will give Turkey the internal reconciliation it needs
to foster its newly defined, and quite prospective, regional role.
Turkey has been a bedrock of the Western alliance and a long-time
partner for the United States. Now, after an absence of many decades,
Turkey has returned as a major player in the Middle East. Clearly
motivated by national interests, its re-engagement in the region’s
affairs will have significant repercussions on regional balances of
powers. It will also impact on the way Arab elites regard Turkey and
their judgments on that country’s historical experience since the
establishment of the republic in 1923.
Turkey increasingly serves as model for its Eastern neighbors. Solving
the minority questions and defining citizenship in a way that embraces
cultural and religious diversity will only enhance that position. The
old Western alliance, which relied for so long on Turkey’s role during
the Cold War, should be supporting the current transformation by all
means necessary because it will be a first step toward building a
durable partnership with that important society in the 21st century.
Endnotes [1] Foreign Affairs Snapshot, "Kemalism Is Dead. Long Live
Kemalism," April 23, 2010.
[2] Umit Cizre, "The Emergence of the Government’s Perspective on
the Kurdish Issue," Insight Turkey 11 (4) (2009).
[3] SETA Report, "Public Perception of the Kurdish Question in Turkey"
(2009).
[4] Mustafa Akyol, "The fundamental design flaw of the Turkish
Republic," Hurriyet Daily News, December 18, 2009.
Michael Werz is a Senior Fellow and Sarah Jacobs is an intern at the
Center for American Progress.
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