A NEW STRATEGIC AXIS?
Mihai Hareshan
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17.05.10
Last week the Russian president, Dmitri Medvev, visited Turkey,
where he had talks with his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul, and
the prime-minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. On this occasion, he sealed
an impressive number of agreements with the hosts (no less than 17,
in the most varied of fields), which, inevitably, caught the eye of
commentators of the political scene. Both because the two states have
a considerable volume of trade exchanges, and because their vicinity
to hot spots of the world grants them a key part in the evolution of
those spots. These includes the Black Sea, which the two countries
are directly interested to keep a "closed" sea, as well as Iran,
"hot" because of its nuclear record, which is at the top of the global
agenda, and Middle East, where there seems to be a thaw in the problem
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
On the other hand, we are dealing with two powers on the rise on the
international stage.
Russia, included among the great emerging powers designated by
the BRIC acronym, is using its huge natural wealth and its nuclear
weapons to rejoin the ranks of global actors, without whose consent no
international problem can be solved. Turkey, which has been throughout
the past decade in economic effervescence, which will soon push it,
according to some experts, into the BRIC group, is reassessing its
external agenda by an enhanced interest in its traditionally historical
areas of influence (the Caucasus, Middle East, the Balkans).
The Russian president Dmitri Medvedev twice attributed a new,
special character to bilateral ties during this visit. He said that
"Russian-Turkish ties are reaching the level of a full-scale strategic
partnership," mentioning this is valid especially in the energetic
field. However, undoubtedly, a comprehensive strategic partnership
is not limited to a single field, and the agreements perfected during
last week’s visit highlight this.
Obviously, the agreement they signed to complete the oil pipeline
which will tie Samsun harbour on the Black Sea shore to Ceyhan on the
Mediterranean shore is crucial, both in terms of the investment, as
well as by its significant part in preventing the overcrowding of the
Straits by the transport of hydrocarbon on carrier ships, which may
have dramatic ecologic consequences in the case of an accident. Along
with this agreement, the Turkish side accepted the South Steam project
should cross the economic section of the Black Sea which belongs to
Turkey. Added up, the two agreements have a remarkable geopolitical
significance. On the one hand, they stand proof of the intensifying
economic ties between the two countries; on the other hand, they
encourage Russia’s energy policy, which is, as we know, closely bound
with the aims of Moscow’s foreign policy. South Stream is not simply
an alternative to the Nabucco project, therefore, one which would
grant the EU’s energy market a certain amount of independence from
the twists and turns of Russian politics, but it also makes Russia
less dependent on the Ukraine transit of its hydrocarbon resources.
According to statements from Russian officials, in November Turkey
will give its agreement to start implementing the South Stream project.
Another agreement signed during this visit is extremely momentous. It
deals with the building by Russia of a nuclear-electric plant in
Turkey, with a 4,800 MW potential, worth USD 20 bln. It is the first
time Russia obtains another state’s agreement to build such a plant
and to operate it on the latter’s territory, selling the energy it
will generate. After the building of this plant, to be completed in
seven years, Russia will sell 49 per cent of shares to investors,
only keeping control of the production of nuclear energy. Already this
project has come in for criticism from environmental NGOs, as well as
strategic experts, who argue Turkey will come to depend too much on
Russia in the energy sector by this. In the context, it is reminded
that 65 per cent of the gas needed by Turkish economy is imported
from Russia, so that the new project is perceived as one which may
have undesired political consequences. It remains to be seen what the
result of this agreement is, given that, in the past, quasi-similar
agreements have been rejected four times by court rulings.
Other bilateral agreements signed during this visit envisage the
boosting in years to come of the volume of bilateral trade, from the
present amount of USD 30 bln to the ambitious USD 100 bln, as stated
by the president Medvedev, mutually lifting the visas for visits
below a month, as it is common knowledge millions of Russians visit
Turkey every year, cooperation measures in opposing drug peddling,
as well as in encouraging better transport and education.
The field of foreign policy was, also, directly addressed by the
recent top-level bilateral meeting. Thus, the two sides stated their
willingness to act towards a peaceful solution of the Iranian nuclear
record, to ensure stability in the Caucasus and, generally, to enhance
regional stability. Already, in the latest visit to Syria undertaken
at the beginning of last week, Medvedev met the leader of Hamas, which
resulted in protests from Israel. In Turkey the Russian leader urged,
alongside the hosts, for extending the frame of negotiations in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel officially opposed this position.
As far as the situation in the Caucasus is concerned, the Turkish
side underlined the "coinciding" (the Foreign Minister, A. Davutoglu)
interests of the two powers in the region and voiced its hope Russia
will become more actively involved, by means of OSCE, in solving the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in Nagorno-Karabach. The collaboration
of the two sides on this intricate issue is reflected in news of a
trilateral Russia-Turkey-Armenia conference to take place in Sochi
next month.
Can we speak of a new Russian-Turkish strategic axis? On the one hand,
given the treaties signed and the agreements they reached following
this visit, this aspect is worth considering. After the war in Georgia
in August 2008, the West has seemed less present in the Black Sea area,
and this facilitates Russia’s geopolitical recovery action (see the
Ukraine) and, at the same time, encourages its reaching an agreement
with Turkey on common interest affairs, especially in the Caucasus or
in the Starmator problem. It is also not to be ignored that there is
a growing collaboration between the two states in the energy sector,
to include the nuclear field from now on. On the other hand, tensions
in bilateral ties endure, for instance in the Chechen file. What is
obvious, however, after this visit, is the formal acknowledgment of
a special relation between Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea area
and in the Middle East. Its evolution should be closely scrutinised.