CORY WELT: IT WAS A MAJOR MISTAKE FOR THE U.S. NOT TO LINK KARABAKH PROBLEM WITH ARMENIAN-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT
Today
May 25 2010
Azerbaijan
Cory Welt is associate director of the George Washington University
Elliott School of International Affairs’ Institute for European,
Russian and Eurasian Studies.
It seems that U.S. forgot the Karabagh settlement and has changed it
for support Armenia by various means (economic assistance, pushing
Armenian-Turkish border issue etc). Is it happen because of influence
of Armenian lobby or there are any other reasons?
The Obama administration has not really adopted a more “pro-Armenian”
position than previous governments – this is a misperception. U.S.
administrations have all more or less worked from the same “playbook.”
Armenian-Turkish rapprochement was promoted, in part, out of a
genuine belief this kind of dramatic (peaceful) shift in context
would have the potential to unfreeze the conflict resolution process
over Nagorno-Karabakh. It was a major mistake not to talk about this
linkage more, engage Azerbaijan on the issue, persuade Armenia to
take the linkage seriously, and jointly to develop this idea into
some concrete suggestions.
Russia and Turkey has been developing a close collaboration, especially
during the last 2 years. What is your opinion, may this collaboration
be fruitful for the stability in the South Caucasus region?
Such a collaboration could be fruitful for stability in the South
Caucasus, but only if Turkey approaches the problem from the position
of both regional power and Euro-atlantic ally. I don’t think much
good will come of Turkish-Russian collaboration in the Caucasus that
does not take place within the context of broader European security
discussions and the continued development of European-Caucasus
relations.
Some experts agree, that the West is more and more losing its
positions on the post Soviet space… Can the Russian activity be
expected to increase?
First, recent history has demonstrated to us that policy shifts in
the post-Soviet space are cyclical. This is most clearly the case in
Ukraine but it is relevant for other states as well. Second, a problem
with this formulation is that most policymakers in the West, at least,
have never conceived of regional politics as a “fight” with Russia.
There are perfectly imaginable scenarios in which states of the region
have improved relations with Russia and still maintain very close
relations to Europe and the United States, particularly in the case
of Moldova and Georgia, where societies and leaders have not at all
turned away from the West. This is a long-term process and we should
not be so focused on what appear to be dramatic short-term changes.
In Azerbaijan, the same thing could be said. Of course, Russia is
developing a more active “soft power” policy toward all states of the
region (as well as throughout Europe), and it should be no surprise
that Azerbaijan is receptive to offers that are in its interest or
those of its leadership. I don’t think this means that Azerbaijan is
seeking a permanent transformation of its foreign policy orientation.
Moscow says that it CIS countries to decide to be a member of EU and
NATO or not. Do you think that Russia might agree with membership of
Azerbaijan or even Georgia in NATO?
The issue of NATO enlargement into the Caucasus is not as pressing as
it once was. The promise of NATO membership to Georgia, and implicitly
to Azerbaijan, remains, but this is now an even longer-term process
than it was before the Russian-Georgian war. The greatest chance for
membership will lie with the development of stable, democratic states.
Russia is unlikely to consent to NATO membership for Azerbaijan and
Georgia, but that won’t necessarily be the deciding factor. However,
there are many possible security arrangements for the Caucasus (and
Ukraine and Moldova), and it would be good to at least begin a serious
discussion about what the available options are that can truly provide
security to all these states currently stuck between NATO and the CSTO.
From: A. Papazian