PEACE FOR OUR TIME IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH
By Thomas de Waal

The Moscow Times

June 24 2011
Russia

Call it a sleeping volcano, the elephant or perhaps even the mammoth
in the room. The Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is the
longest-running unresolved dispute in the former Soviet Union, dating
back to 1988. Much is at stake, from the ordinary human predicament
of more than 1 million people displaced by war to the strategic map
of the South Caucasus, which has been tied up by this dispute for
a generation.

The peace process for Nagorno-Karabakh, mediated by the co-chairs
of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, France, Russia and the United States, does not get much
attention, for understandable reasons. It has dragged on for years
without results. There is nothing newsworthy about it. Negotiations
are conducted behind closed doors between an inner group of about a
dozen individuals, making it very closed – in fact, far too closed
for its own good.

A few near successes trumpeted by the mediators over the years
inevitably evoke cynicism about the latest initiative. Many Armenians,
having won a military victory in 1994, do not want to give up captured
territory in return for an uncertain future. Many Azeris, flush with
oil and gas revenues, believe they can wait until circumstances turn
more in their favor in a few years.

This time could be different, however. President Dmitry Medvedev
has convened a meeting of Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan in Kazan on Friday. He is calling on them to
agree to a framework deal, the Document on Basic Principles, which
the parties to the conflict have been discussing in various drafts
since 2007 and whose basic ideas were first formulated in 2004. In
other words, a small document has been under discussion for a period
longer than World War II. It is truly a moment of decision.

The outline of the Document on Basic Principles was released into the
public domain in two declarations made at the Group of Eight summits
at L’Aquila and Muskoka in 2009 and 2010. It consists of six elements
that seek to reconcile the Armenian aspiration for Nagorno-Karabakh’s
secession with Azerbaijan’s claim to territorial integrity.

The six elements, as stated at Muskoka, are: “The return of the
occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; interim status
for Nagorno-Karabakh guaranteeing security and self-governance;
a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; final status of
Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined in the future by a legally binding
expression of will; the right of all internally displaced persons and
refugees to return; and international security guarantees, including
a peacekeeping operation.”

The most eye-catching elements in this package are the second
and fourth points, which try to square the impossible issue
of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status. They are designed to persuade the
Armenian side to give up the Azeri territories it captured outside
Nagorno-Karabakh and has kept as a “security zone” pending a decision
on the future status of the disputed enclave. The innovative term
“interim status” will fascinate diplomats and international legal
scholars as they ponder similar sovereignty disputes. It means a
status that falls short of independence but gives Nagorno-Karabakh a
place in the international system it does not have at the moment. The
“legally binding expression of will” constitutes the theoretical
promise of a vote on independence for the Armenian side. The timing
and modalities of such a vote are the main target of concern for the
Azeri side as it goes to Kazan.

The declaration made at the G8 summit in Deauville in May by Medvedev,
U.S. President Barack Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy
crystallized the impression that the mediators have decided that
now is the moment – five years on – to make the leaders bridge their
differences on the Document on Basic Principles. The differences on
paper are small enough for Medvedev to raise the stakes and demand
his two colleagues to close the deal.

Medvedev has personally involved himself in this process. This is the
fifth meeting he has convened, and he has edited the document himself.

His central role usefully turns the spotlight on Aliyev and Sargsyan
so that they have fewer places to hide. It also exposes him and his
reputation to the risk of failure.

Up until now, resistance in the region to a peace settlement has
always been stronger than international pressure. The suspicion has
always been that the Armenian and Azeri leaders are too comfortable
with their status quo, bad as it is for their citizens, and prefer
not to step into terra incognita, unleash domestic opposition and make
peace with the enemy. Leaders on both sides – especially Azerbaijan,
the losing party in the conflict of 1991-1994 – continue to use strong
nationalist rhetoric at home, even as they negotiate peace in private
in foreign capitals. For peace to begin to happen on the ground,
there needs to be a “rhetoric cease-fire” in which trust can start
to form gradually between the two conflicting parties.

It is worth underscoring the amazing fact that for all the years of
diplomacy that have gone into it, the Document on Basic Principles
is only a framework agreement. If it is agreed, there will then be a
push to sign a comprehensive peace treaty several months down the line.

That also means there will be a dangerous moment of hiatus in which
even if initial agreement is reached, heavy domestic Armenian and
Azeri opposition will remain against the deal.

Medvedev’s mini-summit in Kazan could usher in a fundamentally new
phase in this protracted conflict, but there will still be a lot of
work to do. If there is a breakthrough, it will require much greater
international commitment to make peace a reality on the ground. If
there is disappointment, expectations will have been raised and will
have to be handled. There will be a greater risk of conflict, and the
other international actors – primarily the United States – will need
to move in and apply pressure to hold things together in the Caucasus.

Thomas de Waal is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington.