Congressional Documents and Publications
February 12, 2015
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging
Threats Hearing: “Azerbaijan: U.S. Energy, Security and Human Rights
Interests.”
Testimony by Richard Kauzlarich, Adjunct Professor, School of Public
Policy, George Mason University, (Former American Ambassador to
Azerbaijan)
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DOCUMENTS
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, I thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to comment
on Azerbaijan. I have had over two decades of experience with the
South Caucasus — as a senor Foreign Service Officer and Ambassador, a
think tank and intelligence analyst, and an academic teaching at the
graduate level on the geopolitics of energy security. I was U.S.
Ambassador in Azerbaijan for three years and have been back several
times to observe elections and to train local non-government
organization (NGO) representatives in conflict resolution skills.
I commend the Committee for holding these hearings. Azerbaijan and US
relations are at a critical point because of human rights violations
and the conflict with Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.
Background
The period of engagement with Azerbaijan since the breakup of the
Soviet Union has been a remarkable success for US diplomacy. From my
first visit to Baku in 1992 until today, many positive changes in our
relations have taken place. This despite the unfair limits imposed on
US Government (USG) assistance by Section 907 of the Freedom Support
Act of 1992 (FSA907), and the intense conflict with Armenia over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.
Both Azerbaijani officials and some US-based analysts argue that the
US lacks a coherent policy toward Azerbaijan. I disagree. For two
decades, the United States has pursued the following bipartisan policy
objectives in Azerbaijan.
. Support the Government of Azerbaijan in maintaining its independence
and territorial integrity.
. End the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding
Nagorno-Karabakh and, through the Minsk Group process of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), support
Azerbaijan and Armenia in achieving a peaceful, negotiated settlement.
. Encourage US commercial interests in the production and
transportation of Azerbaijan’s substantial energy resources to global
markets.
. Work for closer Azerbaijani relations with transatlantic
institutions such as the OSCE and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO); and stronger economic relationships with the European Union
(EU).
. Strengthen the commitment of Azerbaijan to (1) implementing
internationally recognized principles of democracy and human rights;
while (2) adopting transparent approaches to governance that minimize
corruption.
Azerbaijan and its people have benefited from this US policy and those
similar policies of our European allies including Turkey.
. Thanks to USG political support and US energy companies pursuing
their commercial interests, the Azerbaijan energy sector has enjoyed
enormous success. From the signing of the Contract of the Century in
1994 to the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in
2005, US leadership has been critical. Azerbaijan has earned tens of
billions of dollars from these energy resources.
. The OSCE Minsk Group process has provided a venue for mediating
direct contacts between Baku and Yerevan to conclude peacefully this
tragic and painful conflict regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.
. Increased Azerbaijani engagement since the September 11 attack on
the US in the international community’s priorities of dealing with
international terrorism, and participating in NATO-led peace making
activities in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.
This progress was not easy. FSA 907 prohibited direct USG assistance
to the Government of Azerbaijan — unlike its neighbors Armenia and
Georgia — in those early days when institutions and attitudes toward
good governance, democracy, and human rights were being developed.
Azerbaijanis saw this as unfair treatment of Azerbaijan especially
compared to Armenia.
Regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as the Minsk Group process
produced no results favorable to Azerbaijan, USG positions on
resolving the conflict were contrasted with USG positions vis-a-vis
the Balkans and more recently Ukraine/Crimea.
Finally US pressure to hold more democratic elections and observe
international human rights standards clashed with leadership desires
to preserve stability – as they saw it — and political power.
Times are Changing
Many observers have noticed deterioration in the tone and, in some
respects, the substance of US – Azerbaijan relations, especially since
the flawed Azerbaijani presidential elections in the fall of 2013.
Part of this reflects fundamental shifts in the global and regional
political and economic environment.
. The global energy markets have changed profoundly over the past two
decades. Global oil and gas production especially in North America has
reduced the significance of gas and oil from the Caspian region, and
in particular Azerbaijan. The potential energy resources in Azerbaijan
are not as great as they appeared in 1994. Gas has replaced oil as the
high demand (for energy security reasons) hydrocarbon. Unlike in the
1990s, energy development is being determined more on commercial terms
than political priorities as applied when the BTC pipeline was
developed.
. Despite the dedication of talented US Minsk Group negotiators,
neither Baku nor Yerevan has negotiated directly in a manner leading
to a peaceful settlement of this conflict. The leadership in Yerevan
and Baku has not prepared their respective publics to accept the
compromises that must accompany a negotiated settlement. Further there
have been attempts to hold the Minsk Group responsible for finding a
solution acceptable to one side and imposing it on the other side. The
longer the impasse in the Minsk Group continues the greater the risk
of resumed armed conflict. We are at such a point today.
. As the US and NATO drawdown in Afghanistan continues, the importance
of Azerbaijan and its neighbors in securing the northern supply route
to Afghanistan diminishes. Also Iran’s greater engagement in its quest
for a nuclear agreement with the West has reduced the security
priority accorded to Azerbaijan in that context.
. International support for the observance of human rights and
promotion of democracy in Azerbaijan has increased in recent years. At
the same time, Azerbaijani support for its international obligations
in this area has waned. From the US and Europe, private and official
voices have been raised about why after two decades of prosperous
stability in Azerbaijan, elections still are not conducted in a free
and fair manner, the number of political prisoners has increased,
religious freedom is restricted, and freedom of expression shut down.
While such external factors play a role in this deterioration, the
most critical factors flow from choices the Baku regime is making for
its own reasons, including:
. Frustration over the lack of Western support for the Azerbaijani
position on return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Baku’s full sovereign
control, while supporting Ukraine’s position on the return of Crimea
to Ukraine.
. Unfairness of FSA 907 while the USG provides economic assistance to
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
. With the extraordinary growth of Azerbaijan’s energy revenue,
Azerbaijan now has the resources including financing and access to
technology that it depended on Western companies and governments to
provide in the 1990s. It no longer “needs” US and Western political
support in the energy arena.
. Lack of respect for Azerbaijan’s support for US/NATO efforts
especially in Afghanistan, the global fight against terror, and
standing up to Iran. Failure of the US to provide lethal capabilities
that Azerbaijan could use in its confrontation with Armenia.
. Concern about internal political instability and the imagined role
of US assistance and foreign NGOs and media outlets in supporting the
political opposition. Anti-regime demonstrations in Baku and elsewhere
in the country in 2013 called attention to corruption, mistreatment of
draftees in the Azerbaijani military, and unlawful detention and
arrest of opposition politicians, NGO representatives and reporters.
. In particular following the flawed Presidential elections in 2013,
the regime began attacking US officials for promoting anti-regime
activities. The persons targeted included congressional staffers, US
ambassadors (bilateral and Minsk Group co-chair), and finally the
President of the United States.
. The shutdown of US NGOs such as IREX and the National Democratic
Institute (NDI), and information services including Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).
This culminated with the December 3, 2014 polemic by Chief of the
Presidential Apparatus, Ramiz Mehdiyev. This document accuses the USG
of fomenting a color revolution in Azerbaijan through “fifth columns”
created by USG assistance to US NGOs and affiliated local NGOs.
End of the Heydar Aliyev Era
I have written elsewhere that I believe the Mehdiyev attack on the US
represents the end of the Heydar Aliyev (the current President’s
father) era – an almost two decade long effort by both the United
States and Azerbaijan to improve relations despite differences. During
that period there was a public profession from the Azerbaijani side of
cooperation with the US and support for internationally recognized
standards for democracy and observance of human rights.
More than anything else, the many USG statements about flawed
elections and human rights abuses, and critical assessments from some
European partners pushed official Baku over the top. I believe that
the Azerbaijani decision not to follow Georgia on an explicit path
toward closer association with the EU reflected official Baku’s
assessment that closer engagement with the EU would mean a brighter
spotlight on its unacceptable treatment of opposition figures and
independent media.
The regime is walking a line between being forced to join Russia’s
Eurasian Economic Union or rejecting the EU – Azerbaijan’s largest
market for natural gas exports. Yet, it appears that either Europe or
Russia is a more acceptable strategic partner for Azerbaijan than the
US as long as Washington advocates on behalf of the 90 plus political
prisoners, the NGOs, RFE/RL, and an independent Azerbaijani media.
What Can the US Do?
The US and Azerbaijan are in a different place than just five years
ago. There are new global and regional geopolitical realities. The
global energy picture in particular has changed making Azerbaijan and
the Caspian region less critical to US energy security needs.
Rather than trying to construct an abstract “strategic partnership,”
we need to establish a limited set of attainable goals. Progress on
these goals would determine whether a strategic partnership between
the US and Azerbaijan is realistic. These could be:
. Serious engagement between Armenia and Azerbaijan by a specific date
leading to a peaceful settlement of the dispute regarding
Nagorno-Karabakh, and resumed Track-II unofficial contacts between
Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
. Support for stability in Azerbaijan based on Baku’s movement toward
greater democracy and observance of internationally recognized human
rights standards.
. Freedom for the over 90 political prisoners.
Without progress in each of these areas, I fear:
. Resumption of armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
. Further internal suppression of the remaining liberal democratic
elements in the run-up to the 2015 Parliamentary elections in
Azerbaijan.
The US cannot allow that to happen. On the human rights front, there
are more political prisoners in Azerbaijan than in Belarus and Russia
combined. That is unacceptable. Years of diplomatic engagement have
not improved the situation. Recently it has become markedly worse than
anything I have observed in my experience with Azerbaijan.
If there is no progress toward release of all these prisoners then the
USG should consider imposing travel and other sanctions on those
officials responsible for the arrest and continued detention of NGO
activists and journalists.
I also believe that as long as there is a risk of surveillance and
possible detention or arrest of American citizens in Azerbaijan, the
Department of State should issue a travel warning for all Americans
planning to travel to Azerbaijan.
Why Should the USG Care about Human Rights in Azerbaijan?
Lately Azerbaijani officials have questioned why the US pays attention
to “minor issues” like abuses of human rights when there are far more
important areas of concern (e.g. European energy security, Iran,
Russia, cooperation on anti-terrorism) that the US should be
addressing.
Let’s set aside for the moment the obligations Azerbaijan has freely
undertaken in the UN, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE.
Human rights are a major US security concern. We support, as we have
for two decades, the independence and territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan. We are limited in what we can do, however, when the regime
in Baku suppresses liberal democratic institutions, arrests those who
peacefully oppose the lack of democracy and human rights in
Azerbaijan, and creates political and social space for other forces
that are more dangerous to real stability in Azerbaijan. Make no
mistake: radical Islamists are quickly filling the void. They not only
burn American and Israeli flags but also send recruits to fight in
Syria. When these fighters return to Azerbaijan they represent not
only a threat to Azerbaijan but to US security interests as well. That
is why human rights are not minor issues.
Thank you.
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