Iran and Armenia Expand Strategic Co-operation
By Erik Davityan
Feb. 16, 2015
[Erik Davtyan works as a reviewer at the International Association for
Political Science Students. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in
international relations from Yerevan State University. His areas of
interest include the foreign policies of Armenia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan.]
On January 27th 2015, the minister of foreign affairs of Iran,
Mohammad Javad Zarif, paid a two-day visit to Armenia. Welcoming the
foreign minister, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan attached great
importance to high-level reciprocal visits which, according to him,
provide a good opportunity to discuss the agenda of Armenian-Iranian
relations and the prospects for co-operation. Sargsyan noted that he
warmly recalled his visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2013 and
the agreements made during his meeting with President Hassan Rouhani
and added that Armenia was ready and keen on fulfilling them. He
emphasised further enhancing of relations with the friendly state of
Iran. Zarif underscored that Armenian-Iranian relations could set a
good example for the world on how Muslim and Christian countries can
reach peaceful symbiosis living side by side. Zarif noted that Iran is
also keen on enhancing relations with Armenia as a friendly and
reliable partner in all sectors. During his visit, Zarif had meetings
with the prime minister, Hovik Abrahamyan, minister of foreign
affairs, Edward Nalbandian and the president of the National Assembly
of Armenia, Galust Sahakyan.
After Armenia declared independence in 1991, the country established
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In response to the dual
blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan, Iran became a strategic
route for Armenia in its international communications with the world.
Taking into consideration the economic and energy potential of Iran,
Armenia has focused on enhancing co-operation with its southern
neighbour in order to counterbalance the Turkish-Azerbaijani blockade
and to reduce the extremely high level of dependence upon Georgian
transit routes. The fact, that the parties have established an
Armenian-Iranian inter-governmental committee many years ago stresses
the importance of that both countries put on bilateral relations.
In August 2013 when Iran was under pressure and sanctions by the
international community, Sargsyan participated in the inauguration
ceremony of Hassan Rouhani, the seventh president of Iran. Since 1991
more than 50 mutual visits have been paid by the two states (at the
level of heads of states and governments, as well as ministers of
foreign affairs), so these facts symbolise the willingness to continue
the comprehensive co-operation.
During the most recent meeting, Zarif emphasised the importance of
enhancing the economic and energy cooperation between the two states.
In the framework of the 12th session of the inter-governmental
committee in December 2014, the parties signed a protocol on the
construction of a hydro-power station in Meghri, near the border. Iran
is the second largest gas supplier for Armenia, thereby providing an
alternative to Russian gas and securing energy security for Armenia.
On the other hand Armenia is a potential route for Iranian exports to
Russia and the EU, therefore economic co-operation may, to some
extent, be called strategic.
Another important aspect of Zarif’s visit concerns Armenia’s accession
to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the perspectives of
Iranian-Armenian relations. On October 10th 2014, Armenia signed the
membership agreement and became the fourth member of the EEU, along
with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. As the membership to this new
geopolitical reality assumed both political and economic changes, it
was of top importance for Armenia to harmonise the integration process
with Armenian-Georgian and Armenian-Iranian relations. Despite the
fact that Armenia and Georgia have chosen different integration paths,
in 2014 the prime ministers of both countries, Abrahamyan and
Garibashvili assured this fact will not undermine relations. In fact,
this was very important for Armenian-Iranian relations as Armenia and
Georgia play a transit role for Iranian foreign economic policy.
During his visit to Yerevan, Zarif hoped that Armenia’s accession to
the EEU will bolster bilateral ties.
Interestingly, Zarif’s visit followed a visit by Russian defence
minister, Sergei Shoigu, to Iran between January 19th and 20th. There
they signed an agreement on military co-operation between Iran and
Russia, leading to some concern among western countries, especially
the United States. It is quite obvious that Iran and Russia are trying
to develop a greater strategic partnership in the Middle East. As to
the economic aspect of bilateral relations, Russia and Iran aim at
promoting their national interests via infrastructures to unite the
two states. In this context Armenia may serve as a transit territory,
especially after the EEU agreement came into force on January 1st
2015.
However, the key issue in Armenian-Iranian relations is a railway
project that touches the national security issues of Armenia. The 305
kilometre-long railway from Armenia to Iran, to be named the Southern
Armenian Railway (SAR), is estimated to cost some 3.2 billion US
dollars. The high cost of the project is explained by the mountainous
terrain through which it is supposed to pass. During his visit, the
Iranian foreign minister confirmed that after solving some technical
issues, the parties will launch the construction of the `strategic
railway’. According to the Armenian government, the SAR will create
the shortest transportation route from the ports of the Black Sea to
the ports of the Persian Gulf and establish a major commodities
transit corridor between Europe and the Persian Gulf.
If Iran and Armenia manage to implement the project, it will have both
political and economic consequences not only for Armenia, but also for
the entire South Caucasus. First of all, Armenia will successfully
overcome the blockade imposed on it by Turkey and Azerbaijan and have
access to a much less expensive Iranian market. Secondly, due to the
Iranian railway network, Armenia can improve its foreign trade
turnover with Central Asia and the Gulf states. Thirdly, Armenia will
serve as a railway bridge between Georgia and Iran, thereby gaining
some political and economic dividends. Fourthly, in case of the
restoration of the Abkhazian railway (which does not work because of
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict), Armenia will obtain not only
regional, but also international transit status, unifying the Black
sea basin with Iran and the Persian Gulf. Lastly, much easier access
to the gulf seaports will be available, helping diversify the way
Armenian goods are exported.
The Nagorno-Karabakh peace regulation process was the other issue
discussed in the framework of Zarif’s visit. The Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic, which declared independence in 1991, borders Iran in the
south along the Araxes River, therefore the Iranian official position
towards the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is of great importance for
Armenia. In 1992, the President of Iran, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
hosted a meeting of leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Levon
Ter-Petrosyan and Yagub Mammadov. In Yerevan, the Iranian foreign
minister reassured Iran’s balanced position towards the conflict and
stressed the importance of peaceful regulation, based on the
principles of the international law. The current high level of
relations is, to some extent, stipulated by the existence of a
well-organised and strong Armenian diaspora in Iran, actively engaged
in the policymaking process of Iran.
The Azerbaijani factor has some political impact on Armenian-Iranian
relations. Azerbaijan is the third state with a Shia Muslim majority,
after with Iran and Iraq. Being a secular state, Azerbaijan tries to
reduce the religious influence among the Azerbaijani population. The
tense situation between the two states is much more conditioned by the
Azerbaijani speaking minority, living in the northern parts of Iran
which Azerbaijani officials claim to be historic Azerbaijani
territory. Undoubtedly, the Iranian-Azerbaijani dispute is beneficial
to Armenia and reinforces the role of Armenia in Iran’s foreign policy
strategy.
From: A. Papazian