TURKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS ‘FROZEN CONFLICTS’ AND UKRAINIAN CRISIS – ANALYSIS
Eurasia Review
March 30, 2015 Monday
By Guner Ozkan*
Three ‘frozen conflicts’ areas in the South Caucasus – in Nagorno
Karabakh (NK), Abkhazia and South Ossetia – are situated near Turkey’s
north-eastern border. Another conflict to its north, in Ukraine,
typified by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the recent Minsk 2
Agreement, seems, at best, being presently transformed into another
‘frozen’ dispute.
There are several prominent, and perhaps valid, reasons why old and
new ‘frozen conflicts’ are of great importance for Turkey, and why
Turkey has come to assume a position that simultaneously reflects
a balanced overall policy and selective engagement approach. It is
only these mixed policy approaches that will help first to reduce
the deepening of, and then perhaps to outright resolve, the ‘frozen
conflicts’ in the South Caucasus and the Ukrainian crisis.
A Balanced Overall Policy
Turkey has always favoured the principles of territorial integrity
and self-determination as outlined in international law when it comes
to the ‘frozen conflicts’ to its north, including Ukraine. Turkey is
also well aware of the fact that these ethno-territorial disputes
have never been simple disputes over land among dominant national
and minority groups in the particular countries where they take place.
They are also very much integral components of the geopolitical
visions of great international and regional powers. In this sense,
the Abkhazia conflict in Georgia and NK in Azerbaijan cannot simply
be considered with regard to the legitimate demands of the Abkhaz and
Armenian minorities in Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively, but must
be examined by paying close attention to what Russia has envisaged
and acted to create with the ‘near abroad’ policy it has followed
since the early 1990s.
A long-time ally of the western security system, and proponent of the
rule of international law, Turkey has supported the same approach that
its western allies and Russia have adopted towards ‘frozen conflicts’,
both within the OSCE as well as in other international mechanisms.
Turkey has advocated the maintenance of the territorial integrity
of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, while also urging that not all
doors should be closed to the ethnic minorities that find themselves
in conflict with their parent state. In the same vein, Turkey has
continued to defend its pursuit of maintaining dialogue and developing
relations with Russia, which, not just under Putin, has never shied
away from demonstrating its reactions to the imagined security and
geopolitical vacuum that the western powers have supposedly tried
to fill in the post-Soviet area. To better illustrate this point,
Turkey has developed its relations with Russia similar to the way
that Germany and France developed their own relations with the country
under Yeltsin, and later under Putin. On the regional level, despite
the complaints uttered by the Georgian government, Turkey and the
EU have tried to find ways to develop constructive and beneficial
trade relations with Abkhazia after it was recognized as a de facto
independent state by Russia in August 2008 after the Russo-Georgian
War. Among other reasons for this course of action, they wanted
to reduce Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia, both economically and
politically.
The Selective Nature of Turkish policy
Turkey seems to have also assumed a selective approach towards these
‘frozen conflicts’. Ankara appears to take the side of certain parties
involved in the ‘frozen conflicts’ to its north. Turkey’s support of
Crimean Tatars in Ukraine, the permission it has given to its private
sector to engage in trade with Abkhazia and its support of Azerbaijan
over the NK issue may all be seen as the efforts of Turkey to promote
its regional and international geopolitical interests. Indeed, such
selective and tendentious positions are much more related to Turkey’s
own internal and external security, as well as to its legitimate
social and economic interests in its immediate neighbourhood, than
to its pure geopolitical ambitions.
Turkey, for instance, promotes a peaceful resolution of the NK dispute
between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Yet, in doing so, it has kept its
border with Armenia closed and has not established diplomatic relations
with Yerevan. Certainly, there are several reasons why Turkey acts
in this way, or put differently, in support of Azerbaijan.
Firstly, Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 when Armenian
military forces, in defiance of the UN Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions, expanded their occupation of Azerbaijani territories.
Secondly, Armenian military manoeuvres adjacent to the Azerbaijani
region of Nakhichevan, which borders Turkey, threatened the security
of Turkey itself. Thirdly, the Turkish public is very sensitive to
the NK issue as it is characterized by the Armenian occupation of 20
percent of Azerbaijani territory and has resulted in tens of thousands
of displaced Azerbaijanis who have the same ethno-cultural identity as
the Turks. Fourthly, Turkey and Armenia share a long and problematic
history that spans all the way back to the tragedy experienced by
Ottoman Armenians in 1915. All this suggests that the ‘frozen conflict’
of NK is as much related to Turkey’s security as it is to Azerbaijan’s.
In short, Turkey sees all the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the South Caucasus
as part of a particular regional security complex which should be
considered collectively. Even though they have remained unfulfilled,
Turkey’s efforts to form a Caucasian Stability and Cooperation
Platform just after the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008, as well
as its drive to push forward the Turkish-Armenian Protocols in 2009,
have exhibited the objective to resolve these ‘frozen conflicts’
by developing complex economic and social interdependencies between
all the regional actors involved.
What about the Ukrainian Crisis?
Indeed, Turkey sees the Ukraine crisis in general and the Crimea issue
in particular through the same perspective. Turkey is very sensitive
towards these disputes because they directly influence its own domestic
stability and regional security. There are now more Tatar people in
Turkey than there are in Crimea, just as there are three times more
ethnic Abkhaz living in Turkey than in Abkhazia itself.
Therefore, Turkey cannot turn a blind eye to the concerns of the
Tatar people in Crimea.
Concerning regional security, Turkey is the central actor in
maintaining peace and security in the Black Sea. The Montreux
Convention of 1936 that regulates the passage of war and trade ships
through the Turkish straights in times of war and peace is the key
instrument in the region in that respect. Any incident that would
question and damage the applicability of the Convention, especially in
sensitive periods, could pose a great security risk for Turkey. Only an
international legal obligation, imposed by the UNSC, and/or a unanimous
decision of NATO, would impel Turkey to act. Any other unilateral
action would be a dangerous undertaking that would drastically worsen
the security situation in Ukraine and the Black Sea region.
Therefore, from the Turkish viewpoint, in order avoid turning the
already difficult security situation into a nightmare, it is better to
concentrate on the positive outcomes and possible benefits that all
sides have so far garnered, and have yet to garner, from cooperation
and dialogue, no matter how hard this may be.
*Guner Ozkan, USAK Center for Eurasian Studies
This article was first published at European Leadership Network’s
website on March 23rd, 2015
The post Turkey’s Policy Towards ‘Frozen Conflicts’ And Ukrainian
Crisis – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.