IRAN WILL WAIT FOR ARMENIA AFTER APRIL 24

Hakob Badalyan, Political Commentator
Comments – 22 April 2015, 11:48

The presidents of none of the four neighbors of Armenia will be in
Armenia on April 24. It is clear with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Neither
the presidents of Georgia and Iran, nor other high-level delegations
of these countries will arrive. Georgia’s deputy speaker will arrive
in Armenia, while the delegation of the Georgian minister of defense
will be leaving for Turkey.

Although, here the situation is quite clear too. Armenia is not at
a conflict with these countries but they have not recognized the
Armenian genocide, each has their interest. Georgia does not want
to earn problems with Turkey and Azerbaijan which make significant
investments in the Georgian economy.

Iran also has its goals and objectives, and though Turkey is a
competitor in regional aspirations, Tehran does not find it expedient
to cause tension with Ankara.

Besides, there are several other circumstances relating to the
regional setting, the Russian-Turkish influence on this setting, as
well as problems in the Near East, and in some of them the service
for tactical issues of the Iran-Turkey cooperation.

Many years ago, during Robert Kocharyan’s presidency, the Iranian
president Mahmud Ahmadinejad visiting Yerevan avoided the visit to
the Genocide memorial envisaged in the protocol of official visits.

Ahmadinejad returned home early to avoid this visit, which was
explained by some urgent problems in Iran.

In this respect, the positions of Georgia and Iran are clear, and
their absence on April 24 can be understood. At the same time, there
is an important circumstance – the roll call on April 24 cannot be
a measure of the foreign policy of Armenia, despite the temptation.

The Armenian Genocide, the Armenian issue is highly important as a
foreign political resource of Armenia, as a trump card for Armenia, as
an international subject which Armenia still needs to be able to manage
efficiently for a lasting and broad process. However, this resource
cannot be a starting point for building foreign relations because
it will place Armenia in front of restrictions, transforming from an
important resource of foreign policy to a national security threat.

Moreover, Georgia and Iran who will not be in Yerevan on April 24 are
more valuable for Armenia amid the current geopolitical tendencies
and environment than, for example, Russia represented in Yerevan
by its president, the Caucasian policy of which has been built
on the priorities of strategic development of Russian-Turkish and
Russian-Azerbaijani relations since the mid 2000s, entering into an
increasingly threatening controversy with the national interest and
security of Armenia and culminating in the past two years.

Georgia and Iran are important for Armenia, at least for the land roads
provided the blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey as subjects which have
a big potential for forming a new valuable and prospective regional
vector in the economic, political and security aspects.

Now this potential is actually scattered in three countries for
different reasons. In Armenia, for example, it is the lack of
sovereignty and Russian dominance for which the Iran-Armenia-Georgia
pole is seen as a threat while this pole is an opportunity for Armenia
to break through the Turkish-Azerbaijani policy of blockade.

At the same time, there are problems in Tbilisi. Tbilisi prefers
dealing with Ankara and Baku because it has more economic benefits
provided that the Iran-Armenia direction is closed, and the
political-military aspect is more reliable for Georgia, considering
Russia’s aggressive stance towards Georgia’s orientation to the EU
and NATO.

Tbilisi fears that Russia may use its influence to make Armenia or the
factor of the Armenian community in Georgia a tool for its aggression.

The core of the problem is again the ability of Armenia to conduct
an independent and sovereign foreign policy which will help overcome
Georgia’s lack of confidence, at the same time facilitating Tbilisi’s
awareness of the essential strategic issue.

Even though the Turkish-Azerbaijani direction is reliable and
economically beneficial for Georgia, in strategic terms this direction
is no less a threat to Georgia. And if Tbilisi has the smallest
inclination for the idea of the Georgian state, the Russian-Turkish
direction cannot be superior to the political- military cooperation
with Armenia. Therefore, it is important for Armenia to rid of Russia’s
strategic counterinfluence.

Iran which is facing the strategic process of normalization with
the West is waiting for this. Recently Iran has been making hints to
Armenia on starting a more strategic and comprehensive relationship
but Yerevan has not responded. In this respect, Yerevan’s refusal to
initiate negotiations on import of cheap gas from Iran despite the
Iranian ambassador’s straightforward statements is indicative.

The Iran-Armenia-Georgia direction can be one of the roads of the
West-Iran relationship which still has to overcome a lot of tactical
reefs and be a lasting process.

Unfortunately, despite the delineating prospects, due to the Russian
imperial influence Yerevan is actually a tactical reef for both Iran
and the West.

Hence, the problem is not the presence or absence in Armenia on April
24 but the presence or absence of Armenia in the region as a sovereign
political subject.