Turan Information Agency, Azerbaijan (Opposition) Wednesday Presidential elections with the Karabakh background by Turan Analytical Service Two components could also be distinguished in the foreign policy component. The first is the attitude of the leading world players to the fact of the very transfer of presidential elections and the nomination of Aliyev for a fourth term. In this regard, many observers note that the US, in its official reaction to the upcoming events, has limited itself to calling on the Azerbaijani authorities to act within the framework of the current constitution, which, in fact, means acknowledging the transfer of choice and nomination for a fourth term. In this sense noteworthy is an unexpectedly successful and important visit of Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, to the United States. The top meetings clearly demonstrated that the priority of the Trump Administration in the world and in the post-Soviet space will be geopolitical interests of the United States, and in choosing partners for cooperation he will not be guided by the criterion of the presence or absence of the level of democracy, or the protection of certain declared principles, as it was before. Why can Nazarbayev's visit be considered a landmark for Azerbaijan? The answer is obvious: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are similar countries due to the peculiarity of their political and economic institutions, established structures of power and traditions of governance. And if Kazakhstan is important for the US as a neighbor of Russia and China, then Azerbaijan is the most important Western ally and neighbor of Iran in the context of the escalating crisis of Iranian-American and Iranian-Israeli relations. Russia's traditionally restrained reaction to the postponement of the election and the nomination of Ilham Aliyev as a presidential candidate shows that President Vladimir Putin is satisfied with the way Aliyev demonstrates his readiness to take into account Russia's interests in the region. And, of course, the second in the list, but the most important issue on the foreign policy agenda of Azerbaijan is the situation connected with the current state of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Assess the situation with the conflict only by the state of the intensity of the negotiation process, today, unfortunately, it is not necessary. The 25-year history of the Minsk process, and especially the last period after the April events of 2016, led to the fact that the effectiveness of these negotiations by the public of Armenia and Azerbaijan is perceived as zero. And periodically repeating rounds of negotiations cause ridicule over participants, both in a press, and in social networks. Therefore, it is difficult to assume that the negotiation process in this format and with the old participants, both in the propaganda plan and in terms of effectiveness, will be successful after the presidential election campaigns in Azerbaijan, Russia and the elections of the Prime Minister in Armenia. Analysis of the speeches of the Armenian political elite and, in particular, President Serzh Sargsyan in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe shows that the radicalization of Armenia's position has reached its maximum. Several years ago in the speeches of the Armenian leaders it was possible to meet the idea that the liberation of some occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh is possible in exchange for some concessions on the part of the Azerbaijani side, but now Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories around it are, in the opinion of the Armenian side, "the territory of the sovereign state of Artsakh", the borders of which cannot be subject to negotiations. In the Azerbaijani society, the opinion was strengthened that the reason for such radicalization and a source for the confidence of the Armenian elite is the activity of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who is an ethnic Armenian. He is considered the spokesman, coordinator and executor of the pro-Armenian policy of Russia towards Azerbaijan. Russia's actions in April 2016 and after showed that the Russian state opened the "security umbrella" not only for the territory of the Republic of Armenia, but also de facto over the territories occupied by Armenians around Nagorno-Karabakh. This is confirmed by the fact of demand for an immediate suspension of the successful Azerbaijani offensive in April, accelerated arms supplies to Armenia and a declaration of Russia's intentions to ensure the balance of the defense capabilities of the two countries in the conditions of the continuing occupation of Azerbaijani lands. All of the above means that the negotiation process and attempts to imitate its intensity did not have, and will not have a positive public resonance in Azerbaijan. This situation creates problems primarily for the Azerbaijani leadership, as the public, in the absence of effective negotiations, raises questions and claims to the authorities because they cannot ensure the de-occupation of the territories and the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons to their homes. Under such circumstances, it should not be ruled out that today's practice of suppressing these problems in relations with Russia cannot continue indefinitely. The current tactics of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry can only act as a temporary means for the prolongation of the current state, but it cannot lead to a solution of the problem, the main one of which is the threat of a spontaneous resumption of military actions of high intensity and scale. In this situation, Russia will be forced to accept and support one of the parties to the conflict, which is guaranteed to lead to the destruction of the entire construction of the system of multi-level ties aligned with the countries of the region for many years, or at least one of them that will feel hurt. It should be noted that the progressive evolution of the defense capabilities of Armenia and Azerbaijan has led to the fact that the resumption of hostilities "on the basis of the domino" principle can cover the entire territory of both states in a short time. Moreover, the important enclave factor of Nakhichevan will provide Azerbaijan with the opportunity to strike at the center of the Armenian capital in case Armenia applies medium-range missile weapons, as it says. It should be noted that Aliyev's recent statement on the need to implement the strategic task of "returning Azerbaijanis to Yerevan" has become a landmark. Now, the statement of the Armenian side on the impossibility of releasing any occupied territories of Azerbaijan and the possibility of strikes against Baku and the need to destroy the Azerbaijani state only means that the Karabakh issue and the Nagorno-Karabakh region itself becomes part of the overall panorama of the conflict between the two states for the entire operational- tactical and strategic depth of their territories. In this regard, it should be mentioned that the inclusion of the problems of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the agenda of the talks between Erdogan and Putin means that Turkey has practically made it clear that the solution of this problem is part of its national interests system, and it will not stand aside directly or indirectly in case of resumption of hostilities. Proceeding from this and other factors listed above, it becomes obvious that Russia will in every possible way avoid the possibility of resuming military operations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Therefore, with a greater share of the probability, it can be argued that the situation with the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will directly be related to how elections will be held in Russia and who will be personally entrusted with the implementation of mediation. In this connection, many analysts note that the meeting of the Presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan in Sochi and the "non-public consent" of Putin (pro-government press, only in Azerbaijan wrote about "the presence of a third force under the leadership of S. Lavrov, engaged in undermining Russian-Azerbaijani relations") with the fact that the person of S.Lavrov is not able to ensure progress in the process of settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict became an important basis for predictions about the post-election personnel transformation. Speaking of Western interests, the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict can, and most likely, become one of the elements of the confrontation system between the West and Russia. The present passivity of the West should be perceived only as a temporary tactic, which has the goal, first of all, not to hinder the destructive activity of the Russian Foreign Minister, who monopolized the settlement process. In fact, they confined themselves to the fact that they did not prevent Russia from pursuing a policy that was erroneous from the point of view of its interests. And after waiting for the imminent collapse and crisis, they will come "on stage" as a just and impartial mediator who wants to reconcile all. Correction of the current tactics of the West is possible only if the situation with Russian mediation changes, after the Russian elections and in the event of a radical transformation of the team.