Turan Information Agency, Azerbaijan (Opposition)
 Wednesday



Presidential elections with the Karabakh background

by  Turan Analytical Service



Two components could also be distinguished in the foreign policy
component. The first is the attitude of the leading world players to
the fact of the very transfer of presidential elections and the
nomination of Aliyev for a fourth term.

In this regard, many observers note that the US, in its official
reaction to the upcoming events, has limited itself to calling on the
Azerbaijani authorities to act within the framework of the current
constitution, which, in fact, means acknowledging the transfer of
choice and nomination for a fourth term.

In this sense noteworthy is an unexpectedly successful and important
visit of Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, to the
United States. The top meetings clearly demonstrated that the priority
of the Trump Administration in the world and in the post-Soviet space
will be geopolitical interests of the United States, and in choosing
partners for cooperation he will not be guided by the criterion of the
presence or absence of the level of democracy, or the protection of
certain declared principles, as it was before.

Why can Nazarbayev's visit be considered a landmark for Azerbaijan?
The answer is obvious: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are similar countries
due to the peculiarity of their political and economic institutions,
established structures of power and traditions of governance. And if
Kazakhstan is important for the US as a neighbor of Russia and China,
then Azerbaijan is the most important Western ally and neighbor of
Iran in the context of the escalating crisis of Iranian-American and
Iranian-Israeli relations.

Russia's traditionally restrained reaction to the postponement of the
election and the nomination of Ilham Aliyev as a presidential
candidate shows that President Vladimir Putin is satisfied with the
way Aliyev demonstrates his readiness to take into account Russia's
interests in the region.

And, of course, the second in the list, but the most important issue
on the foreign policy agenda of Azerbaijan is the situation connected
with the current state of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

Assess the situation with the conflict only by the state of the
intensity of the negotiation process, today, unfortunately, it is not
necessary. The 25-year history of the Minsk process, and especially
the last period after the April events of 2016, led to the fact that
the effectiveness of these negotiations by the public of Armenia and
Azerbaijan is perceived as zero.

And periodically repeating rounds of negotiations cause ridicule over
participants, both in a press, and in social networks.

Therefore, it is difficult to assume that the negotiation process in
this format and with the old participants, both in the propaganda plan
and in terms of effectiveness, will be successful after the
presidential election campaigns in Azerbaijan, Russia and the
elections of the Prime Minister in Armenia.

Analysis of the speeches of the Armenian political elite and, in
particular, President Serzh Sargsyan in the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe shows that the radicalization of Armenia's
position has reached its maximum.

Several years ago in the speeches of the Armenian leaders it was
possible to meet the idea that the liberation of some occupied
territories around Nagorno-Karabakh is possible in exchange for some
concessions on the part of the Azerbaijani side, but now
Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories around it are, in the opinion of
the Armenian side, "the territory of the sovereign state of Artsakh",
the borders of which cannot be subject to negotiations.

In the Azerbaijani society, the opinion was strengthened that the
reason for such radicalization and a source for the confidence of the
Armenian elite is the activity of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who
is an ethnic Armenian. He is considered the spokesman, coordinator and
executor of the pro-Armenian policy of Russia towards Azerbaijan.

Russia's actions in April 2016 and after showed that the Russian state
opened the "security umbrella" not only for the territory of the
Republic of Armenia, but also de facto over the territories occupied
by Armenians around Nagorno-Karabakh. This is confirmed by the fact of
demand for an immediate suspension of the successful Azerbaijani
offensive in April, accelerated arms supplies to Armenia and a
declaration of Russia's intentions to ensure the balance of the
defense capabilities of the two countries in the conditions of the
continuing occupation of Azerbaijani lands.

All of the above means that the negotiation process and attempts to
imitate its intensity did not have, and will not have a positive
public resonance in Azerbaijan. This situation creates problems
primarily for the Azerbaijani leadership, as the public, in the
absence of effective negotiations, raises questions and claims to the
authorities because they cannot ensure the de-occupation of the
territories and the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced
persons to their homes. Under such circumstances, it should not be
ruled out that today's practice of suppressing these problems in
relations with Russia cannot continue indefinitely.

The current tactics of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry can
only act as a temporary means for the prolongation of the current
state, but it cannot lead to a solution of the problem, the main one
of which is the threat of a spontaneous resumption of military actions
of high intensity and scale. In this situation, Russia will be forced
to accept and support one of the parties to the conflict, which is
guaranteed to lead to the destruction of the entire construction of
the system of multi-level ties aligned with the countries of the
region for many years, or at least one of them that will feel hurt.

It should be noted that the progressive evolution of the defense
capabilities of Armenia and Azerbaijan has led to the fact that the
resumption of hostilities "on the basis of the domino" principle can
cover the entire territory of both states in a short time. Moreover,
the important enclave factor of Nakhichevan will provide Azerbaijan
with the opportunity to strike at the center of the Armenian capital
in case Armenia applies medium-range missile weapons, as it says. It
should be noted that Aliyev's recent statement on the need to
implement the strategic task of "returning Azerbaijanis to Yerevan"
has become a landmark. Now, the statement of the Armenian side on the
impossibility of releasing any occupied territories of Azerbaijan and
the possibility of strikes against Baku and the need to destroy the
Azerbaijani state only means that the Karabakh issue and the
Nagorno-Karabakh region itself becomes part of the overall panorama of
the conflict between the two states for the entire operational-
tactical and strategic depth of their territories.

In this regard, it should be mentioned that the inclusion of the
problems of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the agenda of the
talks between Erdogan and Putin means that Turkey has practically made
it clear that the solution of this problem is part of its national
interests system, and it will not stand aside directly or indirectly
in case of resumption of hostilities.

Proceeding from this and other factors listed above, it becomes
obvious that Russia will in every possible way avoid the possibility
of resuming military operations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Therefore, with a greater share of the probability, it can be argued
that the situation with the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict will directly be related to how elections will be held in
Russia and who will be personally entrusted with the implementation of
mediation. In this connection, many analysts note that the meeting of
the Presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan in Sochi and the "non-public
consent" of Putin (pro-government press, only in Azerbaijan wrote
about "the presence of a third force under the leadership of S.
Lavrov, engaged in undermining Russian-Azerbaijani relations") with
the fact that the person of S.Lavrov is not able to ensure progress in
the process of settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict became an
important basis for predictions about the post-election personnel
transformation.

Speaking of Western interests, the settlement of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict can, and most likely, become one of the
elements of the confrontation system between the West and Russia. The
present passivity of the West should be perceived only as a temporary
tactic, which has the goal, first of all, not to hinder the
destructive activity of the Russian Foreign Minister, who monopolized
the settlement process. In fact, they confined themselves to the fact
that they did not prevent Russia from pursuing a policy that was
erroneous from the point of view of its interests. And after waiting
for the imminent collapse and crisis, they will come "on stage" as a
just and impartial mediator who wants to reconcile all. Correction of
the current tactics of the West is possible only if the situation with
Russian mediation changes, after the Russian elections and in the
event of a radical transformation of the team.