Ararat Institute
February 19, 2018 by GrigorH
Is Azerbaijan Readying
Itself for Another Round of War With Armenians?
By Grigor Hakobyan
Summary:
In a speech to the ruling party New Azerbaijan
on February 6th, in addition to claiming the Republic of Artsakh as part of
Azerbaijan, Aliyev made territorial claims against the Republic of Armenia. He
specifically singled out Armenia’s capitol Yerevan, Lake Sevan and the Syunik
province (also known as Zangezoor). Aliyev stated: “Because Yerevan is our
historic land, and we should return to this historic land of Azerbaijanis. This
is our political and strategic goal.” Aliyev’s revanchist remarks were dismissed
by most Armenian politicians, analysts and media outlets while Minsk Group
co-chairs: USA, Russia and France offered very weak condemnations or no
response at all. Very few in Armenia or diaspora seriously considered the
implications of Aliyev’s comments that are no doubt a warning of a looming
confrontation that will resemble the war of 1988-1994 with more devastation
than before. This analysis is meant to close that gap and prepare the Armenians
around the world and the world community at large for the events to come.
Background:
Since the failed blitzkrieg of 2016 that
became to be known as a Four Day War in Armenia and diaspora, Azerbaijani
leadership continued to threaten the security of Armenian republics not only
through political statements both at home and abroad, but also through fast
phase acquisition of ever more devastating modern weaponry such as new T-90
tanks and BTR-80A/82A (APCs), additional quantities of TOS-1/A (thermobaric
rocket launchers) and others. Acquisitions of modern weapons were not limited
to Russian made tanks, artillery systems and air-defense systems only, military
products of other countries such as Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, South African
Republic and Czech Republic (Dana self-propelled howitzers and RM-70
multiple-launch rocket systems) made the cut as well.
Pumped up with new weapons and large military
budget, in light of apparent indifference on behalf of the international
community, Azerbaijan unexpectedly launched its blitzkrieg against the Armenian
positions along the entire LoC in Artsakh on April 1/2. It carried out combat
actions and war atrocities against Armenian civilians in the battlefield until
April 6th self-imposed ceasefire, when its military began to suffer significant
losses under Armenian counter-offensive that managed to drive Azerbaijani
troops back to its previous positions and reclaim more than a dozen of
previously held Armenian positions that were lost in the first few days of the
war. The appearance of Armenian short-range ballistic missile systems in
Artsakh (Scud-B and Iskander-E) deterred Azerbaijani military from pressing on
with its offensive while large number of casualties and panic overcame its
infantry that turned its tail and ran away from the battlefield.
Analysis:
In light of failed Azerbaijani blitzkrieg in
2016 and recent military drills conducted in Azerbaijan (particularly in
Nakhijevan) in the summer 2017 in conjunction with the Turkish military, it is
most probable to anticipate the next round of aggression to come from three different
directions: Aran (bordering Askeran and Martuni regions of Artsakh), Nakhijevan
(bordering Ararat, Vayots Dzor and Syunik provinces of Armenia) and
Ganja/Gazakh (bordering Tavush province of Armenia). Just like in 2016 it is
realistic to expect Azerbaijani forces to utilize various pro-Turkish militias
from Syria, hundreds of Turkish military “advisers” and ultra-nationalists
known as “gray wolves” in concert with Azerbaijani special forces at the
forefront of attacking formations. In the presence of vary capable air-defense
systems in possession of Armenian armed forces, use of combat aircrafts and
helicopters by Azerbaijan will be limited in nature. Meanwhile, “Kamikaze”
drones and other attack drones will make an exception due to their low cost and
expendability. Most likely they will be used first or in conjunction with the
barrage of rocket artillery against the Armenian positions.
Considering that Armenian positions along LoC
in all three directions are very well fortified and surrounded by minefields it
is most likely that the first round of attack will be carried out by long range
artillery systems utilizing BM-21 (Grad), BM-30 (Smerch), T-122
(Sakarya-Turkish), RM-70 (Vampire-Czech), and LAR-160 (Lynx-Israel) and EXTRA
(Extended Range Artillery-Israel) and long range canons such as Atmos 2000
(Israel), 2S7 Pion (USSR/Russia), 2S3 Akatsiya (USSR/Russia), 2S1 Gvozdika
(USSR/Russia), D-22, D-30 and other cannons. At closer ranges, TOS-1/A
thermobaric rocket systems will be utilized as well. The sappers will be tasked
with demining fields leading to Armenian positions while artillery carrys out
its bombardment. Soon afterwards, infantry attack supported by tank formations
(T-90 and T-72) and armored vehicles (BTR-80A/82A, BMP-2/3, ) under cover of mortar
fire from 2S31 Vena (Russia), 2S9 Nona (USSR/Russia), Cardom (Hatchet-Israel),
MO-120 RT-61 (France) and others will follow.
Among all directions of attack described above
the most threatening to Armenian security will present the LoC along the border
with Nakhijevan. Presently Azerbaijan has stationed over 20,000 troops and
hundreds of pieces of military hardware, including combat aircrafts and mobile
artillery units such as Russian made Smerch and Turkish made T-300 Kasirga, and
T-122 Sakarya multiple-launch rocket systems which are fully capable of
reaching Yerevan and other densely populated towns and villages in the Republic
of Armenia. The presence of such a large number of Azerbaijani-Turkish troops
and military hardware in Nakhijevan threatens Armenian transportation routs of
strategic significance such as the Yerevan-Stepanakert road artery and present
North-South highway connecting Armenia to Iran via Meghri border checkpoint.
The Azerbaijani contingent is also equipped with S-300 (Favorit) air defense
systems and combat aircrafts such as Su-24 (Fencer), Su-25 (Grach) and Mi-24
(Hind) helicopters.
Conclusion/Recommendations:
Considering the experience of Four Day War in
April of 2016, Armenian forces will most likely engage in all-perimeter defense
followed by a counter offensive on all its flanks. However, if they continue to
remain in the same positions as before a third round of an all-out war is
guaranteed to occur in another few years. Therefore, it will be only prudent
for the Armenian armed forces to carry out preemptive strikes against large
concentrations of Azerbaijani military personnel and hardware deep into the
enemy’s territory by devastating all Azerbaijani military installations between
the present LoC up to the Kur river in the direction of Azerbaijani Aran and
Ganja/Gazakh provinces before Azerbaijan launches its attack against the
republics of Armenia and Artsakh. Furthermore, taking out some strategic
installations in Azerbaijan, such as oil/gas drilling platforms, pipelines and
railroads leading to Turkey may be necessary to stop the war early.
In the meantime, a special attention needs to
be given to Nakhijevan direction where the most of the threat is coming from.
Specifically, all Azerbaijani military installations in Nakhijevan need to be
neutralized while its military contingent totally decimated and liquidated.
Furthermore, Armenian armed forces should enter Nakhijevan and liberate the
province from the Aliyev’s rule in Baku. Subsequently, its remaining residents
should be given Armenian residency and citizenship status, and offered the same
legal protections as all other ethnic minorities residing in Armenia. There are
other factors such as Russia, Turkey and the International Community
(US/EU/NATO/UN, etc.) and the actions of Armenian diaspora that weren’t taken
into consideration for this analysis to avoid a lengthy article. However, those
hefty factors cannot be excluded from the resolution of this conflict and their
influences upon the warring sides cannot be ignored.
Given past experiences, this new round of war
may not last longer than six months, if not fewer, considering the amount of
damage that can be inflicted by both sides against each other in a very short
period of time. In the meantime, additional steps need to be undertaken to end
the rule of a warmongering regime in Baku that will result in the toppling of
the Aliyev’s regime in Azerbaijan and the coming to power of a democratically
elected government that will find trading with Armenian states and peacefully
living with them side-by-side more beneficent than violent confrontation and
xenophobia sickening every layer of Azerbaijani society from kindergarten to
higher echelons of power. Aliyev’s regime has created false illusions of a
short and victorious war against Armenians that cannot ever happen. No amount
of black caviar, Oil or gas in Azerbaijan will be able to save Aliyev’s regime
from a prison cell somewhere in Baku or Apsheron Peninsula.