The ongoing crisis [reference to popular protests in Armenia that ended in Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan's resignation on 23 April] has completely engrossed my thoughts. Being an Armenian, I consider it to be my obligation to carry out an analysis for Russian and foreign information and analytical editions. Despite the nationwide euphoria, which is quite well-deserved and understandable, there is understanding of the need in detached analysis.

I would like to pitch upon the analysis of fundamental factors, which rank above this struggle and which the Armenian nation's and state's mid- and long-term prospects depend on. Many experts (and partly your humble narrator) have become carried away by the passions prevailing in the country, forgetting that any process needs to be considered in dynamic and with pragmatic understanding of many unknown aspects, too.

The basis of domestic stability is a healthy competition between political forces (organized minorities) oriented on their part of voters (unorganized majorities).

'Feudal, oligarchic groups' driving force in Armenia

A party is a political entity resting on unchanged values, which lay the foundation for the competition with other forces in the struggle for people's minds and hearts. In Armenian reality, a completely different construction has taken shape with the interest of feudal and oligarchic groups become a driving force. A political layer was created on the basis of interpersonal relations, which gradually generated close interdependence. The value-based component was left out and the unorganized majority was ignored. Strive for the accumulation of wealth became the only idea and reproduction of power was considered as a guarantee of preserving the system's inborn essence.

The [ruling] Republican Party was created as a conservative force and the idea of [19th-century Armenian liberation movement military leader] Garegin Nzhdeh's Tseghakron [a national/ethnic and political movement towards a renewal of the spiritual, behavioural and cultural identity of the Armenian people] was at the heart of its ideology. However, there arises a question: How can a conservative party exist in the country, whose independence has a history of 25 years? One does not have to be an analyst and a pundit to realise that the aim of conservatives is to conserve (preserve concrete things intact). Hence yet another question: What were representatives of this party going to preserve, if the republic had not even established the tradition of power and civic society and created strategic political culture? In the country, the whole domestic political field is full of apparent paradoxes and inconsistencies. Suffice to mention that Dashnaktsutyun, which is a left-wing socialist-revolutionary party and which has traditionally adopted a highly ambivalent attitude towards Ndzheh's ideas, forms a coalition with the right-wing nationalists of the Republican Party of Armenia, which adheres to "Tseghakronism and Nzhdehism".

The Prosperous Armenia [party] bore up for such a complicated basis of values as liberal conservatism, which experiences difficulties taking root in the countries, which have centuries-old traditions of government. Centrists of the Armenian National Congress develop programmes and adopt slogans, which are by no means oriented on "the centre" (and it is difficult to say whether these "centrist voters" exist in general).

Essentially, we currently have only two groups in the country: Feudalistic-oligarchic and the people. Each of the groups lives its own life, having its own rules and interests. As for the state, it has turned into ordinary physical borders of [their] co-existence.

Ruling system needs 'iron-clad guarantees'

Law enforcement structures are the system's support. In the system, each narrow group is interested in a strong and reinforced power-wielding bloc (a slender support always represents the main danger). Based on this, it is not quite clear what the essence of the current dispute about who is going to become prime minister is. At present, Nikol Pashinyan [the leader of the popular protests that led to Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan's resignation], has received support from Prosperous Armenia and Dashnaktsutyun, which are two elements of the system. And now the question of his appointment depends on the votes of the Republican Party, which is the main force of the system. To put it otherwise, achieving the short-term goal (holding a temporary post) utterly and completely depends on the political will of the same forces of the system.

In a construction of the kind, party discipline plays the main role rather than a formal role and informal relationships between members of all the three groups. Representatives of these forces have kinship relationships (dynastic marriages), common business-interests, and common secrets. I personally rule out the scenario, in which such a system (and not only in Armenia) will make concessions without receiving iron-clad guarantees (for example, preserving the power-wielding bloc intact). External centres, which are seriously influencing internal processes in the country, cannot be removed from the equations either. The main loan supplier in the shape of the collective "West" is concerned about the country's capacity to pay foreign debts amounting to 7bn dollars (about 58 per cent of the GDP).

External forces

Russia is concerned about its influence (Armenia's membership of the EEU [Eurasian Economic Union] and CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization], the [Russian] military base, the integrated air defence system, and so forth). As for Iran, it does not want to see any Western elements in the country, and so forth. For now, the Armenian side is facing the unresolved problem of Artsakh [Azerbaijan's breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh] (international recognition) and a serious military, political, and economic dependence on the outside world, which remains in place. It will be extremely problematic to sort out fundamental challenges.

Steps to be taken

In the mid-term perspective, I can see the need in the following steps:

Fundamental changes in the country's secondary and higher education are first to come. A real demolition of the system will take place only if the value basis is shapes in the new generation. To this end, a school of Armenian political thought needs to be set up to supply the country with necessary personnel.

The real and visionary opposition should realise that the main weapon for fighting decayed reality is the Education Ministry, rather than law enforcement agencies. We need to secure a wide corridor of opportunities and with time, the new personnel of the new education system will be in all structures in the country. It is important to begin creating a new future with education even as we speak. Otherwise, we will lose it and the velvet revolution will become irrelevant.

Second is strategic and targeted repatriation. As it happened, our main human capital, which has fantastic potential capacity, is scattered all over the world, serving the interests of other countries. We need to make use of the experience if the Irish, Jews, and Poles, developing programmes for [Armenian] communities. I see three main directions: Mass repatriation, which should be selective and lobbyist. In the first case, we will dilute the post-Soviet reality with the Armenians, who are bearers of different socio-political cultures. Selection should be oriented on filling in "gaps" with professionals having vast experience and extensive ties. And finally, it is cultivation of Armenian-speaking lobbyists locally. They will be able to defend Armenia's national interests internationally. Thus, I am absolutely certain that to build a new Armenia, we need to get hold of the two ministries – [those of] education and diaspora.