Regnum news agency, Russia
July 28 2018
Fighting reconnaissance in Armenian-Russian relations. The tactic of Fighting reconnaissance is used in cases, when other opportunities of assessing a situation are limited
[Armenian News note: the below is translated from Russian]
The story of a charge lodged against the secretary general of the [Russian-led] CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organisation], Yury Khachaturov, is worth considering within the chain of events initiated by new Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in his search for red lines within the frames of Armenian-Russian relations.
From all appearances, the charge under a criminal case and a pre-trial restriction in the shape of a bail for the head of the international military and political block, the CSTO, and the proposal made through the media (!) to "replace the CSTO head" without at least informal preliminary coordination of the issue with partners in the block are beyond the boundaries of official, formal, partnership, allied, block, and other relations between Armenia and Russia.
In addition to a couple of phrases from a press release regarding a telephone conversation between the heads of the two countries' foreign ministries, Moscow responded indirectly too, also through the media, dubbing such an approach to things as "non-professional". At the same time, there was a report on an appropriate procedure for the "termination of powers" of Khachaturov, not his "replacement".
It is also noteworthy that in this connection, Pashinyan decided to call [Belarusian President] Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the head of a partner country in the block, which Yerevan is assailing with letters concerning the sales of multiple launch rocket systems to Azerbaijan. It is possible that the press services of the heads of the two countries did not become preoccupied with a telephone conversation with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and they did talk. However, given the tonality of the indirect response from the Russian Foreign Ministry, it is more likely that there was no such conversation.
In general, a firm opinion is taking shape that in foreign relations, Nikol Pashinyan is guided by the straightforwardness of the well-known [Russian film] character, Zhiglov: "A thief must be in prison". You can by no means find fault with this position. However, sending a thief to prison in the modern situation in international relations and cooperation, it is necessary to take into account also a whole complex of conditions and objectives resulting from the spirit and interests of these relations.
Pashinyan's methods of struggling against corruption and the former regime and for environmental protection, human rights, and other things are identical in their rudeness with his actions in the international arena. And it is not only the CSTO and the EEU [Eurasian Economic Union] that are at issue. He demonstrated his simplified approaches to relations with the EU on the sidelines of the recent Nato summit. However, if there is no one to put him in his place within his country even in his closest entourage in the government, it is possible to find such people in the international arena.
In his live appearances in social networks, interviews, and speeches, Pashinyan has stressed on a lot of occasions the need to build equal partnership relations within the frames of the CSTO and in cooperation with Russia, which, as he says, is a centuries-old brother of Armenia. This is quite understandable and acceptable. Enjoying formal and real legitimacy among citizens, Pashinyan can indeed raise the benchmark (as compared to the previous government) to a higher and more efficient level as regards the protection of the interests of a small republic when building relations within the frames of the EEU and in cooperation with the EU, the United States, and Iran.
Raising this benchmark within the frames of the EEU and with Moscow in particular, he chose the tactic of fighting reconnaissance. This includes the prime minister's tough reaction to the incident involving the drills of the 102nd Russian base despite all the apologies on the part of Russia as well as his statement on the role of a military arbiter for Moscow in the Karabakh conflict and the concealment of information on Yerevan's possible participation in the Nato drills in Georgia together with Baku and Ankara.
The story involving Khachaturov or, to be more exact, the way things were done, should also be considered in this context. However, in all appearances, the Armenian government has already reached the line, where it would be good to slow the pace down and start considering external relations from the position of more elaborate complex methods for international relations. The tactic of fighting reconnaissance is used when there are no other opportunities of assessing the situation or when they are considerably limited. It can often prove to be fatal too.