New Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan participated in the 11-12 July Nato summit. A month after the [Velvet] Revolution, Nikol Pashinyan managed to have a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on two occasions: For the first time, within the frameworks of the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Sochi on 14 May and for the second time, at the 14 June opening ceremony of the World Football Championship. Against this background, many in Armenia perceived his arrival at the Nato summit as a step towards restoring a balance. However, in actual fact, this balance has never been disrupted.
Pashinyan's visits to Moscow and Brussels fits quite well in the "multiple-vector" or "complementary" foreign policy, which Armenia has been pursuing over the whole post-Soviet period.
There was nothing new about attending the Nato summit: This was accepted practice even under the "old regime". It can be said that Pashinyan is also doing the same, although in a new fashion. Thus, the unprecedented post-revolutionary situation has failed to make an impact on the country's foreign policy.
The Sochi visit with post-Soviet leaders was a kind of "familiarisation", while one of the reasons for attending the Nato summit was establishing contacts with Western leaders.
For example, during his meeting with Macron, Pashinyan and one of the officials accompanying Macron, who was Armenian by origin, greeted each other in an embrace, slightly breaching the protocol by doing so. These details are extremely important for the domestic Armenian public: This is perceived as a proof that strong world leaders perceive Pashinyan as an "insider".
Things did not end in photos and embraces with fellow-countrymen. Pashinyan made several important statements, saying that the new Armenian leadership approached the foreign policy issue in a new fashion.
However, as regards geostrategic priorities, there are no particular changes: In his interview to Euroenews, Pashinyan said that Armenia was going to remain Russia's ally, developing relations with the West and Nato at the same time and that among other things, Armenia was going to carry on participating in Nato missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
However, Pashinyan laid emphasis in a new fashion. Speaking about the problem of [Azerbaijan's breakaway Nagorno-]Karabakh, Pashinyan said that Azerbaijan's aggressive position regarding the new and democratic Armenia was aggression against democracy, which had won a victory in Armenia.
As regards relations with the EU, in this case, too, the strategy remains the same on the whole. However, in this case, too, Pashinyan laid emphasis in a new manner. Pashinyan said that democracy was a system of values, rather than a geopolitical orientation. He indirectly said that Armenia was going to build a democratic state and that at the same time, it wanted no conflict with Moscow.
Many positive assessments were made about the developments in Armenia during meetings with EU officials. However, as Pashinyan put it, the Armenian side held bigger expectations.
As Pashinyan put it, due to these changes, Armenia expected the EU to increase the amount of financial assistance [by 10m euros] [square brackets as published]. Ultimately, after Pashinyan and EU Ambassador in Armenia Piotr Switalski exchanged opinions in a tough manner, it was said that Armenia was going to prepare its proposals to the EU and that the EU was ready to consider them.
On the whole, the visit showed that in relations with the EU, the Armenian leadership was oriented on concrete results, rather than the process. Pashinyan said that changes would anyway be made in Armenia and that international organisations had an opportunity to make an impact on them. However, [he said] that they would be made even if there was no support and that Armenia was not going to be in the role of a petitioner.
Yerevan-Moscow
As I have already said, the Brussels visit was aimed to emphasise that Armenia's foreign policy was multiple-vector.
During the first weeks after the revolution, some deviation to Moscow's direction was noticeable in the foreign political agenda of Armenia.
From all appearances, the special attention was due to the fact that before the revolution, Pashinyan and his companions-in-arms were perceived as "pro-Western", which caused fear in the Russian elite. From all appearances, Russia's fear grew due to the fact that in Pashinyan's cabinet, there appeared people, who had experience in working in NGOs and had received education in Western universities.
In some Russian media outlets, they focused attention on the fact that the new secretary of the Armenian Security Service, Armen Grigoryan, earlier worked in the Transparency International [NGO]. In Russia, the organisation is considered as a "foreign agent".
Nevertheless, the programme, which was broadcast on Radio Komsomolskaya Pravda proved to be the most scandalous. During the programme, former TV presenter and currently Rosneft Vice President Mikhail Leontyev and his respondent spared no insulting pronouncements against Armenia. In the Armenian mass media, the programme caused a stir. The Russian ambassador in Armenia even had to make a statement. Indeed, episodes of the kind failed to create a trend and on the whole, the Russian media have preserved a neutral tone with respect to Armenia. However, it is also obvious that after the revolution, distrust in the new Armenian leadership was created in the Russian elite.
Given Armenia's dependence on Russia in different spheres, starting with the military and ending with the economic sphere, if desired, Moscow can certainly cause serious problems to Pashinyan's cabinet. To this end, it has quite a broad spectrum of instruments, including possible detection of dangerous substances in Armenian agricultural products and an increase in arms supplies to Azerbaijan.
The new Armenian leadership will anyway have to build a new model of relations with Russia. Being in opposition, Pashinyan repeatedly accused the Armenian authorities of sacrificing the country's sovereignty and interests to relations with Moscow.
Now, Pashinyan has to show Armenian society that Armenia's sovereignty cannot be subject to compromise and at the same time, he should not sour relations with the Kremlin. Finding a balance is quite a challenging task, particularly as due to the former authorities' lobbying activities, this is becoming increasingly difficult.
Indeed, Serzh Sargsyan never earned particular trust on Moscow's part: They thought that he wanted to "double-cross Moscow", developing relations with the EU and Nato behind Moscow's back. Nevertheless, due to his party background, Serzh Sargsyan was a more understandable person for Moscow than Pashinyan and his associates – yesterday's oppositionist and NGO people – are.
Yerevan- Baku [and Ankara] [square brackets as published]
In addition to this, there is the factor of Azerbaijani lobbyism and ties between the two nations. In the Russian elite, [Azerbaijani President] Ilham Aliyev, who is a former member of the Political Bureau of the [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and a graduate of the MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations], is considered as an "insider", despite the differences over issues such as [going into] competition [with Russia] for gas supplies to Europe.
It was due to these lobbying efforts that several well-known Russian celebrities visited Azerbaijan. These were high-profile visits by well-known media personalities Maxim Shevchenko and Alexander Dugin. Apart from this, two MPs of the State Duma arrived in Azerbaijan to participate in the conference "Moscow-Baku Axis", making pro-Azerbaijani statements. As expected, photos showing Shevchenko and Dugin with Azerbaijani military men caused a stir in the Armenian social media.
It is difficult to say whether Shevchenko's and Dugin's visits were coordinated with Moscow or not. However, episodes of the kind always cause a stir in Yerevan.
If Baku manages to secure trustworthy relations with Moscow, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh might again escalate. In Yerevan, they fear that Baku might take advantage of Moscow's distrust in the new Armenian leadership. So far, with the exception of several episodes, there has been no evidence that Baku is capable of winning Moscow over regarding the issue.
Presumably, Moscow should not be interested in the escalation of situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. At present, when the tensions are at the level of incidents, Moscow can turn a blind eye to this. However, if there is a serious escalation, Moscow will be faced with an undesirable choice between Baku and Yerevan: In that case, it will be impossible to maintain the policy of balance. Apart from this, the situation will deteriorate not only on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, but also in Armenia's territory within internationally recognised borders, and the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organisation] will raise the issue of interfering. This will probably cause contradictions within the organisation.
And finally, at present, when relations between Moscow and Ankara have "thawed", escalation of the situation in Karabakh does not play into the hands of either of them.
In the conflict zone proper, the station is currently quite aggravated. However, compared to perilous years, tensions are not as great as they used to be. Incidents on the front line and along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border have been part of Armenia's and Azerbaijan's everyday life at least since 2012, when the situation around the Karabakh issue became aggravated as a result of Ramil Safarov's extradition [Safarov killed an Armenian officer in Budapest and was first convicted in Hungary and then extradited to Azerbaijan, where he was released]. Compared to 2014, never mind the April 2016 [war], the situation has been more stable even during the [Armenian] Velvet Revolution and afterwards.
At present, the worst thing is that incidents have become increasingly frequent on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan's Naxcivan Autonomous Republic. This territory is very close to Yerevan and at the same time, it borders with Turkey, which according to the Kars Treaty, is the guarantor of Naxcivan's status.
Therefore, possible escalation in Naxcivan is fraught with the danger of losing control over the situation. Indeed, after the recent developments unfolding in Azerbaijan [the collapse of the power distribution system and also unrest in Ganca] [Square brackets as published], the level of risk decreased. On the other hand, in view of these developments, people in Azerbaijan might take interest in "winning a victory in a small-scale war".
