[Armenian News note: the below is translated from the Russian edition of Turan]
From time to time, discussions break out within society, political elite, and the community of pundits and analysts about Azerbaijan's landmark choice of the military and political block to join to ensure the country's security and geopolitical stability to the full. To a certain extent, these discussions resemble speculations and bargaining aimed to manoeuvre between "stick and carrot", the [Russian-led] CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organisation] and Nato, as Azerbaijan is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, which demands that its members forego joining military and political blocks. One might raise an objection, [saying] that Belarus, which is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, is a member of the CSTO. However, this example is rather an exception from the rule. At present, people seem to have quite forgotten that not only Azerbaijan, but also Georgia (!) was a member of the CSTO.
In May 1992, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed in Tashkent a collective security treaty (CST). Azerbaijan signed the treaty on 24 September 1993. Georgia signed it on 9 September 1993 and Belarus signed it on 31 December 1993. The treaty came into force on 20 April 1994 and it was meant to last for five years, allowing extension. On 2 April 1999, presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan signed a protocol on prolonging the time of operation of the treaty for the following 5-year period. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan refused to prolong the treaty.
Pros and cons of joining a military block
At different times, supporters and opponents of one or the other block put forward numerous arguments for and against. In 2008, it was said that Azerbaijani armaments were Soviet-designed and that joining the CSTO, it would be possible to make the same procurements at lower prices; apart from this, Russia's policy regarding [Azerbaijan's breakaway Nagorno-]Karabakh was expected to change, but Armenia and Azerbaijan could not officially be at war; in the case of a military conflict, Armenia could not count on the CSTO's help; and lastly, regional security would increase. It should be taken into consideration that Armenia, which is intertwined with Russia, enjoys the benefits of cooperation with Nato and the EU. An emphasis was also placed on Azerbaijan's closeness to Russia in economic and political terms. It was emphasised that joining the CSTO was not going to create any problems, as Russia wanted to have an ally of the kind in the Caucasus to prevent Nato expansion in the region. Forecasts were made that joining the CSTO, we would tie Armenia's hands, beginning a new stage of talks from better positions. This is why this choice is better than today's military neutrality.
The arguments presented by those opposed to the CSTO are as follows: Sooner or later, Azerbaijan will switch to more sophisticated Western armaments, striving to achieve Nato standards; Russia's pro-Armenian policy will become neutral at the best and Baku will finally lose the opportunity to regain occupied territories under military duress; if necessary, the CSTO (to be read as Russia) might demand that military bases be set up on Azerbaijan's territory. (The constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan says that military bases of foreign countries cannot be stationed on the territory of Azerbaijan.) Joining the CSTO, Azerbaijan will lose the opportunity to pursue the policy of manoeuvring between the West and the Russian Federation.
Is it right to compare Nato with its history and traditions with a marginalised organisation such as the CSTO, which effectively has no development prospects?! Joining the CSTO, Azerbaijan will not only change the vector of development and [upset] the existing balance, but it will also face the danger of revision of a number of ongoing and planned transport, communications, and energy projects related with the West. Therefore, even if Azerbaijan takes a fancy for the CSTO, it will not be able to join it.
Cooling in relations with Turkey, which is the only ally, will become yet another danger posed.
Russia's position regarding Karabakh will change only after it realises that it has completely hooked Azerbaijan, which will replace Armenia as its foothold in the South Caucasus.
Nevertheless, given the experience of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, Azerbaijan's joining Nato is suicidal. Azerbaijan needs to set up its own alliance: Turkey-Azerbaijan-Israel.
Azerbaijan is facing no danger as long as it steers clear of any military blocks. Therefore, it is foolish to forgo the position.
Other opinions were also voiced. More often than not, they were unexpected. Until the Karabakh conflict is settled, Azerbaijan should not join Nato or the CSTO. Becoming a member of a military block, Baku will automatically recognise the military block's control over its military forces. It is clear that providing security guarantees, leading superpowers of the military block demand that members of the block coordinate their military and foreign polices with it in exchange.
By and large, Iran and Russia have no particular interest in Azerbaijan proper. What they need is the Moscow-Baku-Tehran road. The West will feel anger, failing to realise that we cannot speak with Russia or Iran from the position of strength and threats of blockades. If the West needs this, let it settle the problem by itself. We should remember the fate [former Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili faced. In the case of Azerbaijan, the more global communications run across the country, the more convenient the blackmailer's position becomes. It is possible to turn Naxcivan into a free economic zone for trade between Georgia and Russia, Iran and the West, and Turkey and Armenia under Baku's control.
We should listen to the advice from neighbouring Georgia: "I am from Georgia and I have no right to participate in the opinion poll, but let me express my opinion:
"Azerbaijan is living a peaceful life, because it pursues a neutral policy. As for Georgia, it is rushing to the West and Nato. Azerbaijan is helping us (gas, political support) and there is enough [of both]. If you now try to infract neutrality, trying to join Nato, provocations will begin in Karabakh [to be followed by] artillery attacks on Azerbaijani settlements; planes cruising out of nowhere will bomb your towns; Lezgians will show a desire to reunite with their historic motherland [in Russia's North Caucasus]; the Talysh (or someone else) will begin to stir; the Armenian Army will mount an attack, demanding that "Bakurakert [Baku]" be returned, and Russia will carry out a 'peacekeeping' mission.
"If you try to join the CSTO, you will see orange roses in Baku. Therefore, enjoy your peaceful life by now. We will join Nato and then your turn will come. It will be easier for you to join Nato. We will help you," [the person said].
Let us continue [considering] the arguments of those opposed to the CSTO. If Azerbaijan joins the CSTO, Russia may very well return us five districts (without Lacin and Kalbacar and without Nagorno-Karabakh, of course) to award the choice and improve its own image. It may help us to sign with Armenia a peace agreement or an interim peace agreement, to be more precise. In exchange, we will lose Karabakh forever; we will have to sell all gas pipelines to Russia and increase oil transportation along the whole northern route. In a word, we will depend on Russia's whims not only politically, but also economically.
If we decide on Nato and the West, at the initial stage, we will quite possibly experience pressure on Russia's part; we might face deportation of our fellow-countrymen from Russia; there might be provocations in the regions adjacent to the Armenian border and local battles in Karabakh, which will possibly turn into a war. Russia might increase the issuance of Russian passports (the process has already begun) in the north of our country, repeating the Georgian scenario at any time. However, if our leadership and the whole nation manage to withstand Russia's pressure, we will afterwards return our territories, becoming stronger with a better trained army and becoming the West's powerful lever for bringing Armenia over to the Western course to finally oust Russia from our region. We will receive economic benefits, support, investments, and practical help in the reforms to be carried out.
Objections: The danger of the situation is that we can no longer be a neutral country, pursuing a "balanced" policy. The main obstacle to our authorities when [thinking whether] to decide on the West is that pro-Western course requires reforms. And this is what [they find] unacceptable! Therefore, I fear that our "ship" will head to the North…
Baku joined the Non-Aligned Movement back in 2011. Correspondingly, talk about membership of the CSTO is doubtful. Baku has always been consistent in avoiding participation in any military and political alliances. So far, no military alliance has effectively been formed between Azerbaijan and the "elder brother" – Turkey. What is the point of joining the CSTO for Azerbaijan, which is rich in oil, has a lot of money and is developing close military and technical cooperation with Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey?
When relations with the West deteriorate, populist statements by official persons and MPs are on the increase: "To settle the Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan needs to normalise relations with Russia. The West and Nato anyway show no support for Azerbaijan in the issue (MP Qudrat Hasanquliyev, 26 November 2009) Azerbaijan can join the CSTO, stationing Russian military bases in exchange for the return of Nagorno Karabakh".
Another MP, Aydin Mirzazada, believes that official Baku can join the CSTO only under one condition: "The CSTO should condemn Armenia's expansionist policy against Azerbaijan. It should demand that Armenia withdraw all troops from Azerbaijan's occupied territories. Afterwards, Azerbaijan will be able to cooperate with the organisation in different directions. I do not think that Azerbaijan should necessarily join some block, taking part in implementing its strategy. However, along with this, it is now possible to cooperate with the CSTO in a number of spheres. However, as long as Armenia is a full-fledged member of the organisation and the organisation has not made an assessment of Armenia's expansionist policy, cooperation with the CSTO is ruled out in any sphere."
The condition, which was laid down, once again implies for Russia that taking Azerbaijan's side in the Karabakh conflict, Russia will gain a lot in exchange.
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