[Armenian News note: the below is translated from the Russian Edition of Turan]

An Azerbaijani news agency has offered several theories as to why Norway has decided to shut down its embassy in Baku. She said that Norway sought to support Georgia's integration with Europe, to have more "freedom of action" to promote reform in Armenia and that it may have concluded that it is "unproductive" to continue to seek democratic reform in Azerbaijan. The following is text of report by independent Turan news agency on 10 November headlined "Norway leaves to stay"; subheadings inserted editorially:

10 November: The Norwegian Foreign Ministry announced on 9 November that it would close down its embassy in Azerbaijan in 2019. The embassy has been the kingdom's only diplomatic mission in the South Caucasus since July 1998 when the kingdom opened the diplomatic mission in Baku. The Norwegian diplomatic centre in the region will relocate to Georgia. Norwegian-Azerbaijani relations are [to be] transferred to the jurisdiction of the Norwegian embassy in Ankara.

Public surprised, but not government

In Azerbaijan, this news came as a surprise for the public, but not for the government. There were no prior statements about this. Even the actual announcement of the shutdown of the diplomatic mission was made in passing in the context of a more detailed statement by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry about the opening of an embassy in Tbilisi.

"Georgia is one of our main partners in the Eurasia region. For many years it has followed the path of reform which has drawn it closer to European and Euro-Atlantic organisations. Based on an overall assessment of Norwegian interests and our ties with the South Caucasus countries, Norway has decided to open an embassy in Georgia. Owing to a permanent representation in Tbilisi, it will be convenient for us to follow developments in the entire region," Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Soereide said.

And then: "At the same time, the embassy in Baku will be shut down. Then, the embassy in Ankara will be responsible for Norway's relations with Azerbaijan. However, Norway plans to set up an honorary consulate-general in Baku. These changes to Norway's representation in the South Caucasus will be implemented in 2019."

The Azerbaijani government, in the shape of the acting chief of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry's press service, Leyla Abdullayeva, expressed regret about the decision of the Norwegian government.

'Cautious' conclusion

So, the brief but comprehensive statement by Ine Eriksen Soereide still does allow one to draw a cautious conclusion – which, however, is a necessary one amid an information vacuum – about Norway's motives and goals in the region that made it take the decision.

1. Norway decided to relocate the embassy to Georgia which has made a transaction into the system of European values and Euro-Atlantic cooperation which the latest presidential election in the country showed, too. Support for Georgia's Europeanisation is becoming a main and important factor that plays the role of a driving force for the advancement of the South Caucasus into the Euro-Atlantic space.

2. The assessment by the Norwegians of their interests and ties with the South Caucasus countries is a second ground for the decision, and it has to do with two factors: 1) the Georgian scenario for the reforming of Armenia which started in spring 2018 will require a more active involvement on part of Oslo in Armenian reforms, 2) which would have been less effective while the embassy was based in Baku and which to a certain extent constrained the freedom of action for Norwegian diplomats.

3. The form of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry statement, which pays special attention to the pro-European Georgia and drily notes the shutdown of the diplomatic mission in Azerbaijan, may indicate that Norway thinks it unproductive and prospectless to conduct further dialogue with Baku regarding democratic reform. This aspect of the matter has always been a stumbling block in the Norwegian-Azerbaijani relationship.

Numerous attempts by the Norwegians to build relations with the Azerbaijanis within the system of European norms and values via energy, cultural, public and educational projects have not produced anything. And one can say that the current decision had been brewing for many years within the context of a disproportionate development of the political vectors of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is sliding increasingly further toward the establishment of absolute authoritarianism.

Energy cooperation vs democracy

In December 2013, the striking power of Norwegian policy – Statoil company, a participant in the Azerbaijani ACG [Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli] base oil agreement, refused to participate in the project to build the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) which is planned to deliver gas from Azerbaijan to Europe, and announced the sale of its 10-per-cent share in the Shah Deniz gas project. In May 2014, shareholders in the company decided to pull out of oil and gas projects in Azerbaijan. In April 2015, Statoil sold its 15.5-per-cent share in the Azerbaijani gas field Shah Deniz, including in the Azerbaijani gas supply company (12.4 per cent) and the South Caucasus Pipeline Company (15.5 per cent) to the Malaysian oil and gas company Petronas.

These oil and gas decisions were taken in a period when the government of Azerbaijan stepped up pressure on civil society and efforts to restrict democracy. At the same time, talks were under way on democracy-related problems both at a high official level and at the level of Baku with Norwegian democracy foundations which, as the latest developments show, proved to be ineffective and prospectless. These may have been coincidences, if we take into account the fact that on 30 May 2018 the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and Statoil Azerbaijan, which is part of the Norwegian group Equinor, signed, within the framework of the oil and gas exhibition, a risk service agreement (RSA) on the Karabakh field in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea and a production-sharing agreement (PSA) regarding the Ashrafi-Dan Ulduzu-Aypara [field] which is in also in the Caspian.

Norway draws a line between energy interests, political interests

However, this may also be evidence of the fact that Norway has decided to draw a line between its energy and political interests in the South Caucasus, promoting the former through its projects in Azerbaijan, and [promoting] the latter by expanding its operations in Georgia. Considering the fact that due to the Karabakh conflict, Georgia has since the early 1990s always been a venue for discussing South Caucasus projects involving Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is not hard to continue the line of expansion of informal public contacts among the three countries in which the West, including Norway, is interested.

Speaking in favour of this is the fact that the embassy in Ankara, not the one in Georgia, will be responsible for [Norway's] relations with Azerbaijan. In effect, the Norwegian mission in Tbilisi will not be in contact with the Azerbaijani government. That mission will be partly assumed by the honorary consul-general, possibly in the shape of Equinor in Azerbaijan.