Turan Information Agency, Azerbaijani Opposition Press
November 18, 2018 Sunday
Is the U.S.-Azerbaijani Relationship in Decline?
by ASTNA.biz
Washington D.C.-based Azerbaijani journalist, Alex (Alekper) Raufoglu, answers ASTNA questions about the current state and prospects for relations between the United States and Azerbaijan.
-After a statement by the US National Security Advisor to President, John Bolton, as part of his recent trip to the region, the question on eliminating the Section 907 is again on the agenda. John Bolton noted that US President Donald Trump might suspend the Section 907 prohibiting direct assistance to Azerbaijan. Do you think Trump will be able to repeal the amendment adopted by the US Congress 26 years ago prohibiting America"s direct assistance to Azerbaijan?
– Fair question! Albeit, allow me to offer a quick, sketchy clarification before diving deeper. Every time this topic comes up in Washington, we are urged to be extra attentive when referring to the detailed statements of authorities, and this is not in vein. The devil is in the details, as they say… As you"ve also noticed, Ambassador Bolton during his trip to the region – and in his interviews afterwards – repeatedly hinted at the White House"s position on possibly waiving the Section 907, not necessarily repealing it (unfortunately, the administration"s hands are short on this, but more on that later) and there are reasons for this:
The fact is that, since 2002, just a year after the U.S. Congress allowed the President to issue yearly waivers to this section of 1992 law, following Azerbaijan"s support for anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. presidents have been waving this article annually up until last year. The latest formal authority of freezing Section 907 was issued in 2016, signed by Ambassador Anthony Blinken, then assistant secretary of State, and at that time, it was made clear that the delegation of authority would terminate on March 21, 2017.
In other words, the Section 907 – for the first time since 2002 – is currently active, and it has been in effect over a year and a half now. Prior to Amb Bolton"s recent trip to the region, there was an impression that Washington did not really favor waiving this article without any profound reason. However, as Ambassador Bolton made in clear both in Baku and in Yerevan, that the White House had enough interest and will to waive this amendment. But the fact remains that given the current state of Section 907, the U.S.- Azerbaijan military cooperation – at least, on legislative level – has largely returned to its pre-9/11 state, with some exceptions of joint operations and training as part of global initiatives.
One may ask, "wait but why, what happened, and how come the White House, after 15 years, has turned its interest against this matter?" Here you can count all kinds of objective and subjective factors on your fingers. Of course, official Baku is looking for the easiest explanation, shifting the blame on the Armenian lobby. Although we should not forget that the Armenians, as a community, have always engaged in strong lobbying in Washington. So the lobbying factor is not new. Even if, theoretically, we convince ourselves that this factor is one of the reasons, but it is not the whole thing.
To begin with, when in 2002, Section 907 was amended to where the President of the U.S. can waive the restrictions in the original legislation, it was though under the following conditions: The President may waive section 907 if he determines and certifies to the Senate Committees on Appropriations that to do so — (A) is necessary to support United States efforts to counter international terrorism; or (B) is necessary to support the operational readiness of United States Armed Forces or coalition partners to counter international terrorism; or (C) is important to Azerbaijan's border security; and (D) will not undermine or hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia." Because of the United States" interest in a peaceful resolution to the NK conflict, as a peacemaker, U.S. officials keep this final criterion in mind regarding defense cooperation with Armenia as well, and apply an even-handed approach in their work with the two countries.
As a result, since 2000, the U.S., having allocated about $ 300 million to Azerbaijan for security projects that are considered important in international operations, allocated about half (a little less than $ 150 million) to Armenia, through different projects. Currently, this assistance due to the revitalization of the Section 907 has been significantly reduced, and it"s now clear that the main factor making it necessary to waive the Section 907 for the better part of last15 years had to do with Azerbaijan"s support for international anti-terrorist operations. Today though this support has lost its primary significance.
Secondly, no matter how hard it is, we have to admit that the April 2016 clashes, although they brought some success to Azerbaijan (according to official propaganda,) nevertheless, on the military-diplomatic arena shortened our tongue. As I mentioned above that one of the four conditions [of waiving the section 907] put forward by the Congress in 2002 is the strengthening of peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, or at least, not harming it. True, you may ask "wait a second, how come the decision of waiving the Section 907 in 2016 was made just a month after the events in Karabakh?" Good question. However at that time, this process had began at least months before and the military factor had no effect on the decision of the White House. Under the pretext of a global fight against terrorism the countries that are in a state of war, due to their support operations in Afghanistan, received help from the West. And where is the guarantee that they will not use these military capabilities against each other?
Moreover, it also later became known that Azerbaijan (while day and night asking the West to freeze the Section 907) had apparently, began purchasing significant portion of its weapons from Russia, a very country that had not only orchestrated Karabakh war in a first place, but also is doing it best to suck the oxygen out of the peace process…
As for the United States, it seems like when it comes to the arms sale, the current administration of president Donald Trump, is likely interested in direct cooperation, not through the mediation of a third force, such as Israel and other countries.
Regarding the second part of the question, U.S. sanctions are notoriously difficult to overturn. American sanctions restricting exports to the Soviet Union and its European allies started in 1948 and they were practically never discontinued. Take for example, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which linked trade to the freedom of Jewish emigration, was on the books from 1974 until 2012. It was ultimately only repealed to be replaced by another set of sanctions contained in the Magnitsky Act.
The same can be said about the US sanctions against Iran, which have been in place for almost 40 years. The sanctions on Cuba have lasted for more than half a century so far.
Therefore, section 907 was enacted in 1992 by the US legislative body and while this piece of legislation has been and remains controversial, it is the law and can only be repealed by the Congress.
– By the way, John Bolton, in response to a question from an Armenian journalist about the Section 907 prohibiting United States assistance to Azerbaijan, said that freezing it would not lead to imbalance. Asked about the sale of weapons to Azerbaijan, the diplomat said that Armenia receives weapons from Russia. 80% of the armament of Azerbaijan comes at the expense of Russia. This does not create a favorable situation for the settlement of the conflict. According to Bolton, this situation creates additional pressure opportunities for Russia and does not lead to peace. John Bolton noted that in any case, American weapons are better than Russian ones. Could it be that the United States took this step in connection with the sale of weapons?
– This scenario is absolutely real. Although the intention to waive the Section 907 was hinted by Ambassador Bolton during his recent trip, Washington, in my opinion, however will not revisit this topic just for the sake of "waving". If Azerbaijan and Armenia in the name of the security of the region (including amid possible threats from Russia and Iran) are interested in buying American arms, then this intention should be declared clearly. This process should be implemented by using all the means of diplomatic creativity. Thus, it is necessary to take into account that the Karabakh conflict prevents the United States from selling arms not only to Azerbaijan, but also to Armenia (to maintain the balance). Therefore, if Washington were interested in a dialogue on this issue, it will approach both countries equally.
Soon a new U.S. ambassador will be sent to Baku. The approval of Amb. Lee Litzenberger"s nomination is a matter of days, if not weeks. The new ambassador"s career and his experience of directly engaging in these processes, offer Azerbaijan a unique opportunity to use this rare chance. What do I mean? It should be noted that, there is a myriad of laws, regulations, and provisions that govern what weapons can be sold and/or provided by the U.S. The Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which is currently lead by Ambassador Litzenberger, oversees the government-to-government and commercial company-to-government transactions. Beyond the legal/legislative aspects of which country can or cannot acquire U.S. weapons technology, there are other factors of whether U.S. weapon systems are the right fit for a particular country. Issues such as purchase costs, compatibility with other (communication) systems, maintenance costs, etc. For example, if a country already possessing or purchasing Soviet-era Russian weapons were to acquire U.S. small arms then this purchase would necessitate a large scale purchase of ammunition as U.S. ammunition is of a different size than what is used in Soviet/Russian weapons. Ammunition is expensive and given training and operational needs the ammunition required for these weapons can be large and thus costly. Part of the package may be necessary for the storage and protection of implements accessories. In short, if the Azerbaijani side is actually interested in modernizing its arsenal of weapons for competition with Armenia, then first of all, it should reconsider its military cooperation with Russia. The unusable and expensive weapons and ammunition sold to us by Moscow not only do not help us, but it can also complicate and make the process of arm-sale by the west out of reach for us. So, Baku can only appreciate the experience of the new U.S. ambassador on these matters. But, of course, regardless of who the diplomats are, the most transparent and definitive way to mark success in both bilateral and international relations – whether it is about long-term arms supplies, or any other form of cooperation – comes down to your country's image, or at least, to refraining from steps that can damage your reputation. Essentially, the conditions lie within the leadership of both countries. Baku must take into account that given current political situation in the United States, the leaders in Washington are compelled to refrain from cooperating with individuals who are making bad headlines, both inside and outside the country. Therefore, if Azerbaijan is up to compete with its next-door rival Armenia in such matters, then first of all, it should refrain from actions that damage its image (disrespecting human rights, stifling independent voices, etc).
– The main topic of discussion of John Bolton during the visit was the issue of Iran. Is it possible that Azerbaijan, in exchange for the wishes of the US regarding Iran, wanted to waive the Section 907?
– Theoretically, if we were refer to the conditions that highlighted by the Congress in 2002, this may look quite realistic, although the role of Azerbaijan as a potential player in the Iranian issue, is not yet included in the US military strategy. Following his recent trip to the region, Amb. Bolton made it clear that he "understood" the existing natural ties of Azerbaijan with Iran (such as the Nakhchivan factor, and other reasons). For this reason, it seems like Washington at this moment is betting high hopes in other countries of the region.
Frankly speaking, given the background of the rhetoric that is growing between Washington and Tehran, the fluctuations of officials in Baku (including somewhat suspicious attitude) surprise many observers. There was a time when Azerbaijani diplomacy had been trying its best to present itself as "an international mediator"… There is a famous saying in Washington: "If you're not at the table, you're on the menu."
When comparing the rhetoric used by the current U.S. president with regards to Iran and North Korea, many observers recognize the important role that South Korea played in its neighborhood, to prevent a war that seemed to be so real a year ago. Azerbaijan, if we take into account its historical, religious connection with Iran – let alone the human factor (not event to mention linguistics ties) – as an ally of the West, could become the South Korea of the region.
But again, these all come down to the image and weight of the country in international politics. Unfortunately, today, Azerbaijani officials are famous for their corruption, political crackdown, repression, in a word, pettiness towards their citizens, and this puts the country"s strategic importance, as well as its national security interests, at risk. If officials in Baku still believe that they are "sandwiched" in the choice between Russia, Iran and the United States, then they are profoundly mistaken. Azerbaijan no longer stands at the crossroads of three roads. The only direction is to forward-looking. Unlike those in Baku, politicians in neighboring Georgia and Armenia seem to have understood this reality more quickly…
When it comes to Iran issue, given the current reality existing in the region, as well as Washington"s expectations from Baku, I would like to refer to a strategic document that drafted by the State Department just three months ago in connection with Azerbaijan. The document, which was published on August 30, 2018 highlighting the top priorities of U.S. mission Baku, begins with the following line: "At a time of renewed Russian actions against the former Soviet republics, the potential for changes in Iran"s relations with the rest of the world, and with a shared objective to prevent the spread of violent extremism, a stable, independent, democratic, and prosperous Azerbaijan is more important than ever for U.S. strategic interests."
Well, I think, everything is pretty much clear enough…
Recently, the focus has been on US elections and on statements by the US president. The fact that during the elections the Democrats took the lead in the Lower House of Congress, the US President"s speech against his allies in Europe on updating the sanctions against Iran, including the violation of freedom of speech at a press conference on behavior with a CNN correspondent, suggests new thoughts. One of them – Trump will face impeachment or will fail in the next election. What do you say about the latest processes? How can they be completed?
– I was fortunate enough to have a chance not only to participate in the midterm elections as a voter, but also to observe these processes closely as an election official at one of the local polling stations near Washington D.C. Regardless of the results, I can assure you that in these elections, just as in the previous ones, democracy won. All the troubles and the intensity of political passion that you are referring to are in fact indicators of democracy, not chaos. Perhaps in other countries where there are no strong democratic institutions, all this can be diagnosed in a different order. In the US however, whether politicians might like it or not, they have to share their powers with others – this is what makes American democracy strong.
Led by President Trump, the Republican Party in the last election – although it lost control of the House of Representatives – was able to maintain and strengthen its control over the Senate. This means that over the next two years, the Democratic-controlled Congress will mostly function as an investigatory body to challenge the Trump administration, while the Republican Senate, in turn, will defend the interests of the administration by strengthening other branches of the government, such as confirming more judges. American society, by its nature, is not inclined to one-party system, just like I said before; various voices at the table make this country strong.
As for the relations between the president and the media, frankly speaking, this is not new to us. Democracy is only strengthened when journalists challenge politicians rather than defer to them. Therefore free media has never been eager to become the favorites of the White House. What is new here is the tone that used by this president. And this, of course, is not perceived unequivocally by neither the media, nor by democratic institutions.
A noted media association, along with a TV channel, just recently sued President Trump, claiming he was violating the First Amendment by using his seat to "punish and stifle" news organizations. Both those close to the ruling Republicans party, and those who oppose the president, joined this process. How often do we see such a picture – with the exception of some European democracies – in any other country in the world?
