The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan around Nagorno-Karabakh has reached a dangerous level, where the existing status quo is difficult to preserve due to the military successes of Azerbaijan and inherent problems of Armenia’s dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, as Moscow has biggest stakes in the conflict, it will continue to supply arms to both Baku and Yerevan to keep the military balance, preserve the existing state of affairs, as well as deny any other power, such as Turkey and Iran, possibilities to increase their influence in the conflict resolution process.
Unlike other breakaway conflicts across the former Soviet space, the one around Nagorno-Karabakh has not been frozen since its inception in the early 1990s. Daily ceasefire violations can at times reach more than 100 instances, which limits the possibility of reaching a peaceful resolution to the standoff where Armenia and Azerbaijan are locked. However, as the near-war between the two sides showed in April 2016, the conflict is not static but is susceptible to changing geopolitical circumstances.
Beyond the immediate situation on the contact line, any progress towards resolution of the conflict is complicated by the many actors which have geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus. One of the major powers is Turkey, for which Azerbaijan is an important economic and military ally. Since the end of the Soviet Union, the two countries have developed a network of railway and pipeline infrastructure spanning from the Caspian Sea to the Turkish border through Georgian territory. Geopolitically, Turkey has resisted the expansion of Armenia as it will not only weaken Azerbaijan but will also strengthen Russia’s military position in the South Caucasus.
Another power which could potentially play an important role in the simmering Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is Iran. Since the lifting of sanctions against Teheran in early 2016 by major western powers, Iran’s influence is expected to increase in the South Caucasus. While until now this has been mainly in the economic realm, another area of involvement for Iran could be the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. And Iran already has experience dealing with the Azerbaijani-Armenian confrontation: in the early 1990s, there were some unsuccessful attempts by the Iranian government to mediate the conflict. Since both Armenia and Azerbaijan border on Iran, it is quite natural to expect from Tehran to try playing a bigger role in the conflict. However, Russia, which still is a dominant power in the conflict resolution process, would be opposed to any Iranian initiatives which can diminish Moscow’s role.
There are other powers too which are interested in the conflict resolution process. Yet, in comparison with the neighboring Turkey and Iran, the US and the EU currently have only nominal influence. Both are taking an active part in the Minks Process (the official name of the mechanism for the conflict’s resolution), but due to geographic distance, their direct engagement in said resolution remains minimal. This leads us to the remaining and arguably the biggest player in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – Russia.
Russia’s Geopolitical Imperatives
Moscow’s indirect involvement in the conflict falls neatly within the Russian overall strategy of fostering and managing separatist conflicts across the Soviet Union. The Russia-influenced separatist statelets of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnistria have remained a cornerstone of the Kremlin’s foreign policy against the western military and economic encroachment. From Moscow’s perspective, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine’s pro-western aspirations would be stopped if not permanently, then at least significantly hampered if these conflicts continue to exist.
Although Moscow does not have its troops in Nagorno-Karabakh, it does have a military base – the 201st – in Armenia. Moreover, Russia’s influence in Armenia has been increasing over the past decade or so with Kremlin-backed businessmen and companies such as Gazprom and others buying up vital electricity, communication and gas infrastructure in the country. Yerevan has also joined Moscow-led integration projects such as the Eurasian Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russia is also supporting Yerevan militarily through providing separate multi-million loans to buy Russian military hardware.
Armenia’s overall dependence on Russia’s economic and military potential gives the Kremlin the ability not only to navigate Yerevan’s foreign policy vector and keep it strictly within the Russian sphere of influence, but also to impact the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Moscow also needs to be involved in the conflict as it fears Azerbaijan, with its rich energy resources and strong military capabilities, would be able to limit Russian influence on its foreign and internal political processes. Losing any levers of influence to impact Azerbaijan’s foreign policy will be tantamount to the near collapse of Russia’s South Caucasus policy, which includes not only denying Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia possibilities to join western integration projects, but also to successfully export rich deposits of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea.
Any moves around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which could harm Russian interests will in turn embolden Russia’s geopolitical contenders Turkey and Iran. Turkey could increase its military cooperation with Azerbaijan, while Iran could potentially become more vocal about its broader interests in the South Caucasus.
For that reason, Moscow is increasing military hardware sales to both Armenia and Azerbaijan and thus tries to remain a major arbiter. When in April 2016 a near full-scale war broke out in the Nagorno-Karabakh area, Russia was the power which stopped the fighting by brokering a ceasefire in Moscow between the Armenian and Azerbaijani military officials. Russia is also very careful not to allow any of the competing sides to achieve ultimate military preponderance. It is true that statistically Russia sells more armaments to Azerbaijan than to Armenia, but this deficiency is more to accentuate Armenia’s need of having Russia as its supporter. In other words, Armenia’s military dominance would negate any logic of needing Moscow as a military factor around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Bearing in mind these geopolitical imperatives the Russian government has, it is thus unlikely to see any major shifts around the conflict. Russia will try to maintain the existing status quo, meaning both Baku and Yerevan will remain largely dependent on Moscow’s actions. Western influence as well as that of Iran and Turkey will be limited as Russia will continue pursuing its policies of isolating other major powers from interfering with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
By Emil Avdaliani
