Defense News


By Valerie Insinna, Joe Gould & Aaron Mehta



WASHINGTON — Four key members of Congress, either individually or
collectively, have quietly frozen all major U.S. arms sales to Turkey
for nearly two years in a move to pressure Ankara to abandon its
Russian-built S-400 air defense system, Defense News has learned.

The legislative action, which has not been previously reported, is
another sign of the deeply fractured relationship between the two NATO
allies, a disruption that has already led to Turkey’s expulsion from
the F-35 joint strike fighter program.

While it is unclear exactly how many potential sales have been held
back, at least two significant deals are in limbo: a follow-on
contract for F-16 structural upgrades and export licenses for
U.S.-made engines that Turkey needs to complete a $1.5 billion sale of
attack helicopters to Pakistan. Historically, the United States is the
largest exporter of weapons to Turkey.

When Congress holds up sales of major weapon systems like tanks,
planes and ships, it is typically meant to rebuke a country’s specific
military or political actions, such as when lawmakers attempted to
block sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2019. But
freezing arms sales is a diplomatic tool that the United States hasn’t
used against Turkey since 1978, after the Turkish military invaded
Cyprus.

Defense News learned of the situation from a half dozen sources in
Congress, the administration, and the defense industry, all of whom
requested anonymity because of the sensitivities involved.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jim Risch, R-Idaho, and
House Foreign Affairs ranking member Rep. Mike McCaul, R-Texas,
acknowledged they are part of the freeze after they were contacted by
Defense News.

The two other lawmakers who can sign off on foreign military sales ―
House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Eliot Engel, D-N.Y., and
Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Sen. Bob Menendez,
D-N.J., are also part of the hold, according to multiple Capitol Hill
sources. Neither would comment for this story.

“There is serious concern over [Turkey’s purchase of the S-400] in
both parties and in both chambers on the Hill, and until the issues
surrounding this purchase are resolved I cannot and will not support
weapon sales to Turkey,” Risch said in an email to Defense News.

“An oh shit moment”

Turkey’s relationship with the United States has been strained for
several years — especially with Congress.

Lawmakers have blasted President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s deepening ties
with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Erdogan’s rejection of U.S.
offers to buy the Patriot surface-to-air missile system over the
Russian-made S-400 and Turkey’s military incursion last year into
Kurdish-controlled northern Syria also frustrated members of Congress.

“Turkey is a longtime strategic ally of the United States. That
relationship has deteriorated dramatically in recent years and is
quickly deteriorating further,” Risch said. “President Erdogan’s
purchase of the Russian S-400 significantly changed the nature of our
relationship. This purchase benefits our adversary Putin and threatens
the integrity of the NATO Alliance.”

Traditionally, during the arms sales process, the chairmen and ranking
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign
Affairs Committee — the so-called “four corners” — are granted an
opportunity to dissuade the U.S. State Department from approving arms
sales to foreign governments on an informal basis. The lawmakers have
used that notification period to block sales from moving forward, but
they consider such deliberations sensitive and rarely speak publicly
about them.

Engel has refused to sign off on military sales to Turkey since mid
2018, while Risch has maintained his own hold since Turkey officially
took possession of the S-400 in July 2019, according to multiple
congressional sources. McCaul doesn’t have a blanket hold, and has, at
certain points, signed off on sales specifically in support of NATO
operations.

“Nobody has signed off on anything, roughly, for the last year,” said
one congressional source. “Nothing moves in this process until all
four of the offices have said, ‘yea.’”


A second congressional source described Turkey taking possession of
the S-400 as “kind of, pardon my language, an oh shit moment.” The
source added that Turkey riled lawmakers further in November, when it
publicly targeted a Turkish F-16 with the S-400, a move interpreted as
an implicit threat against other F-16 users, such as the United
States.

“Not only was it intentionally provocative, but it happened the day
after Erdogan was in the Oval Office,” the source said.

Turkey’s September 2017 decision to purchase the S-400 created a major
rift between Turkey and its alliance partners. NATO officials quickly
sounded the alarm that Turkey would compromise NATO’s security if it
plugged the S-400 into allied systems, as the Russian system would be
sharing a network with sensitive alliance data. Most significantly,
American officials worried that the system would be able to gain
information about the F-35, compromising the stealth capabilities of
the jet. The presence of Russian contractors in Turkey to support the
S-400 was also a concern.

President Donald Trump has yet to engage in the sort of high-profile
confrontation with Congress over Turkey such as when he vetoed
Congress’s attempt to halt U.S. sales to Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates last year. But the administration has made efforts to
lobby lawmakers in favor of individual deals with Turkey, according to
the second congressional source, who noted opposition to Turkey is
both bipartisan and bicameral.

“Right now, the mood [in Congress] toward Turkey is enormous,” the
source said. “Unless Turkey wants to change the narrative and do a mea
culpa, the president could very easily lose a veto override vote.”

Just as the Trump administration has been quiet about the hold on
sales, so have the U.S. defense contractors who would benefit from
those purchases.

Two sources with ties to major defense primes said they had not seen
evidence of a full-scale lobbying push from industry to clear the way
for these deals, which include new sales and the renewal of existing
contracts typically viewed as routine.

Instead, an unspoken consensus exists among contractors to wait out
the holds until tensions between the United States and Turkey cool, or
until new policymakers in either a Biden or second Trump
administration shift the White House’s willingness to work with
Turkey.

“We’re operating under the impression that anything that requires
congressional notification will not move forward this year,” said one
source.

Risch in particular has evinced frustration the United States could
not reach a deal on the Patriot system. Similarly, when congressional
ire was peaking over Turkey’s invasion of Syria in October, Engel
called Erdogan an “authoritarian thug” whose rule is “a glaring black
mark on Turkey’s historic secular, democratic traditions.”

“We need to pressure him while ramping up diplomacy in the hopes of
getting Turkey back on the right track as a NATO ally,” Engel said at
the time.

Another motivating issue is the lack of action from the Trump
administration on implementing the Countering America’s Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA.

Under that law, the Trump administration is bound to level sanctions
against any nation that purchase a major defense article from Russia,
but the administration has yet to impose those sanctions, much to the
consternation of Congress.

“Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 is unacceptable and undermines
NATO’s mission to deter Russian aggression,” McCaul said in a email to
Defense News. “The Administration must impose the sanctions required
by law in response to this purchase. Turkey must reverse course on
this destabilizing action to renew the United States’ confidence in
our defense relationship.”

McCaul supports a proposal to lift CAATSA sanctions against Turkey,
once imposed, if Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. That proposal
passed as part of the House’s version of the annual defense policy
bill.

Melissa Dalton, a former Pentagon official now with the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, called the lack of resistance
from the administration “surprising, in the sense that Turkey is an
actual ally, whereas the Saudis are just a close partner.” But she
noted that Turkey falls on a seam between the European and Middle
Eastern subject teams, both at the Pentagon and at the State
Department, and so putting together “a coherent policy to start with
is tough.”

Through a spokesman, the State Department declined to comment on the
Turkey arms hold.

In a statement to Defense News, the Turkish embassy in Washington said
“There are a number of arms procurement cases for Turkey, pending
approval in Congress. As a staunch member of NATO and an ally of the
U.S., we are confident that approval of these requests without further
delay will be a natural outcome of our strategic cooperation.

“The U.S. is our number one trade partner in defense industry and we
believe that it is in the strategic interest of both Turkey and the
U.S. to further increase our bilateral cooperation in this field.”

Industrial impact

The defense industry is watching the export issue closely.

Arms deals between the United States and Turkey totaled nearly $1
billion from 2015 through 2019, according to data compiled by the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. During that time,
Turkey ranked within the United States’ top 20 customers, with
purchases that included aircraft and missiles. Its military is now in
the market for trainer helicopters.

Not all arms deals to Turkey have stopped. Older cases that are
already underway have not paused, and any weapons sales — be it
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), where the U.S. government acts as a
go-between, or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), in which the country
deals directly with industry — less than the $25 million threshold is
not subject to Congressional approval.

But direct commercial sales and low-tier FMS cases tend to be smaller
deals, such as spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance packages for
aging equipment. The tanks, planes and ships that form the core of any
modern military remain the province of major FMS sales.

The blockage has paralyzed negotiations for several deals, including a
follow-on contract for F-16 upgrades, according to one source with
knowledge of the matter.

Lockheed Martin is performing structural upgrades to a portion of
Turkey’s aging F-16 Block 30 fleet under a direct commercial sales
contract that expires this fall. Defense News reported in 2017 that it
would take until 2023 for Lockheed to complete modifications for all
35 F-16s included in the deal.

An industry source with knowledge of the F-16 contract said that
Lockheed is still “planning to complete the requirements” of the order
and does not “foresee any performance changes or requirement changes.”

When asked to comment about the Turkish F-16 upgrade contract,
Lockheed Martin officials said that “any questions related to F-16
sustainment work should be directed to the U.S. government.”

Another side effect of Congress’ hold is the endangerment of a $1.5
billion deal between Turkey and Pakistan for the sale of 30
Turkish-made T129s attack helicopters, an issue Defense News reported
on earlier this year.

Two major Turkish firms are licensed to domestically produce the T129
and its engine. Turkish Aerospace Industries manufactures the
helicopter through a partnership with Italian-British aerospace
company AgustaWestland. Meanwhile, the helicopter’s CTS800 engine —
originally designed by the Light Helicopter Turbine Engine Company, a
joint venture between U.S.-based Honeywell and U.K.-based Rolls Royce
— is made by Tusaş Engine Industries.

Because the CTS800 was originally produced in the United States,
Turkey cannot sell T129s — or any weapon system containing that engine
— without obtaining an export license from the U.S. government.

But those licenses are also being held back as a result of the
congressional block on arms deals, leaving Tusaş Engine Industries
racing to develop a replacement engine for the T129.

“Pakistan has agreed to give us another year [to resolve the problem].
We hope we will be able to develop our indigenous engine soon to power
the T129,” Ismail Demir, the head of Turkey’s top procurement agency,
said Jan. 6. “After one year, Pakistan may be satisfied with the level
of progress in our engine program, or the U.S. may grant us the export
license.”

Threatening the T129 sale to Pakistan hurts Turkey more than just
financially, said Joel Johnson, a Teal Group analyst who has
previously worked for the State Department and as a staff member on
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

For one, the sale cements a relationship between Turkey and a fellow
Islamic nation, signaling the country’s pivot from the West.
Increasing annual defense exports is also a key priority for Erdogan,
who vowed in 2015 to boost arms sales to $25 billion by 2023 and to
rid the Turkish defense industrial base of its reliance on foreign
suppliers.

“This is a nerve ending that is very sensitive to Erdogan. It’s not
the helicopters, per se, it’s the symbolism of the sale that hits him
in a way that hurts,” Johnson said.

Honeywell and Rolls Royce declined to comment for this story.

The current hold marks the first U.S. arms embargo on Turkey since
1975, after Turkey invaded Cyprus and Washington halted sales of
weapons and military assistance to Turkey for three years.

Some industry officials worry that if the hold extends much beyond
2021, the relationship between American and Turkish defense
contractors could diminish as legacy contracts expire, leading Turkish
firms to seek industrial partnerships elsewhere.

“What value [does] the Hill or the administration see in holding up
these legacy areas of cooperation? Do we really think that will
influence Erdogan’s decision making?” the source said. “Will industry
be able to simply restart the defense industrial cooperation once
Erdogan is out of power in the future? I think that’s the tricky part.
The policy decision makes sense, but the byproducts of that policy
decision and the implications down the road have the potential to hurt
industry and U.S. national security.”

But Teal’s Johnson countered that Congress’ block on sales could force
the White House to work with lawmakers more closely on issues related
to Turkey, including potential sanctions or punitive measures in the
wake of the S-400 acquisition.

“Congress can’t negotiate with Turkey. They can only really go
negotiate with the White House, so the question is, what do they want
the White House to do, and is anybody talking?” he said. “Normally, if
you had a normal president, the congressional staffers would be
quietly talking to the [National Security Council] and the State
Department about what they want. … It’s hard to see the way forward
with this group.”

Even if Turkey fulfills U.S. government demands and arm sales resume,
it remains to be seen whether Turkey will still line up to buy
American weapons.

Over the past 15 years, Turkey has drastically cut its spending on
weapons imports, going from the world’s third largest importer in the
1995-1999 timeframe to 15th in 2015-2019, according to SIPRI.

The last FMS deal approved by the State Department to Turkey was in
2018: an offer to sell 80 Patriot MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missiles,
and 60 PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement missiles — a last ditch
effort by the U.S. government to entice Ankara to cancel its S-400
purchase in favor of an American air defense system. It was never
completed, as Turkey pressed on with the procurement of the S-400.

Ultimately, the Patriot deal was taken off the table.

According to figures from the State Department, in 2017 the United
States authorized more than $587 million in DCS sales for Turkey and
shipped equipment worth more than $106 million. The next year, the
United States approved more than $600 million and shipped $136 million
in weapons. In 2019, more than $615 million was authorized and over
$66 million shipped.

Although the United States remains Turkey’s biggest foreign supplier
of weapons, the country makes a fair amount of military goods
domestically, has purchased Russian arms like the S-400, and even
flirted with buying a Chinese missile system in 2013.

“They have a reasonably capable defense industrial base that is
getting more capable because of investment going in from the
government. They’ve also become a little more of a catholic shopper,”
said Douglas Barrie, a military aerospace expert at the International
Institute of Strategic Studies. “They have some options. They wouldn’t
just have to look to Europe if the U.S. was no longer seen as a
supplier nation to them. I think, on some occasions, they may look
farther afield.”

It’s unclear whether a retaliatory action like the arms sale freeze
helps bring Erdogan to the table, or whether it pushes Turkey even
further into Russia’s arms.

“The alliance is incredibly troubled at the moment, but I don’t think
it’s beyond the pale,” Dalton said. “The U.S. has a lot at stake in
terms of Turkey’s trajectory, and the NATO alliance has a lot at stake
as well. So for all those reasons, [any actions] need to be framed as
part of a broader approach.

“I don’t have high confidence that it’s being framed in that way.”