By Anton Evstratov

On July 12, armed clashes broke out on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which eventually led to tactical military successes for the Armenian army and caused a huge public outcry far beyond the borders of the South Caucasus region.

Anton Evstratov

The uniqueness of this situation is that sufficiently large-scale hostilities took place not on the borders of the unrecognized republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), but on the line of contact between Azerbaijan and, in fact, Armenia in (Tavush region of Armenia – Tovuz region of Azerbaijan).

Azerbaijani troops unexpectedly recklessly attacked the Armenian positions. After a warning fire from the Armenian side, they were stopped and left the battlefield, leaving a UAZ vehicle there. The reason for this aggressive act, perhaps globally, was some attempts by Azerbaijan to redirect the attention of its society from the ever-increasing socio-economic and political problems (falling living standards due to lower energy prices, some political problems, including the conflict of the Pashayev clan with the conditional technocrats led by former Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov, Russian-Turkish gas and political contradictions, etc.). However it is not serious to talk about this specifically in relation to the attack with UAZ. Most likely, the Azerbaijani detachment, being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, simply got lost, falling under fire from the Armenian military.

Later, the Azerbaijanis tried to return the abandoned car, launching an attack and supporting it with artillery fire, but this action was unsuccessful – the assault units were repulsed with losses, and the artillery was suppressed. Armenian troops, in turn, launched a daring counterattack, during which the dominant height was occupied. This made it possible for the Armenian Armed Forces to control the situation in the Azerbaijani village of Agdam.

On July 13, the clashes continued – Azerbaijan used armored vehicles and unmanned aircraft, and used them until the very end of the conflict. The equipment did not achieve the assigned tasks – moreover, the Armenians managed to knock out at least 2 Azerbaijani tanks and destroy and “plant” (taking control) more than 10 UAVs.

Some of them, both in parts and in full, were later put on public display in Yerevan. Perhaps the destruction and, especially, the seizure of Azerbaijani drones (Israeli and Turkish production) and their subsequent research will be an important milestone in the development of Armenian unmanned aircraft.

It should be noted that in this conflict too, Armenian UAVs, including drums, showed themselves beyond praise, causing panic on the Azerbaijani side and destroying a certain amount of its manpower and equipment. Moreover, on the 13th of the Armenian Armed Forces, another counterattack was successful, which ended with the capture of the second Azerbaijani position – practically within the village of Agdam. This made it possible for the Armenian troops to control the regional center of Tovuz. At night, the Azerbaijanis tried to restore the status quo with another attack, but failed again.

Along with the hostilities in the Tovuz region, Armenia and Azerbaijan clashed in the public arena, both at the level of online information and in the plane of official statements. So, in the very first hours after the start of clashes at the border, Baku initiated the appearance on social networks of a huge number of allegedly Armenian users who began to talk about some relatives serving in Tavush and reporting on the plight of the Armenian army.

Such attempts at disinformation were immediately exposed – firstly, they all together called the same, certainly round, numbers, and secondly, the tonality and even the syllable of their messages were almost copied from those posts that Azerbaijani fakes also wrote even during the aggravation in April 2016 in Nagorno-Karabakh. There were also Azerbaijani attempts to portray the video of socio-political protests in Armenia in 2018 and later as “anti-war actions”, which was also quickly revealed and exposed.

The same fate befell the video of the “destruction” of the Armenian positions – one of them, as it turned out, was taken from the chronicle of the exercises of the Russian army, and the other was a video recording of the destruction of the Azerbaijani post by the armed forces of Armenia.

On the third day, July 14, the first data on losses appeared, which began to grow rapidly. Baku has lost in killed and wounded this time much more servicemen than Yerevan. To date, Azerbaijan has recognized 12 killed, including the military of a fairly high level – the chief of staff of the 3rd corps, Major General Polad Gashimov, the chief of the corps artillery, Colonel Ilgar Mirzeev, Majors Anar Novruzov and Namig Akhmedov.

Later, under strange circumstances, they were joined by the chief of staff of the Khudat border detachment, Colonel Mirza Shahin, who died, however, according to the official version, not in the course of hostilities, but in a car accident. This version cannot but raise doubts. Moreover, given that official Baku usually does everything to hide its losses, it can be assumed that in fact there are many, and possibly many times more people killed from the Azerbaijani side.

As an example of this kind of suppression and concealment of the truth by the Azerbaijani leadership, one can note the unsuccessful attack on the Armenian positions of the Yashma special forces unit on the night of July 15-16, which ended in failure and the death of several dozen people.

According to the Armenian side, the Azerbaijani special forces did not even have time to join the battle – they were covered with artillery fire as soon as they were within its reach. Speakers of the Armenian Armed Forces reported the deaths of at least 20 attackers, whom the Azerbaijanis then, in agreement with the Armenian military, carried from the battlefield. Official Baku did not say a word about this.

There was also a strange story with the former Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan Rahim Gaziyev, who on the second day of the exacerbation announced 12 killed Azerbaijani soldiers. A few hours after this statement, Gaziev was kidnapped by unknown persons in masks, who eventually turned out to be employees of the National Security Service of Azerbaijan. The ex-minister was charged with provocation and appeals against the authorities, and he is still being held in a pre-trial detention center.

The Armenian army has lost 6 people killed, and two soldiers have died in hospitals in recent days. 36 people were injured. The Azerbaijani side published huge lists of Armenian soldiers, the names of which, however, turned out to belong to the victims of the April 2016 war, which once again exposed Baku to this conflict and the presentation of information on it is very odious.

At the moment, the Armenian side has moved forward, capturing and holding at least 2 Azerbaijani positions – one of them controls the city of Tovuz, and the other is being driven like a wedge between other Azerbaijani posts, breaking the connection between them. Thus, we can state a serious tactical success of the Armenian armed forces, albeit a local one. In this regard, the situation in the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan was very alarming – photos appeared on the Internet showing a massive exodus of civilians from border villages. However, at the moment, the panic in a sense, not without the help of the military police and the State Security Service, has subsided.

Such an outcome could not and cannot suit the leader of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, since Without ending this conflict with any, albeit local and visible, success, it runs the risk of social upheavals within the country – it is obvious that the Azerbaijani society will have to explain the reasons for the deaths of dozens of military personnel and the loss of territories and expensive military equipment. Aliyev’s problems began almost immediately after the first news of the victims – a 30,000-strong demonstration in Baku demanded to immediately start a war against Armenia and Artsakh. In addition, the intensified contradictions in the government of Azerbaijan led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov.

Baku has taken a number of measures to increase the authority of its military leadership and the authorities in general. First, the peaceful infrastructure of Armenian border settlements, including the city of Berd and the villages of Aygepar, Movses, and others, were bombed. 24 residential buildings, 1 kindergarten, a gas pipeline, a water supply, a police post, a wine and brandy factories, 4 cars and a cemetery were damaged.

Then, on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nakhichevan, a civilian from the village of Khndzoresk, Narek Sardaryan, was captured by the Azerbaijanis, who stated on camera that he had moved to Azerbaijan voluntarily due to the difficult economic and political situation in Armenia. These words cannot be taken seriously, since, apparently, the man simply got lost, was kidnapped by the Azerbaijani military and faced their threats.

Having failed to achieve serious successes in the military-political plan, the Azerbaijani side tried to act with the help of its diasporas abroad. The latter initiated clashes with Armenians in Los Angeles and Brussels, as well as the “apricot war” and an open hunt for lonely Armenians in Moscow. Of all the above, the Russian case should be analyzed in more detail. First, the Food City shopping center, owned by the natives of Azerbaijan Zarakh Iliev and God Nisanov, stopped accepting Armenian agricultural products.

As a result, the Armenian diasporas called on their compatriots to immediately buy up perishable fruits and vegetables, which was done in the next few hours. The Azerbaijani boycott extended to retail outlets in St. Petersburg, but the goods there were quickly sold out. As a result, the conflict was de jure resolved with the intervention of the Moscow authorities, but contradictions still persist.

Then organized gangs of Azerbaijanis began to attack lonely Armenians, and not only in Moscow, but also in St. Petersburg and other cities. As a result, several people were injured, and videos of the beatings were leaked. The Moscow police reacted quickly enough, and quite harsh arrests soon followed.

However, not only Azerbaijanis were detained, but also Armenians, who tried to defend themselves and organized actions against xenophobia and violence. Nevertheless, at the moment, a significant number of Armenian activists have already been released. A number of criminal cases were initiated against the instigators of Azerbaijani provocations under the article “Hooliganism”. But, it is now quite obvious that not only local bandits, but also the “conductors” from Baku were organizing the riots in Moscow. Among them, for example, is the former officer of the Azerbaijani army Mousavi, who is currently a member of the administration of Ilham Aliyev.

Thus, it can be stated that this action, albeit indirectly, was orchestrated by the Azerbaijani authorities. At the moment, however, the situation has calmed down, and has moved to the legal plane – the participants in the attacks and their victims are waiting for the investigation and courts.

Events around the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and in the diplomatic plane developed quite characteristically. The permanent ally of Baku, Turkey, literally in the first hours of exacerbation unconditionally supported Azerbaijan. The corresponding statement was published by the country’s Foreign Ministry. Later, similar theses were voiced by Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Russia, an ally of Armenia, in turn called on both sides of the conflict to restraint, but then the Russian Foreign Ministry noted the unacceptability of the intervention of the members of the Minsk Group in the conflict.

This message was addressed to Turkey as she is the only member of the group who intervened diplomatically in the situation, and did not rule out the transfer of intervention to the military plane. Then Russia lifted its helicopters from the 102nd base in Armenia, sending them to patrol the Armenian-Turkish border, which can also be regarded as a designation of the Russian position in the region for the Turkish military-political leadership. A few days later, the Russian Defense Ministry initiated unscheduled checks in the Western and Southern military districts.

Note that the latter includes the mentioned 102nd military base, stationed in the RA. Also, Armenia drew attention to the situation in the CSTO, of which it is a member. However, it was not about a request for military assistance, but only about a diplomatic assessment of Azerbaijan’s aggression. According to the representative of the Armenian Armed Forces Artsrun Hovhannisyan, the Armenian army coped with the enemy on its own.

Soon, the armed forces of Armenia and Russia held joint military exercises, which also prevented aggressive actions by both Turkey and Azerbaijan. An attempt to “copy” the Armenian-Russian event by Turkey and Azerbaijan, which started on July 29 throughout Azerbaijan, including Nakhichevan, looks frankly amusing.

The threat of the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry to launch a missile strike on the Metsamor nuclear power plant in Armenia deserves a separate mention. Such threats fall under the definition of international terrorism, which immediately caused a negative reaction on the head of the Azerbaijani military not only from a significant part of the world community, but also from their allies, the Turks. Later, Azerbaijani diplomats tried in every possible way to conceal such a serious mistake of their Ministry of Defense, but the corresponding sediment from the mentioned statement and questions to Baku still remain.

Currently, the situation has relatively calmed down on all levels – from military to socio-political. However, some political changes in the region are likely to follow. So, after the aggressive actions of Azerbaijan and the statements of Turkey, some circles in the leadership of Egypt, which already has problems with the “Turkic world” in Libya, as well as Greece and Cyprus, began to lean towards supporting Armenia.

In addition, the aggravation became a kind of test, on the one hand, of the Armenian-Russian military alliance and the CSTO, and on the other, of the Turkish-Azerbaijani military “brotherhood”. If the first and the last this check was generally passed, then the CSTO was not able to make a single anti-Azerbaijani statement in support of its ally, which is now viewed in Armenia very cautiously. The statements of some Russian politicians look even stranger. For example, Leonid Kalashnikov, chairman of the RF State Duma committee on the CIS, unexpectedly said that the CSTO … will never fight with Azerbaijan. Obviously, such words cannot work to resolve the conflict in the South Caucasus. As for the internal political situation in the conflicting countries, in Armenia the position of the already popular government of Pashinyan has become even more consolidated – the latter has shown itself not only as a fighter against internal enemies, but also as a successful supreme commander in chief, which is extremely important in a belligerent country.

As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, the degradation of the Aliyev regime there, amid ever-increasing economic difficulties and the decline in the popularity of the authorities and the belief in them on the part of society, will continue, possibly bringing the country to a critical state. The lost “small victorious” war in this context will become another, very important, and possibly even fatal factor.

Photo credit: Resul Rehimov – Anadolu Agency

Author: Anton Evstratov  (Russian historian, publicist and journalist living in Armenia, lecturer at the Department of World History and Foreign Regional Studies at the Russian-Armenian University in Yerevan).

(The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).