A step, this time a big step, backwards

There were some people who used to say that the resolution of the Karabagh conflict should have priority, without procrastination, on the basis of mutual concessions, that without the resolution of that conflict it will be impossible to resolve the other problems, that delaying the resolution of that conflict our independence would be endangered, that is, we would lose the possibility of solving our problems on the basis of our own interests.

There were also people who insisted that it is not necessary to resolve the Karabagh conflict as an urgent matter, that we are able to continue as we are, that we could us the time to create a strong state and then obtain our maximum demands, that we have the time to first resolve our other problems.

Some people even argued that the problem was solved already.

There were people who indicated that  the outcome of wars is often unpredictable, that the heroism of our soldiers and the patriotism of our army were not sufficient to secure victory; they pointed out that it was dangerous to adopt the concept of “permanent war” as the way of the future. There were also people for whom such a problem did not even exist; those who were happy that the enemy was repelled in July and thought, therefore, that that is how it was going to be, always. The end.

Ten or so days ago, at the end of a webinar that assessed the Velvet Revolution, I insisted that all attempts to bring democracy, the rule of law, and sustained economic development to Armenia were condemned to failure without a resolution of the Karabagh problem.

And where are we now, at the beginning of September 2020?

I my view, our ability to influence the resolution of the Karabagh conflict has diminished by a significant measure due to recent developments.

What has occurred in the recent period to justify such a statement?

A few things:

A. Azerbaijan was unable to score a victory on the battlefield in July, but it turned that defeat into the most significant diplomatic victory by convincing Turkey that its defeat was also Turkey’s defeat, thus engaging Turkey fully in the problem.

B. Last month Armenia made the Sevres Treaty an important part of the country’s foreign policy. For Turkey that became the most important part. I don’t know if our leaders did so knowingly, but the statements by the President and Prime Minister of Armenia were equivalent to a declaration of at least diplomatic war against Turkey. And that, against the Turkey with a dangerous leader such as Erdogan. Adopting the Treaty of Sevres as an instrument of foreign policy Armenia placed the demand of territories from Turkey on its agenda. This was possibly the last step that will, in the eyes of our opponents and the international community, define the Karabagh problem as a question of territorial expansion, setting aside the right of self-determination of our people in Artsakh  as the basis of our policy. And that revanchist approach depends so much on the sympathy of that same international community to see its demands satisfied. That which is considered “the solution to the Armenian Question” by some is regarded by the international community as inane, at the least. Is it not time to stop harming our chances of resolving the real problems we face with what we say and do for internal consumption?

C. These declarations were followed by the statement of the Minister of Defense of Turkey, who declared that henceforth Turkey considered itself a party to the Karabagh conflict. That means that (a) now the conflict is between, on one side, Armenia and Artsakh against Azerbaijan and Turkey, on the other side, and (b) Turkey is declaring that it is now ready to provide additional support to Azerbaijan, although it is not clear what form that new support will take. It is necessary to note, nonetheless, that this statement was not made by the minister of Foreign Affairs or any other functionary, but by the Minister of Defense.

And this is just the beginning.

What will Armenia and Artsakh do in such an eventuality. Some people can scream that all of this shows how evil Turkey and Turks are. But these screams will not change the new reality. Also, such people forget that they were the ones who were also screaming that Turkey is a party to the conflict and should be removed from the Minsk Group since it provided unconditional support for Azerbaijan. At any rate, whatever our screams, whatever our adjectives to describe Erdogan, Turkey and Turks, the fact remains that now we must visualize the possibility of confronting Turkey directly, in addition to Azerbaijan.

Of course, it is possible to argue that the statement by Turkey is simply  an idle threat, that Turkey would never dare undertake military hostilities against Armenia because Armenia has a treaty of mutual defense with Russia. But such an argument can be made only if one forgets that this treaty, as all such treaties, provide first for consultations between Armenia and Russia, that Russia would not get into a war with Turkey automatically if that happens.

It is most probable that during this process, to dissipate the threat presented by Turkey, at a convenient moment, Russia will present demands for concessions from the Armenian side, concession which Moscow has been expecting from Yerevan for a long time. The questions are (a) to what extent will these concessions correspond to our minimal interests; clearly they will have nothing to do with our maximal demands, and (b) can Armenia resist such demands?

It is true that the defense of Armenia’s borders with Turkey are in Russia’s interests as well. But that does not mean that Russia will not extract concessions from us in return, as it has done since the beginning.

We have forgotten how we lost the First Republic of Armenia. There was the Turkish-Russian cooperation. There also was the pursuit of the Treaty of Sevres. Then, as now, we became obsessed with our dreams instead of focusing on the possible, and we lost part of what was possible. More, we lost our independence.

In other words, all of this was predictable and predicted.

Is it possible that the people who for over two decades could find no reason to expedite the resolution of the conflict have not thought of such a possibility? If they have not, that means they really have not understand the problem or have not taken the factors in play seriously enough. And if they have been thinking about these factors seriously but still refused to adopt a policy that responds to the situation, then they deserve a far more serious accusation. I will not go into details in this regard at this time.

I will add that to ascribe the responsibility for the failure of negotiations on Azerbaijan and Turkey alone is denying our own mistakes, to which we just added the adoption of the Treaty of Sevres as the foundation of our relations with our neighbors. I am confident that we have not done everything to normalize those relations. The “Armenian Case” mentality and revanchism seem to ensure that the list of these mistakes will grow longer and that we will not be thinking seriously as to what we must say and do and what we must not say or do to preserve our people and our statehood.

As has been the case with my earlier analyses, I do hope I am wrong. But as time goes I am more convinced that the scenario about which I have written and spoken a few times during the past decades, is already taking a clearer shape today.