Asia Times
by Richard Giragosian
Russia, Turkey and Iran all have big vested interests in the budding
armed conflict over Nagorno Karabakh
YEREVAN – Azerbaijan’s military offensive on the Armenia-controlled
Nagorno Karabakh enclave threatens to spiral quickly into a wider
regional conflict, one that pits Russia and Turkey in a volatile proxy
theater.
With each powerful regional actor aligned on opposed sides of the
fighting, the deeper contest between Moscow and Ankara is now set to
trigger what some analysts foresee as a monumental “clash of the
titans.”
As Azerbaijan’s offensive enters a third day, Karabakh Armenian forces
are engaged in an intense effort to defend territory and prevent any
breakthrough by the Azerbaijani side.
Armenia has reported more than 80 of their troops killed; Azerbaijan
has yet to release any official death toll for its soldiers. The UN
Security Council was set to meet on Tuesday for emergency talks on
Karabakh behind closed doors, diplomats told AFP.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Russia was monitoring the
situation closely and that the current priority was to “stop the
hostilities, not to deal with who is right and who is wrong.”
Tehran said it was ready “to use all of its capacities to establish a
ceasefire and start talks between the two sides,” with foreign
ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh calling for “an immediate end to
the conflict.”
But Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan demanded Armenia end its
“occupation” of Karabakh, whose ethnic Armenians declared a breakaway
republic following a war for autonomy in 1991.
“The time has come for the crisis in the region that started with the
occupation of Nagorno Karabakh to be put to an end,” Erdogan said.
“Now Azerbaijan must take matters into its own hands.”
Amid this dynamic situation, the stage is now set for a heated
competition between regional rivals.
The Karabakh triangle
The South Caucasus has long been a region of contest with a history of
submission and subjugation by larger powers. Over the centuries, the
Persians, Ottoman and Russian empires have all fought for conquest and
control of the area.
This geographic vulnerability in recent days was exposed once again,
as the renewed fighting over Karabakh invited a return of regional
power competition.
The modern replication of this geopolitical contest is between Russia
and Turkey, with Iran as an important yet understated and underrated
third party power. Each of these three regional players has vested
interests and valuable influence in the South Caucasus.
But with this latest outbreak of serious fighting, the risk of
outright war has likely sharpened their attention. From this
perspective of a “Karabakh triangle,” the geometry of the coming clash
reveals a complex and looming struggle for dominance.
Currently, Russia, Turkey and Iran remain vigilant and are reportedly
closely following events as they unfold on the battlefield. Of the
three, Turkey is the most active, however. Turkey’s support of its
Azerbaijan ally increased significantly several months earlier.
This acceleration in Turkish activity is mainly driven by a desire to
regain its former role as the leading military patron of Azerbaijan,
an objective that has only intensified in the wake of Turkish
frustration of having been supplanted by Russia and Israel in arms
sales to Azerbaijan.
By providing military training and equipment to their Azerbaijani
partner, Turkey has encouraged Azerbaijan to adopt a more assertive
and even aggressive posture vis-a-vis Armenia.
Recent military exercises under Turkish tutelage have fostered more
assertiveness within the Azerbaijani officer corps, which in turn has
arguably engendered a considerable degree of over-confidence among
rank and file soldiers.
Due to insufficient and inadequate unit cohesion, discipline and basic
training, the overall combat readiness of ordinary Azerbaijani
military forces is low.
Ironically, from the Turkish perspective, such military need and
necessity is preferred, as it only deepens the Azerbaijani military’s
dependence on Turkish assistance and guidance.
On a broader level, Turkey has also benefited from an apparent vacuum,
as Russian military overtures to Azerbaijan have been strictly limited
to large and expensive arms deals and the procurement of modern
offensive weapons systems.
Although this has been somewhat supplemented in recent years by a
Russian effort at cultivating ties to the senior ranks, the lack of
ties to lower levels such as unit commanders and mid-level officers
has provided Turkish military advisers and instructors with a clear
advantage.
The Russian edge
The second angle of this Karabakh triangle, Russia, holds distinct
advantages that surpass Turkish influence. Despite trepidation over
Russian ambitions in the region, Azerbaijan now sees Russia as the one
pivotal player in the Karabakh conflict.
This perception stems from several factors. First, Azerbaijan
recognizes that Moscow has seized the diplomatic initiative in the
Karabakh peace process, and that fellow mediators France and the US
have grudgingly ceded the diplomatic lead to Russia.
A second advantage for Russia is that not only does Armenia have no
real security alternative to Russia, but the greater the tension and
the more serious the threat from the fighting makes Armenia even more
dependent on Russian security promises.
Despite constant and consistent Russian pressure on the Armenian
government, there is a transactional nature to Armenian relations with
Russia, with Yerevan forced to bargain with Moscow often from a
position of weakness rather than strength.
Third, as demonstrated in earlier rounds of fighting, most notable in
April 2016, only Russia responded to renewed hostilities quickly and
effectively. This is also evident in the reality that the only
ceasefire agreements reached in the Karabakh conflict were brokered
with Russian involvement.
Over the longer term as well, Russia will be essential for any
eventual negotiated resolution to the Karabakh conflict. Moreover,
Russia will likely be the only regional actor capable of enforcing
peace and helping to ensure a durable “day after” any potential peace
deal.
Persian power
Looking to the future and beyond Turkey’s power projection and
Russia’s strategic advantages, Iran is the overlooked third element of
the Karabakh triangle. It is not only disingenuous to underestimate
Iran as a true rival regional actor, it is also dangerous.
More specifically, in the wake of the failure of Iran’s anticipated
westward turn after it’s now dead nuclear deal, Iran is now preparing
to return to the South Caucasus region.
But Iran’s underlying tension with the West will be less of a driver
for Iran in the South Caucasus, unlike Iraq and Syria for two notable
examples.
Rather, Iran’s looming return as a regional actor in the South
Caucasus will be motivated by a desire in Tehran to push back against
two key rivals and perceived interlopers: Russia and Turkey. This will
also be based on an appeal to Shiite Islam, seeking to both bully and
befriend Azerbaijan as a fellow Shiite state.
Moreover, Tehran will also be careful not to directly confront or
challenge either Ankara or Moscow, but rather will likely steadily
undermine and rely on subterfuge to erode its rivals’ positions in the
region.
In this regard, Iran will leverage its already sound relations with
its only stable and friendly neighbor, Armenia, and resist any
challenge from Azerbaijan as the leading Shiite “spokes-state” and
only theological Shiite state.
Against that backdrop, the next stage of fighting over Karabakh will
likely usher in a new and even more unpredictable period of
instability and insecurity in what some foresee as a coming clash of
regional titans.
