Asia Times


By MK Bhadrakumar
October 7, 2020

Nagorno-Karabakh's explosion of hostilities is much more than a
Turkish-Russian clash of wills


[The following is the first installment in a three-part series on the
regional power dynamics that produced the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
and the diplomatic efforts to contain it.]

Early into the renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in the
Transcaucasian region – also known as South Caucasus – it is becoming
clear that the binary narrative dished out by Western commentators of
this being a Turkish-Russian clash of wills and strategies is either
simply naive or purposively deceptive.

The point is, Russia and Turkey – and Iran in a somewhat supportive
role – are already proactively talking of negotiations involving the
warring sides.

September 30 was a turning point of sorts. Tehran had on the previous
day called on Azerbaijan and Armenia to settle their differences
peacefully and offered that along with Turkey and Russia, it could
help the two countries to resolve their dispute.


President Hassan Rouhani repeated this offer in a phone conversation
with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. According to the Iranian
account, Pashinyan responded positively that “any tension and conflict
would be to the detriment of all countries in the region and welcomed
any practical initiative to stop the violence.”

Armenia is a landlocked country and it depends on Iran to provide a
vital transportation route to the outside world. On its part, Tehran
kept up a warm relationship with Armenia – although its rival
Azerbaijan is a Muslim country – even supplying it with natural gas.

Tehran stuck to the friendly track even after the “color revolution”
in Armenia in 2018 and Pashinyan’s steady gravitation to the American
camp in the subsequent period, while also remaining a member of the
Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.


Iran has profound security concerns over Pashinyan’s recent diplomatic
exchanges with Israel – at the initiative of the White House – which
of course has brought the famed Israeli intelligence apparatus Mossad
right on to Iran’s northern borders, in addition to the potential
Mossad presence in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman on
Iran’s southern flank.

Turkey too has reason to be concerned over Israel’s activities in
Transcaucasia. Israel is virtually piggy-backing on the US-sponsored
color revolutions in Transcaucasia. After the US-sponsored color
revolution in Georgia in 2003, Israel overnight made its appearance in
Tbilisi. And the Israel-Georgia ties have since become very close.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu (R) is being welcomed by
officials upon his arrival at an airport in Baku, Azerbaijan, on
October 06, 2020. Photo: AFP/Resul Rehimov/Anadolu Agency

Despite the failure of the color revolution in Azerbaijan in mid-2005
and the sporadic attempts since then, Israel has developed close
“security cooperation” with that country.

Further north, Israel has developed special relations with Ukraine,
another progeny of the color revolution, which also has a president
who is an ethnic Jew who is actively involved also in the ongoing
color revolution in Belarus.

(The strange part is that notwithstanding the company that Israel
keeps in the Black Sea region, which is virulently anti-Russian, it
still enjoys exceptionally close ties with Russia.)

Both Turkey and Iran understand perfectly well why Israel attributes
such excessive importance to the three small countries of
Transcaucasia – total population 11 million – to establish a security
presence in that region with a view to create a “second front” against
its regional enemies – Ankara and Tehran.

(Israel has a record of links with Kurdish separatist groups too who
have ethnic links with Transcaucasia.)

Iran openly voiced its disquiet over Pashinyan’s decision to open
Armenia’s embassy in Israel, which in turn inspired then-US national
security adviser John Bolton to travel all the way to Yerevan, where
he openly took aim at Iran – and Russia. By the way, the Armenian
diaspora in the US is an influential constituency that Pashinyan
cannot ignore, either.

At any rate, demonstrations broke out in front of the Armenian Embassy
in Tehran soon after and senior Iranian officials cautioned Pashinyan.
An Iranian commentary remarked: “Tehran’s considerations … must be
taken into account.… On the other hand, Russia will undoubtedly oppose
the idea of using Armenia to promote security and economic influence.
It had already severely criticized Israel’s arms deal with Georgia and
the Republic of Azerbaijan.”

Clearly, Western analysts are obfuscating the US-Israeli nexus at work
in Transcaucasia. Both Ankara and Tehran have cause to worry that the
US might be the Israeli proxy in the Transcaucasia region – as has
been the case in the Middle East for decades – to weaken and roll back
the rising aspirations of the two regional powers.

Turkey-Iran axis in the making

With the destruction of Iraq and Syria and the weakening of Egypt,
Turkey (under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan) and Iran are the only
two authentic regional powers left standing in the Muslim Middle East
to defy the US regional strategies and to challenge Israel’s military
pre-eminence.

Significantly, the surge of the US-Israeli nexus in Transcaucasia
comes in the wake of the recent US-sponsored “peace agreements”
between Israel and three Gulf Arab states (the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain and Oman). Indeed, both Turkey and Iran have reacted strongly
to the development in the Persian Gulf region.

Just this week, the chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces,
Major-General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, explicitly warned the UAE that
Tehran would view that country as an “enemy” and act accordingly if
Abu Dhabi allowed any Israeli security presence on its soil.

Within a month of the Israel-UAE agreement, Erdogan held a
videoconference with Rouhani where he made a big opening statement
that “Turkey and Iran dialogue has a decisive role in the solution of
many regional problems. I believe that our cooperation will return to
its previous levels as the pandemic conditions alleviate.”

Rouhani responded that Turkish-Iranian relations are built on solid
foundations throughout history and the border between the two
“friendly and brotherly countries” has always been “the borders of
peace and friendship.” He stated that especially in the past seven
years, both governments had made great efforts based on bilateral,
regional and international cooperation.

Significantly, Rouhani added that the two countries are located in a
“sensitive region” of the Middle East and they are “the two great
powers of the region. There was hostility and vindictiveness towards
both countries. It also exists today. There is no way to be successful
against such conspiracies other than by reinforcing friendly relations
between the two countries.”

Sure enough, Israel has taken note of the nascent Turkey-Iran axis,
which also includes Qatar. A commentary in The Jerusalem Post noted
that in recent years Turkish-Iranian ties have “grown closer due to
joint opposition to the US and also Israel. Iran and Turkey both back
Hamas, for instance.” It wryly observed that the Middle Eastern
geopolitics built around the Shia-Sunni sectarian strife may have
outlived its utility.

Again, the Turkish state news agency Anadolu featured a commentary
last week titled New strategic design of Middle East, which pointed
out that the peace agreements in the Gulf bring out the schism between
the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain on one side and Qatar and Kuwait on
the other side. (Qatar is an ally of Turkey while Kuwait has friendly
ties with Iran.)

The commentary noted: “Arab countries seem to have lost both
confidence and a sense of unity; when the sense of confidence is
seriously damaged, it will be easier to put them at odds, and this
regional division, as everywhere, makes Arab countries and their
leaders dependent on external forces for their security and
existence.”

The Anadolu commentary then warmed up to its main theme, that the
so-called “normalization” agreement between the UAE and Israel “may be
a veiled effort not only to expand the imperial space but also to form
a bloc against Iran and Turkey in the Middle East.”

“Iran is a non-Arab country and seems an arch-enemy of the US and
Israel; Iran collaborates with Russia and China, the US’s arch-rivals,
and sometimes with Turkey, which may threaten both the US imperial
interest and Israeli security in the region. Hence Iran’s regional
power and influence should be jettisoned and driven into a corner.

“Turkey is a NATO country and seems a close US ally, [but] US policy
towards Turkey in the region is ambivalent, unclear, and elusive in
the sense that the US still continues to support the [Kurdish] YPG/PKK
terrorist group in Syria that has been carrying out terrorist acts
against Turkey and killing civilians for decades.

“Moreover, the US and Israel, though they seem friendly, do not want a
strong Turkey because a strong Turkey may influence Arab countries
particularly using Islam and then turn them against the exploitation
of the Middle East and its oil and resources by neo-imperial powers,
yet the US and other imperial power will never allow Turkey to easily
stand on its feet in the region.

“What they may prefer is that a weak and fragile Turkey, grappling
with its internal conflicts, will always serve their purpose.”

In the chronicles of the great game, seldom it is that the
protagonists speak up and opt for public diplomacy. The game,
historically, is played out quietly in the shade outside the pale of
public view. Turkey and Iran have decided otherwise.

Can it be a mere coincidence that the conflict in Transcaucasia, a
faraway region that borders both Turkey and Iran where Israel is
consolidating a security presence against them, erupted in such a
backdrop of new alignment that promises to redraw the geopolitics of
the Middle East?

M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.